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Confronting Coup Risk in the Latin American Left

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Abstract

Military coups d'état have become dramatically less frequent in Latin America over the past 20 years, leading many analysts to conclude that the risk of coups in the region today is negligible. Yet we observe that a particular subset of presidents in the region—namely, those commonly associated with the radical left—pursue a wide range of “coup-proofing” behaviors, primarily in the way that they manage relations with their militaries, but also in their political rhetoric. Our goal in this article is to explain why some Latin American presidents spend precious resources on coup-proofing. First, even as we demonstrate that coup activity is significantly diminished across the region as a whole, we offer evidence to suggest that coup risk is quite real in countries with radical left presidents. Second, we identify several specific strategies that these presidents have pursued to minimize coup risk. We explain the coup-proofing rationale behind each of these strategies and document their use in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador. Third, we show that no similar set of strategies or policies has been pursued by moderate leftist or more conservative presidents in the region. We infer from these empirical patterns that radical left presidents have undertaken substantial efforts to maintain military allegiance and to mitigate coup risk precisely because they recognize the possibility of military intervention. In our conclusion, we suggest that these strategies may confer a short-term benefit for the presidents who implement them, but they are likely to have negative consequences for the long-term stability of democratic institutions.

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Notes

  1. For the purposes of this paper, we define Latin America to include the 17 major continental republics as well as Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic; we do not discuss the English-speaking Caribbean or Caribbean microstates.

  2. There is strong consensus in the literature regarding the distinction between the moderate and radical left in Latin America. We concur with Kurt Weyland’s definition of the radical left (which he calls the “contestatory” left): “the moderate current tempers its pursuit of leftist goals prudently, respecting economic constraints and political opposition…By contrast, the more radical wing challenges neoliberalism, defies strictures of globalization, and attacks the political opposition” (see Weyland (2010, 3)).

  3. Coup incidence and coup risk are conceptually distinct. The former refers to an actual event, and is directly observable. The latter is an abstract concept that is not directly observable; coup risk therefore must be estimated or inferred from available evidence. See for example Belkin and Schofer (2003, 595) and Fitch (1998, xv).

  4. The most recent Latin American event recorded as a successful coup in this dataset is Fujimori’s “autogolpe” in Peru in 1992. The codebook lists Gutiérrez’s ouster in Ecuador (2005) and Zelaya’s in Honduras (2009) as cases of “resignation of executive due to poor performance/loss of authority,” thus explicitly excluding them from the set of coups. Presently, we discuss the possibility that these cases are miscoded.

  5. As late as May 2011, several Latin American countries had still refused to recognize the Lobo government and Honduras was only readmitted into the OAS in June of that year.

  6. We consider Nicaragua and Paraguay to be marginal cases that might also be fruitfully considered part of the radical left. But policy making under Daniel Ortega is more erratic, and Paraguay’s President Lugo was constrained by his dependence on centrist coalition partners, making the status of these cases more ambiguous. Neither our definition of the “radical left” nor our classification of cases should be controversial, as the literature on this point has reached a high level of consensus. See Weyland (2010, 3). See also Castañeda (2006), Cleary (2006), Flores-Macías (2010), and Madrid (2010).

  7. For the first two incidents, see Valenzuela (2004); on the third incident, Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas (2010) suggest that the military facilitated Gutiérrez’s fall from power by declining to intervene against a massive protest movement.

  8. Data are not available for Costa Rica, Haiti, and Panama. We calculate 5-year averages to smooth over the relatively high variability across years but the pattern evident in the table is robust to other methods of comparison. And as we discuss below, the pattern is even stronger when we look at individual cases, to trace the timing of spending increases relative to the presidential accessions of Chávez, Morales, and Correa.

  9. On September 30, 2010, members of the Ecuadorian police and military demonstrated against a “law that would reduce their benefits and slow salary increases.” Correa confronted the demonstrators in person, found himself in physical danger, and escaped to a police hospital. He was rescued by the military that evening. See Romero (2010c).

  10. These military reforms are rooted in a clause from the 1999 constitution that cleared the path for political advocacy within the military. See Brewer-Carias 2010, 130–133.

  11. James translates the slogan as “Socialist homeland or death! We will be victorious!”

  12. These terms can be translated as “coup-plotter,” “counter-revolutionaries,” “fascists,” “the bourgeoisie,” “the oligarchy,” “destabilizers,” “the secessionist movement,” and “assassins.”

  13. The transcripts for Aló Presidente can be retrieved at http://www.alopresidente.gob.ve/Multimedia/20. While there have been over 350 episodes of this program broadcast between 1999 and 2010, as of this writing, only 286 episode transcripts are available. Chávez’s blog is accessible from this site: http://www.minci.gob.ve/lineas-de-Chávez/82.

  14. As of this writing, the Copper Reserve Law had not been rescinded. But on May 16, 2011, President Piñera signed a bill to rescind the law (and reform military budgeting procedures) and submitted it to the congress. All major parties in congress support the general principle of rescinding the law. See La Tercera (Chile) (2011).

  15. Lehman (2007). The prospect of irregular officer rotation only emerged when senior officers threatened to resign in response to Lula’s efforts to uncover past abuses committed during the military regime. See The Economist (2010a).

  16. Kirchner won 22 % in the first round of the presidential election, which put him slightly behind fellow Peronist Carlos Menem’s 25 %. Faced with deep unpopularity and devastating poll numbers, Menem withdrew from the second round runoff 4 days prior to the election. Kirchner was then designated as president elect (see Levitsky and Murillo (2003, 157–60)). For a discussion of Kirchner’s human rights agenda upon taking office, see Diamint (2008, 107–109).

  17. Centeno (2002) and Desch (1999) explain why low external threat and domestic politicization creates challenges for civilian control of the military.

  18. Quinlivan suggests that political socialization would in fact be an invitation for a coup and thus a misguided form of coup-proofing. He emphasizes the benefits that accrue to leaders when they attain what Huntington (1957) describes as “objective civilian control.” Such control prevents coups by maintaining a “professional,” i.e., apolitical, officer corps that dwells on battlefield effectiveness, not domestic politics, and that appreciates the “military risks involved in a coup attempt” (1999, 151–153). Chávez and Morales have sought “subjective civilian control” instead, aiming to turn their militaries into accessories of their political movements. As a result, future administrations that follow a different political course could find themselves alienated from their militaries.

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Acknowledgments

A partial draft of this paper was presented at the XXIX Congress of the Latin American Studies Association in Toronto, Canada, October 6-9, 2010. We thank Will Barndt, Ryan Carlin, Michelle Dion, Gustavo Flores-Macías, Kathryn Hochstetler, Raul Madrid, Pierre Ostiguy, Brian Palmer-Rubin, David Rivera, Brian Taylor, and several anonymous reviewers for their comments and criticisms.

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  1. Department of Political Science, Syracuse University, 100 Eggers Hall, Syracuse, NY, 13244, USA

    Eric R. Rittinger & Matthew R. Cleary

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Correspondence to Matthew R. Cleary.

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Rittinger, E.R., Cleary, M.R. Confronting Coup Risk in the Latin American Left. St Comp Int Dev 48, 403–431 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-013-9128-9

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