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Tennis integrity: a sports law analytics review

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Abstract

Using the tools of sports law analytics, we examine several aspects of tennis’ integrity-preservation efforts. We address match-fixing, commercialized gambling ventures, data ownership legal issues, prize money and ranking rules, public relations pursuits, and the litigation history involving tennis gambling. We conclude that tennis integrity is a critical governance issue and offers ten recommendations for future policymaking.

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Notes

  1. See Brown (2016) for a similar conclusion.

  2. For a historical account dating back to the 1980’s, see Amdur (1981), Amdur (1982), Mewshaw (1983), and Mewshaw (2016). For more recent coverage, including revelations from 2003, see Assael (2008), Barr and Weinbaum (2008), Cohan (2011), Harris (2013a), Harris (2013b), Hruby (2013), Karp (2009), Price (2007), Robson (2014), Thomas (2014), and Ramos (2009). In addition, according to Morgan (2015), a Sportradar executive “[r]aised serious concerns over match-fixing in tennis.”

  3. Gunn and Rees (2008). Association of Tennis Professional Investigation (2008) was related to Gunn and Rees (2008). Davies (2012) provided an account of an infamous match that motivated Gunn and Rees (2008).

  4. Gunn and Rees (2008), p. 1.

  5. The TIU is located in London, England and has the same street address as the ITF. The TIU’s coverage is global. In addition to the four Grand Slam tournaments and top-tier WTA and ATP events, the TIU’s reach also extends to minor league professional tournaments sanctioned by the ITF. For example, TIU personnel took part in an on-site probe December 2015 at a USD $10,000 ITF “Futures” tournament in Tallahassee, Florida, USA. See generally Rodenberg (2015b).

  6. TIU (2016b). The TIU described the consultant’s work as part of an “Independent Review Panel (IRP).” The same press release stated: “The IRP has a wide-ranging remit to investigate all allegations of corrupt practice, including those that pre-date the formation of TIU. The governing bodies have unanimously committed to accept, act on and fund all recommendations of the IRP.” Rothenberg (2016b) provided details on the consultant hired to lead the IRP.

  7. Rodenberg and Feustel (2015) included a primer on sports law analytics methodology. In addition to a quantitative approach, we use archival research methods to obtain and analyze legal filings and quasi-legal documents in this context.

  8. In the second installment (“part two”), we use quantitative analysis to examine several discrete areas pertaining to tennis integrity, including both (i) gambling-related match-fixing and (ii) non-gambling match/tournament/ranking manipulation.

  9. Blake and Templon (2016a).

  10. Blake and Templon (2016a).

  11. Cox (2016a).

  12. Examples include Bryant (2016), Cambers (2016), Gibson (2016a), W.S. (2016), and Siegel and Packham (2016).

  13. Scott (2016).

  14. Garrison (2016).

  15. Blake and Templon (2016a).

  16. Blake and Templon (2016a).

  17. Blake and Templon (2016a).

  18. Willerton (2016). See also Blake and Templon (2016a).

  19. Luzzi et al. v. ATP et al (2009e).

  20. ATP (2001), p. 70.

  21. ATP (2001), p. 82–83.

  22. ATP (2007), p. 146–154. While the emphasis here is largely on player conduct, we note that the 2007 ATP rulebook also barred ATP tournament and executive staff from engaging “in any form of gambling or wagering in connection with any ATP or Challenger Series Tournament.” See ATP (2007), p. 126. Likewise, tennis umpires and linespeople are similarly bound to policies that prohibit tennis betting. See Ingle (2016a) and (2016b). The 2007 WTA rulebook included a comprehensive anti-corruption provision with a ban on wagering as well. See WTA (2007), p. 226–231. The anti-corruption provision in the ATP (2006) (p. 134–141) is near-identical to the analogous provision in the 2007 ATP rulebook.

  23. ATP (2007), p. 152.

  24. ATP (2007), p. 147.

  25. ATP (2007), p. 154. As such, while the TIU may have received legal advice that it was unable to retroactively apply 2008 or 2009 rules to conduct occurring in 2007 or earlier, there do not appear to have been any impediments (to the ATP and/or TIU) under the then-existing 2007 rules to investigate and punish conduct occurring in 2007, provided it was done within the statute of limitations. Indeed, in an affidavit dated 3 September 2010, ATP executive Mark Young stated that “[t]he ATP put into effect its Tennis Anti-corruption Program (the “Program”) on January 1, 2005.” Luzzi et al v. ATP et al (2009d). According to the same 2010 affidavit, the purpose of the Program was “to maintain the integrity of tennis and to protect against any efforts to impact improperly the results of any match.” Luzzi et al v. ATP et al (2009d).

