Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading
- Leon de BruinAffiliated withInstitute for Philosophy II, Ruhr-University of Bochum Email author
- , Derek StrijbosAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, Radboud University Nijmegen
- , Marc SlorsAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, Radboud University Nijmegen
According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make sense of implicit false belief understanding in terms of keeping track of affordances.
- Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading
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- Available under Open Access This content is freely available online to anyone, anywhere at any time.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Volume 2, Issue 3 , pp 499-517
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- Springer Netherlands
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