Abstract
A substantial literature on risk perception demonstrates the limits of human rationality, especially in the face of catastrophic risks. Human judgment, it seems, is flawed by the tendency to overestimate the magnitude of rare but evocative risks, while underestimating risks associated with commonplace dangers. Such findings are particularly relevant to the problem of crafting responsible public policy in the face of the kinds of threat posed by climate change. If the risk perception of ordinary citizens cannot be trusted, then it would seem logical to base policy decisions on expert judgment. But how rational, how trustworthy, are expert assessments of catastrophic risk? I briefly review the limitations of conventional models of expert risk analysis, especially in dealing with the large uncertainties endemic to the risk of low-probability, high-impact events in the distant future. The challenges such events pose to the underlying assumptions of these analyses are severe enough to question their basic rationality. I argue that a conception of rationality premised on the bounded knowledge of experts and lay citizens alike, based on context-appropriate heuristics, may help us in the search for a more trustworthy basis for decision making.
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Notes
Which is of course not to deny the enormous variability existing among individual responses.
It would of course be implausible to suppose that the actual methods employed in expert analyses are the products of biological evolution; rather, the implication here is that biological evolution endowed us with the capacities for such forms of reasoning.
For example, rational choice theory has been extensively criticized for its focus on self-interest, neglect of values, and for its neglect of the plurality (and often incommensurability) of human goals (see, e.g., Sen 1977; Nussbaum 1997; Nelson 2006); cost–benefit analyses for their failure to take into account the fact that costs and benefits are differentially distributed, with some paying the lion’s share of the costs, and others reaping the lion’s share of the benefits (see, e.g., Broome 2001); for the very effort of putting a dollar value on human welfare (see, e.g., Nussbaum and Sen 1993; Sagoff 2008).
A parallel to recent developments in computer science suggests itself: computer chips that process certain kinds of data (especially visual data) with less precision than existing chips, but with orders of magnitude greater efficiency (see, e.g., Hardesty 2010 ).
One problem that he does not discuss is that efforts to exercise precaution will, if successful, by definition appear in retrospect as having been unnecessary. That is to say, they will be particularly vulnerable to the cognitive bias that comes with hindsight: they will seem not to have been needed just because their effect was to avoid the feared catastrophe. Taleb gives the example of the recommendation that might have been made prior to 9/11, and might even have been taken seriously—namely, to impose locks on cockpit doors. That person, Taleb writes, “gets no statues in public squares, not so much as a quick mention of his contribution in his obituary. ‘Joe Smith, who helped avoid the disaster of 9/11, died of complications of liver disease.’Seeing how superfluous his measure was, and how it squandered resources, the public, with great help from airline pilots, might well boot him out of office. Voxclamantis in deserto.He will retire depressed, with a great sense of failure” (2007, Chap. 1; http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/22/books/chapters/0422-1st-tale.html?pagewanted=3&_r=1&ei=5070&en=bdae1078f2b4a98c&ex=1178769600, accessed 10 Oct 2009).
Indeed, the confidence with which policy analysts have accepted the application of conventional standards of economic rationality to the particular problems posed by climate change seems something of a puzzle to me, especially given the mounting criticism of these standards that we have begun to see among economists themselves, and especially in comparison with the scrutiny under which the claims of climate scientists have recently been put. Perhaps it is time to put economists to the same kind of scrutiny.
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Keller, E.F. Assessing Risk in the Absence of Quantifiability. Biol Theory 10, 228–236 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-015-0211-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-015-0211-5