  26. Besser and Stevens (2016).

  27. Besser and Stevens (2016).

  28. Besser and Stevens (2016).

  29. Besser and Stevens (2016).

  30. Besser and Stevens (2016).

  31. Culture, Media, and Sport Committee (2016). An official transcript of the hearing was made available to the public shortly after the hearing took place. All quotes and verbatim excerpts included in this paper are taken directly from the official transcript released in the public domain.

  32. On no fewer than three occasions during testimony, TIU executive Nigel Willerton referred to tennis as a “family.” During testimony, he also referenced TIU budget requests being forwarded to a “Tennis Integrity Board.” According Bodo (2016), the Tennis Integrity Board includes Philip Brook (Wimbledon), Steve Simon (WTA), David Heggarty (ITF), and Chris Kermode (ATP).

  33. There was an irreconcilable discrepancy between the answers provided by the TIU’s Nigel Willerton and the ATP’s Chris Kermode as to the sources of the TIU’s funding and the respective percentage shares thereof.

  34. Blake and Templon (2016d). The same article elaborated: “When the [TIU] was formed, the former detectives handed over the five ring-binder files of wider evidence implicating 28 players in suspicious matches. The 2008 team also warned the ATP about how corrupt players were winning their first set and going up a break in the second before tanking…”.

  35. Cox (2016b).

  36. TIU (2016a). In the same press release, the TIU stated: “The TIU had to engage legal counsel in Italy to obtain the information contained in Mr Di Martino’s investigation and is now listed as an Injured Party in the ongoing criminal proceedings.”

  37. TIU (2016a). The same press release claimed: “Tennis welcomes all and any new evidence that can assist the TIU in its work.”

  38. Blake and Templon (2016f). BuzzFeed’s response also queried: “Could you…confirm that you are investigating all 29 international players in the Cremona files?.”

  39. Blake and Templon (2016f).

  40. Holden and Rodenberg (2016).

  41. Preston and Szymanski (2003), p. 613. See Caruso (2009) for additional discussion.

  42. Riach (2016).

  43. Riach (2016).

  44. Holden and Rodenberg (2016).

  45. Holden and Rodenberg (2016).

  46. Holden and Rodenberg (2016).

  47. Holden and Rodenberg (2016). See also Holden and Rodenberg (2015).

  48. Holden and Rodenberg (2016).

  49. Holden and Rodenberg (2016).

  50. Luzzi et al v. ATP et al (2009a).

  51. Luzzi et al v. ATP et al (2009a). In the complaint, the plaintiffs also alluded to (i) a 2007 memorandum of understanding between the ATP and the European Sports Security Association and (ii) information sharing between the ATP and Interwetten. In an update to the purported list of names provided by Interwetten, Blake and Templon (2016f) wrote: “[TIU’s Nigel Willerton] said he had ‘no knowledge’ of the players on the gambling list handed over by Interwetten because ‘the matters you refer to occurred before the TIU was in operation.’” In Luzzi et al v. ATP et al (2009e), ATP executive Gayle Bradshaw said:

    “In 2007, the ATP entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (the “MOU”) with the European Sports Security Association (“ESSA”). The purpose of the MOU was to permit the ATP to obtain from ESSA information regarding online betting on tennis events by individuals subject to the Tennis Anti-Corruption Program.”

  52. Luzzi et al v. ATP et al. (2009b).

  53. Luzzi et al v. ATP et al (2009a). See Blake and Templon (2016b) and Harris (2013a) for a related discussion.

  54. Blake and Templon (2016e). Luzzi passed away prior to the commencement of the 2009 legal case.

  55. Luzzi et al v. ATP et al (2009c). According to the plaintiffs’ motion, numerous documents were designated “Confidential,” “Highly Confidential,” and “Professional Eyes Only – Highly Confidential.” See also Assael (2010), Drape (2010), and Kaplan (2011).

  56. Luzzi et al v. ATP et al. (2009f). See also Kaplan and Ourand (2010).

  57. Kaplan and Ourand (2010).

  58. Luzzi et al v. ATP et al. (2009g).

  59. Luzzi et al v. ATP et al. (2009h).

  60. Luzzi et al v. ATP et al (2009i).

  61. Luzzi et al v. ATP et al (2009i), p. 1.

  62. Luzzi et al v. ATP et al (2009i), p. 4.

  63. According to the court docket, the sealed documents in possession of the court were returned to the ATP’s lawyers on October 11, 2011.

