Abstract
In this paper, I argue that how a mind can come to be about an object and how the world is independently of the workings of any mind are inextricably linked. Hence, epistemology, at its most basic, and metaphysics are systematically related. In order to demonstrate the primary thesis of the paper, I first articulate two contrary accounts of the nature of reality and then two contradictory general views of intentionality. I argue that these positions can be combined in only two ways. This argument turns on the impossibility of there being an object that cannot, in principle, be thought of or referred to, so I present reasons for thinking such a thing cannot exist. The upshot is that there are but two intentional-cum-ontological positions, that is, two unified positions regarding how a mind relates to the world and what the world is like in itself. This might be surprising, for one might have thought that the views in the different domains were independent; it is significant, because it shows that views that might have seemed related by mere affinity are, in fact, necessarily conjoined. I conclude by presenting reasons for thinking one of the two intentional-cum-ontological positions is untenable.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
The name is derived from the work of D.C. Williams, whose influence on twentieth century philosophy is largely unappreciated. His explicit Humean metaphysical views predate and seem to inform the views of those whose influence is more recognized, in particular, Quine, his long-time colleague at Harvard, and David Lewis, a graduate student at Harvard while Williams was there. See Williams (1986 (1959), 1966).
See Sidelle (1992: p. 284).
Sidelle (1989: p. 54, Note 11).
For a similar view, see Jubien (1993: pp. 1–7). This is the view that also seems to underlie (Goodman 1977). Conscious beings are, of course, themselves a kind of object, so there is a deep and, I suspect, irresolvable tension on this version of empirical realism. I revisit this important point in the final section.
(Williams 1986 (1959): p. 2)
(Lewis 1986: ix). These “qualia in relations” and “local matters of fact” are, presumably, just the ontological correlates of Humean impressions.
This view of reality motivates the work of several influential philosophers. It is explicit in Lewis, the basis of his Humean supervenience, and tacit in Quine (see, for example, Quine 1969). It also underlies the work of Theodore Sider (see Sider 2011, 2009) and seems to underlie that of Eli Hirsch (see Hirsch 1993, 2002, 2009). In correspondence, Hirsch has rejected this underlying ontology; his reasons for doing so, however, seem to me to indicate that it is just this ontology he is employing.
It should be noted that Sider maintains that there is “structure” in mind-independent reality. See Sider (2011: Chapter 2) and Sider (2009: pp. 397–402). However, Sider’s use of this term differs from mine. Whereas Sider takes structure to be primitive, I believe it is usefully defined in terms of necessary constraints among objects or natured entities more generally.
Of course, even if substantial realism is correct, there might be no explanation for any original arrangement of objects, but this is beside the point.
Michelle Montague calls the task of answering the primary question of intentionality the access problem. See Montague (2013). Although I disagree with the conclusion of her paper, I benefited greatly from reading it. Montague uses the terms “internal” and “external” to distinguish two common approaches to the access problem. As seen below, my choice of names for the two opposing ways of answering the primary question of intentionality has been influenced by her terminology.
See Davidson (2007).
If one has a view of the mental that is incompatible with a mind generating such a condition, then—if one accepts empirical realism—determinate cognitive engagement with the world is not possible. It is such a (behaviorist) view of the mental that, combined with his empirical realism, yields Quine’s concerns about the “inscrutability of reference” and attendant concerns about the determinacy of meaning. See Quine (1960: Chapter 2).
See, for example, Salmon (1986: pp. 4–5).
The above argument relies on familiar logical assumptions about the truth of existentially quantified sentences, variables, and assignments of values to variables. Though I take it to be provocative, I do not take it to be controversial. To forestall contention, I make some supplementary comments: in the sentence, “There is at least one thing such that it is P,” the variable “it” is bound and therefore not a referring expression. [Most accept that a bound occurrence of a variable is not a referential expression, and so I concede the point here. However, Nathan Salmon presents reasons for thinking the point is incorrect. See Salmon (2006).] Nevertheless, in order for this sentence to be true, “it is P” must be true (on some assignment of a value to “it”); a free occurrence of a variable, given an assignment of a value to that variable, is universally taken to be a referring expression, one that refers to its value relative to that assignment. Hence, its value is an entity that can be referred to. Moreover, I do not take the above argument to show, by merely logical means, that one can establish a singular cognitive connection to every existent entity. I am not claiming, then, that “it” is a proper name of some entity or that one can derive or stipulate a genuine proper name for any entity that makes true “it is P” relative to an assignment of that entity to the variable “it.” I do not need to make this much stronger claim, for my purpose here is merely to show that there cannot be an entity that cannot, by any means, be referred to (and, hence, is the sort of thing that in some context can be thought of).
