Abstract
Many of the existing ethical analyses of genetic engineering technologies (GET) focus on how they can be used to enhance individuals—to improve individual well-being, health and cognition. There is a gap in the current literature about the specific ways enhancement technologies could be used to improve our populations and species, viewed as a whole. In this paper, I explore how GET may be used to enhance the species through improvements in the gene pool. I argue one aspect of the species that may be desirable to enhance is ‘persistence’ or long-term viability. I then look at some of the ways in which GET could be used to improve human persistence and argue that the use of GET to secure benefits for individuals may compromise persistence. This suggests conflicts between uses of GET to enhance individuals and uses to promote the persistence of the species may occur. As GET are further developed, the likelihood that these conflicts will actually arise, and how we should resolve them if they do, will need to be considered.
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Notes
Under the ESC, a species may technically become extinct when they split into two separate lineages (Wiley 1978). Theoretically then, one way that the human species may become extinct is by splitting into distinct daughter species which then evolve separately. In this paper, I do not consider this type of event as affecting human persistence under the ESC. This is because the central reason that I believe we have to value the persistence of the evolutionary species (the continued existence of persons) is likely to hold in cases of lineage splitting. When I talk about the persistence of the evolutionary species, I mean the persistence of our lineage even if it splits and takes a branching form.
Some theories imply there would be little or no value in human persistence. For example, Benatar (2006) argues for an asymmetrical theory of personal goods, according to which we harm people by causing the bad aspects of their lives, but we do not benefit them by causing the good aspects of their lives. It follows that it is wrong to create new humans and prolong the existence of the species. This theory has been criticised elsewhere (Harman 2009; Brown 2011). For the purpose of this paper, I will assume that this theory and others which imply that, in general, human lives contain more negative than positive value or that positive value cannot offset negative value are false.
It is often claimed that certain non-human animals, such as dolphins and great apes, also meet the criteria for personhood that have been stipulated here—rationality and self-awareness (for example see DeGrazia 2006). This is controversial and depends on how these properties are defined and what methods are considered to legitimately demonstrate them in other animals. At least some definitions of rationality, for instance, imply that it is a property confined to hominids (Sterelny 2006).
It should be noted that the change in the colouration of the peppered moth is widely considered to be an example of change occurring within a species (Starr and Taggart 2001). It is unlikely to have constituted a speciation event, under either of the species concepts defined above.
Note that the effect of genetic diversity on phenotypic diversity will differ depending on environmental circumstances. A given genotype can produce a range of phenotypes, depending on environmental conditions—referred to as ‘norms of reaction’. In one environment, the diversity of a gene pool may have a large effect on phenotypic diversity; in another, it may only have a small effect. The effect of genetic diversity on persistence can, therefore, be variable depending on environmental conditions.
The adaptive landscape is a topographic representation of the relationship between genotypes/phenotypes and their fitness value. Peaks in the landscape represent genotypes/phenotypes that have high fitness value, and valleys represent low fitness values.
For example, ‘dead clade walking’ refers to a phenomenon in which some groups of organisms that suffer population losses in mass extinction do not participate in post-recovery diversifications (Jablonski 2002). As a result, some species never fully recover from the drop in population and become highly susceptible to extinction.
Similar points can be made about attempting to use GET to increase persistence with imperfect knowledge. If we attempt to maximize persistence early in the development GET when only a few options are available, there is a danger that we will over-exploit certain genotypes. This may ultimately reduce persistence by limiting exploration.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Michael Selgelid, Kim Sterelny, two anonymous reviewers for Philosophy and Technology and the editors of this special issue for comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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Gyngell, C. Enhancing the Species: Genetic Engineering Technologies and Human Persistence. Philos. Technol. 25, 495–512 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-012-0086-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-012-0086-3