  64. See Bialik (2014b), Soshnick (2015), Rodenberg (2015a), Gibson (2016b), and Futterman et al. (2016).

  65. Forrest and McHale (2007).

  66. Sportradar (2014).

  67. Wertheim (2016).

  68. Rodenberg et al (2015), p. 63.

  69. Rodenberg et al (2015), p. 67, n. 10.

  70. The term “courtsider” is used to describe a person who transmits data in real-time for gambling purposes.

  71. Hutchins (2014), p. 207.

  72. Hutchins (2014), p. 248–249.

  73. Rodenberg (2015a). Ferguson (2014) and Hogg (2016) analyze the differences between courtsiding and match-fixing. Bishop and Martin (2014) highlighted some of tennis authorities’ concerns regarding courtsiding.

  74. Rodenberg (2015a), Rodenberg (2015b), and Rodenberg et al. (2015).

  75. Rodenberg et al. (2015).

  76. Rodenberg (2015a).

  77. See Futterman et al (2016). Tennis is far from the only sport to exploit the commercial nature of gambling. For an overview of gambling-related connections in American professional sports, see Fainaru et al. (2016).

  78. ITF (2012). The 2012 press release stated: “This unique and unprecedented partnership opens up new horizons in the realization of exciting new live betting products and enables us to provide a 24/7/365 Live Tennis betting offer for over 65,000 matches per year.” Sportradar’s gambling-focused subsidiary is called Betradar.

  79. Soshnick (2015) wrote: “At $14 million a year, that’s a 500 percent increase over Sportradar’s original deal with the ITF…”.

  80. IMG Programming (2015). From Kaplan (2014): the “ATP and WTA tour have agreed to renew their live-scoring deal with IMG-owned Enetpulse with a six-year extension valued at more than $30 million. The deal gives Enetpulse the rights to all ATP and WTA live scores, and it sells that information largely to gambling companies.”

  81. Betgenius (2012):

    “Betgenius Limited is pleased to announce their exclusive partnership agreement with Enetpulse, a subsidiary of IMG Media, and partner of the ATP and WTA data rights holders for the sports gaming industry. IMG have completed the transaction with Enetpulse and via that transaction now control the exclusive ATP Tour and WTA Tour tennis data right for the sports gaming industry. Betgenius have subsequently agreed [to] a four year exclusive partnership with Enetpulse for the provision of tennis trading services to their tennis data clients.”

  82. Wertheim (2011).

  83. Associated Press (2015).

  84. Gibson (2016b).

  85. Rodenberg (2015a).

  86. Rossingh (2014b).

  87. Opta (2016).

  88. The four Grand Slam tournaments have had a long-running agreement with IBM, although there is no public domain information as to whether such arrangement includes data dissemination to gambling operators. In Snyder (2015), the deal was described as follows: “IBM has a near-monopoly on data and pro tennis, with engagements at the U.S. Open, Wimbledon, the Australian Open, and the French Open.” We were unable to find any publicly available information evidencing the data link between the four Grand Slams and sportsbooks offering pre-match and real-time tennis wagering. As such, Fig. 3 is silent on the issue.

  89. See Duggan and Levitt (2002), Preston and Szymanski (2003), Caruso (2009), Hill (2013), and Feustel and Rodenberg (2015). For a survey outside of sports, see Zitzewitz (2012). Match-fixing can also be modeled generally. See Bag and Saha (2011), Holden and Rodenberg (2015), Saha (2015), Bag and Saha (2016a, b).

  90. In the second installment of this manuscript (“part two”), we add to the literature on this topic.

  91. Blake and Templon (2016c).

  92. Gunn and Rees (2008). We are unaware of the details of any investigation pertaining to one or more of the 45 pinpointed matches.

  93. Jetter and Walker (2015).

  94. Andreoli-Bersbach (2012).

  95. Brown and Minor (2014).

  96. Rodenberg and Feustel (2014).

  97. Brown (2011).

  98. Pijeltovic (2012).

  99. Lavigne and Pattani (2011).

  100. Berlincioni (2016): “I honestly thought that, after all the attention created by the [BBC-BuzzFeed] inquiry, players would have been more quiet and the match-fixing would have decreased. I was wrong.”

  101. Dorward (2016).

  102. See Bernhardt and Heston (2010), Borghesi (2015), and Feustel and Rodenberg (2015) for an academic review of the concerns.

  103. Forrest et al (2008).

  104. Culture, Media, and Sport Committee (2016).

  105. Gunn and Rees (2008), p. 4.

  106. While we conclude that tennis integrity is a critical governance issue and offer ten recommendations for future policymaking, we simultaneously note that sports governance and related policymaking are not the law itself.

