Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Is There a Duty-Generating Special Relationship of Creator to Creature?

  • Published:
Sophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Mark Murphy has argued that the relationship between a creator and their creatures is not a special relationship that generates new moral obligations for the creator. Murphy’s position is grounded, in part, on his claim that there are no good arguments to the contrary and that the creator-creature relationship (at least in the case of God) is not a relationship between equals. I argue that there are good reasons to think that a creator and creature being equals is not required for such an obligation. I offer an argument for such an obligation based on the moral significance of thrusting upon sentient or rational beings significant, unsought, and wholly new circumstances. More specifically, I argue that it is reasonable to conclude that a creator enters into a duty-generating special relationship with their creatures to promote their creatures’ well-being, when (1) the creator is the voluntary source of the creatures’ wholly new and unconsented to circumstances from which to flourish or languish and (2) it would cost the creator virtually nothing to promote the creatures’ welfare.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Murphy, Mark C. (2017.) God’s Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency & the Argument from Evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 32–34, 177

  2. Murphy 2017, 177

  3. Murphy 2017, 177

  4. Murphy 2017, 177

  5. Murphy 2017, 177

  6. Murphy 2017, 177

  7. Murphy 2017, 33

  8. Murphy 2017, 33

  9. Murphy 2017, 33

  10. Murphy 2017, 24, 76

  11. Murphy 2017, 24–25, 76 (see also 60–62)

  12. For an interesting discussion about whether human beings have intrinsic value and the potential significance of such intrinsic value for the obligations of a creator, see Wielenberg 2017 and Murphy 2017b.

  13. Murphy 2017, 33 (citing Aquinas 1981, Summa Theologiae Ia 45, 5)

  14. Both Jamie Lindemann Nelson and Jeffrey Blustein have argued for this. See Nelson 1991; Blustein 1997. More recently David Archard provided a limited defense of this position, wherein he argues that ‘a causal theory of parental obligation—that those who cause children to exist thereby incur an obligation to ensure that they are adequately cared for—can be defended independently of a theory of parental rights, and has much to commend it’ Archard 2010.

  15. I am drawn to an even stronger position that creators who are sufficiently powerful, like an omniscient and omnipotent deity, have an obligation to make the lives of their creatures on balance worth living full stop, but I adopt the weaker position here.

  16. Le Guin 2012

  17. Murphy 2017, 110

  18. Murphy 2017, 111

  19. Murphy 2017, 111

  20. Murphy makes an argument along these lines in Murphy 2017, 79

References

  • Aquinas, T.. (1981 [c.1265-1274].) Summa Theologiae. Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Christian classics.

  • Archard, D. (2010). The obligations and responsibilities of parenthood. In D. Archard & D. Benatar (Eds.), Procreation and parenthood: the ethics of bearing and rearing children. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Blustein, J. (1997). Procreation and parental responsibility. Journal of Social Philosophy, 28(2), 79–86.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Le Guin, U. K. (2012). The unreal and the real: selected stories of Ursula K. Le Guin. Volume two: Outer space, inner lands. Easthampton, MA: Small Beer Press.

  • Murphy, M. C. (2017). God’s own ethics: norms of divine agency and the argument from evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Murphy, M. C. (2017b). Replies to Wielenberg, Irwin, and Draper. Religious Studies, 53(4), 572–584.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nelson, J. L. (1991). Parental obligations and the ethics of surrogacy: a causal perspective. Public Affairs Quarterly, 5(1), 49–61.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wielenberg, E. J. (2017). Intrinsic value and love: three challenges for God’s Own Ethics. Religious Studies, 53(4), 551–557.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Jim Elliot and two anonymous referees from this journal for their helpful feedback on earlier versions of this paper.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Wayne State University, Detroit, MI, USA

    Mark Satta

Authors
  1. Mark Satta
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Mark Satta.

Additional information

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Satta, M. Is There a Duty-Generating Special Relationship of Creator to Creature?. SOPHIA 59, 637–649 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-020-00796-3

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-020-00796-3

Keywords

Search

Navigation