I would like to thank Phillip Bricker and Nathan Salmon for much helpful discussion of the preceding argument. Their criticism enabled significant improvements in its articulation.
The argument that there can be no necessarily elusive entity is redolent of what has come to be called Berkeley’s “Master Argument.” [This name is coined in Gallois (1974).] This argument which appears in similar forms in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (at §§22-23) and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonus (at page 200 of the Luce and Jessop edition) is supposed to show that there could not be a perceivable object that is not perceived. Since anything perceivable is the sort of thing that can be thought of, for the purposes of the present discussion, one can take Berkeley’s conclusion to be that there could not be an object that could be thought of that is not being thought of. Stating the conclusion in this way makes clear not only that it is different from the one in the text above but also that it is independent of that conclusion. One can accept that there can be no necessarily elusive entity and yet that there are things that could be thought of, but in fact are not. Indeed, I endorse the latter claim in the preamble to my argument, when I presume that there are any number of entities that have yet to be discovered and might never be. [I, like many others, have not been convinced by the Master Argument. For a helpful overview of responses to this argument, see Saidel (1993).] One can also accept the conclusion of the Master Argument and yet maintain (wrongly) that there can be a necessarily elusive entity; there is nothing in the former argument that tells against there being a thing that, in principle, could not be thought of. Note that if Berkeley’s Master Argument is to support his view that to be is to be perceived, it must be shown that there is nothing that exists yet could not be thought of, that is, that there is no necessarily elusive entity. It is only in conjunction with this claim that the Master Argument supports the conclusion that a thing must be perceived (and, hence, thought of) to exist. Thus, it seems that Berkeley is taking for granted that there could be no necessarily elusive entity—a conclusion for which I provide an argument.
I would like to thank an anonymous referee for urging me to explore the connections between my argument that there cannot be a necessarily elusive entity and Berkeley’s Master Argument. The referee also observed that the former is also suggestive of certain semantic paradoxes. However, a consideration of these connections here would, it seems to me, take the discussion afield.
I add this qualification lest it be possible to think of or refer to, in some general way, every existent entity when one considers a claim like everything that exists is self-identical.
Nota bene: the entities under consideration here are ones that are supposed to have merely not been thought of (or referred to); they are not supposed to be entities that, in principle, cannot be thought of or referred to. In this important respect, they differ from the putative entities considered in the previous section. Note, as well, that given the further, forthcoming assumption about the nature of the entity under consideration—to wit, that it is a thing distinguishable only by some property unknown to any thinker (or speaker)—it does not seem possible to show, along the lines of the argument in the previous section, that this entity is being thought of (or referred to) or must be able to be. In particular, the property being the unique entity distinguishable only by some property unknown to any thinker (or speaker) is not unknown to any speaker (or thinker) and so would not distinguish the relevant entity.
For the distinction between epistemic and ontological individuation, see Lowe (2003).
See, for instance, Salmon (1986).
See Kripke (1980).
See Lowe (2007).
There is an interesting connection here to Tyler Burge’s discussion of de re belief in Burge (1977) (especially §II). Burge’s understanding of de re belief seems to be clearly intentionally externalist, allowing for a cognitive relation between a subject and the world without that subject’s mind first presenting features by which it fits that to which it is to be related. Burge argues that de re attitudes are necessary for any use or understanding of language and any propositional attitudes at all. So, Burge considers cases in which initial reference occurs, specifically, when one is first acquiring a language (and cognitive capacities). The tacit substantial realism underlying Burge’s discussion indicates a close connection between this account of the world in itself and intentional externalism—a connection that supports the one made in the text.
Note that it will not do for the empirical realist to maintain that the only objects in the world with natures are minds. This is not merely ad hoc, but incompatible with the definitive feature of empirical realism. The presence of any natured entity would impose constraints on whatever interacted with it, thereby yielding structure. Yet empirical realism is a view of reality on which it is bereft of structure.
“What is a Thing?” (manuscript)
References
Balaguer, M. (2011). Is there a fact of the matter between direct reference theory and (neo-)Fregeanism? Philosophical Studies, 154, 53–78.
Burge, T. (1977). Belief de re. The Journal of Philosophy, 74, 338–362.
Caplan, B. (2007). Sense and direct reference, in (Davidson 2007).
Carnap, R. (1950). Empiricism, semantics, and ontology. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 4, 20–40.