  107. Indeed, as recent rule changes for ranking points, wild cards, and lucky losers demonstrate, rule changes can be made relatively quickly to either address an incentive problem or close an integrity-attacking loophole.

  108. For example, “both the WTA and ATP have adopted player ranking systems where certain tournaments do not count once the player reaches a certain threshold.” Rodenberg and Feustel (2014), p. 79–80.

  109. See Aubone (2016), McGee (2013), and Tisparavic (2012). Cambers (2012) quoted former top-10 ranked player Ivan Ljubicic as saying he “pleaded” with bookmakers not to offer certain tennis betting options.

  110. See Dorward (2014b), Moss (2014a), Moss (2014b), Bialik (2011), Bialik (2014a), Blickenstaff (2016), Oddo (2013), Robson (2012), Robson (2013), Rodenberg and Feustel (2014), Rossingh (2014a), Rothenberg (2014), Rothenberg (2015), Cicenia (2016), and Ingle (2016c). While our primary focus is on player-level issues, we recognize the relevant role of tennis umpires, linespeople, trainers, tournament personnel, and broadcasters as well. For example, Forrest, et al (2008) wrote: “There are some actors, namely referees, whose rewards are relatively small but who may be the target of fixers because of their capacity to influence match outcomes.”

  111. McKenzie-Murray (2016). For additional detail on some of the “prices” to fix tennis matches, see Rothenberg (2016a).

  112. Wertheim (2016) quoted industry expert Scott Ferguson on this topic:

    “[T]he real economic challenge to tennis is fighting the incentive structure, and dealing with the disparity between low levels of prize money and high levels of betting. We have no glib solution but, as things stand now, the math is grim. Gamblers can make tens of thousands of dollars betting on players who are competing for $104 in prize money? That’s an invitation to an all-you-can-eat buffet.”

  113. Cambers (2013).

  114. In this connection, tennis tournaments should consider the usefulness and legal implications from the practice of posting signs informing spectators that they are banned from using mobile devices to send text messages and use social media.

  115. Ferguson (2014).

  116. Wilson (2016) quoted ITF executive David Heggarty saying “…those unusual patterns don’t mean anything happened. We don’t have the evidence.”

  117. As stated in TIU (2016c): “The TIU has committed to publishing headline figures from the Match Alert data it receives from the betting industry, on a regular quarterly basis. Memorandums of Understanding with regulators and operators worldwide, provides alert data triggered by what is regarded by the betting industry as unusual or suspicious activity around a match. There is no industry standard set of indicators for match alerts. Different operators use different trigger points, meaning that one company may issue an alert on a particular match, but another will not.” Also from TIU (2016c): “The 48 alerts are a combined aggregate of all alerts received from the betting industry and represent the most accurate and comprehensive data for the sport. In some cases, alerts are received from a number of operators on the same match. For the purposes of TIU assessment, follow up and reporting, these are treated as a single alert.”

  118. In the same interview, Wilson (2016) quoted ITF executive David Heggarty as saying: “And the ITF itself has created its own independent integrity department.”

  119. From Rodenberg and Feuestel (2014), p. 80: “an inherent conflict of interest arises when the same entity charged with management and marketing also polices the sport through anti-corruption efforts.”

  120. This is particularly important given the concerns raised by a TIU attorney in Riach (2016). Likewise, we acknowledge that this suggestion carries with it important privacy and human rights considerations irrespective of narrow legal differences between jurisdictions.

  121. Whether such activity violates the Wire Act in the USA or related laws in other jurisdictions is beyond the scope of this paper. See Rodenberg et al. (2015).

  122. See Ingle (2016a) for details on how this occurred.

  123. Culture, Media, and Sport Committee (2016), Young.

  124. Indeed, Riach (2016) quoted Ben Gunn, a co-author of Gunn and Rees (2008) as saying: “The transparency of the Tennis Integrity Unit leaves something to be desired.” Likewise, TIU executive Nigel Willerton confirmed during 2016 testimony that he (Willerton) was “personally committed to greater transparency in the TIU.”

  125. Culture, Media, and Sport Committee (2016), Kermode.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Florida State University, 139 Chieftan Way #1016, Tallahassee, FL, 32306, USA

    Ryan M. Rodenberg

  2. Spokane, WA, USA

    Jeff Sackmann

  3. Knoxville, TN, USA

    Chris Groer

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  1. Ryan M. Rodenberg
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  2. Jeff Sackmann
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Correspondence to Ryan M. Rodenberg.

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Rodenberg, R.M., Sackmann, J. & Groer, C. Tennis integrity: a sports law analytics review. Int Sports Law J 16, 67–81 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40318-016-0096-x

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