Chalmers, D. (Ed.). (2002a). Philosophy of mind: classical and contemporary readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. (2004). Epistemic two-dimensional semantics. Philosophical Studies, 118, 153–226.
Chalmers, D. (2002b). The components of content, in (Chalmers 2002a).
Chalmers, D. (2006). The foundations of two-dimensional semantics, in (Garcia-Carpintero and Macia 2006) .
Chalmers, D., Manley, D., & Wasserman, R. (Eds.). (2009). Metametaphysics: new essays on the foundations of ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davidson, M (ed.). (2007). On sense and direct reference (McGraw Hill) .
Elder, C. (2004). Real natures and familiar objects. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Forbes, G. (1987). Review of Nathan Salmon’s Frege’s puzzle. Philosophical Review, 96, 455–458.
Gallois, A. (1974). Berkeley’s master argument. The Philosophical Review, 83, 55–69.
Garcia-Carpintero, M., & Macia, J. (Eds.). (2006). Two-dimensional semantics: foundations and applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goodman, N. (1977). Ways of worldmaking. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
Hirsch, E. (1993). Dividing reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hirsch, E. (2002). Quantifier variance and realism. Philosophical Issues, 12, 51–73.
Hirsch, E. (2009). Ontology and alternative languages, in (Chalmers, Manley and Wasserman 2009) .
Jackson, F. (1998a). From metaphysics to ethics: a defence of conceptual analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jackson, F. (1998b). Reference and description revisited. Philosophical Perspectives, 12, 201–218.
Jackson, F. (2007). Reference and description from the descriptivists’ corner. Philosophical Books, 48, 17–26.
Jubien, M. (1993). Ontology, modality and the fallacy of reference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kriegel, U. (Ed.). (2013a). Phenomenal intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kriegel, U. (2013b). The phenomenal intentionality research program, in Kriegel 2013a.
Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Lewis, D. (1986). Philosophical papers, volume II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Loux, M., & Zimmerman, D. (Eds.). (2003). The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lowe, E.J. (2003). Individuation, in (Loux and Zimmerman 2003).
Lowe, E. J. (2007). Does the descriptivist/anti-descriptivist debate have any philosophical significance? Philosophical Books, 48, 27–33.
Montague, M. (2013). The access problem, in (Kriegel 2013a).
Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Quine, W. V. O. (1969). Ontological relativity and other essays. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rea, M. (2002). World without design: the ontological consequences of naturalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Saidel, E. (1993). Making sense of Berkeley’s challenge. History of Philosophy Quarterly, 10, 325–339.
Salmon, N. (1986). Frege’s puzzle. Cambridge: Bradford Books, MIT Press.
Salmon, N. (2006). A theory of bondage. Philosophical Review, 115, 415–448.
Salmon, N. (1990). A Millian heir rejects the wages of Sinn, in Anderson and Owens 1990.
Sidelle, A. (1989). Necessity, essence, and individuation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Sidelle, A. (1992). Identity and the identity-like. Philosophical Topics, 20, 269–292.
Sider, T. (2011). Writing the book of the world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sider, T. (2009). Ontological realism, in (Chalmers, Manley and Wasserman 2009).
Smith, A. D. (1988). Review of Nathan Salmon’s Frege’s puzzle. Mind, 97, 136–137.
Soames, S. (2005). Reference and description. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wagner, S. (1986). California semantics meets the great fact. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 27, 430–455.
Williams, D. C. (1966). Principles of empirical realism: philosophical essays. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher.
Williams, D.C. (1986 (1959)). Universals and existents, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64:1-14
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the LOGOS Research Group at the Universitat de Barcelona, in particular Max Kölbel and Sven Rosenkranz, for stimulating discussion of some of the ideas underlying this paper. I would like to thank Genoveva Martí for her invitation to present to the group and for her questions and comments during my presentation and afterwards. I would like to thank, as well, the audience at my colloquium at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, especially Phillip Bricker, to whom I presented an ancestor of this paper and the audience at my colloquium at the University of California, Santa Barbara, to whom I presented the paper in its present form. I am also very grateful to Crawford Elder, John Heil, Amie Thomasson, and especially, Nathan Salmon for insightful written comments on that ancestor; to Ted Sider and Eli Hirsch for helpful correspondence; and to Elanor Taylor and an anonymous referee for written comments on the present version of the paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Fiocco, M.O. Intentionality and Realism. Acta Anal 30, 219–237 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-015-0265-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-015-0265-9