Abstract
My purpose in this paper is to clarify or explicate the concept of theodicy. More specifically, I shall provide an account of the concept that takes its logical aspects seriously into consideration as well as satisfies the basic intuitions philosophers of religions have had about it. This shall be done by systematically analysing the several theodical conditions found in the literature. As it shall be seen, these conditions are logically related to one another; collectively, they point not to one, but to several concepts of theodicy. Thus, as by-product of this explicatory endeavour, I shall provide a logically guided, I may say, analysis of such conditions as well as a systematization of the theodical concepts arising from them. I shall follow what might be termed a semiformal approach; despite not developing a full logical theory, I use the standard notation and some important results from the field of formal logic.
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Notes
That these reasons should give a moral justification is clear. The purpose of a theodicy is to conciliate the existence of evil with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being. If the reasons given do not have a moral character, then one feature, namely perfect goodness, would be left out. It is not, as one might think, an asymmetry regarding the treatment given to the three features; instead, it is an exigence of the problem of evil itself.
This taxonomy conflicts with a traditional one according to which a theodicy is (and only is) the theist’s answer to the evidential problem of evil; a defence would be the theist’s answer to the logical problem of evil. According to this tentative taxonomy of mine, there can be a theodicy aimed at answering the logical problem of evil; Plantinga’s so-called free-will defence (1974, 1977) would be an example of this. On the other hand, a defence, as the very name indicates, would be an answer to (or a tentative refutation against) a specific argument from evil, be it logical or evidential. While, for instance, Pike (1963) would be a defence against Hume’s logical argument, Wykstra (1984) well-known CORNEA critique would be a defence against one of Rowe’s evidential arguments (1979). Although I am convinced this is a much more satisfactory and elegant taxonomy, for space reasons, I shall not elaborate on it any further; besides, it is in no way an essential part of what I intend to accomplish in this paper.
There are different uses for the terms ‘problem of evil’ and ‘theodicy’ in the literature. As I made clear in the beginning, my use of them follows the standard in analytic philosophy of religion and assumes the concept of God as encompassing an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being. Therefore, a ‘solution’ that denies that God is omniscient, for instance, is not a solution at all.
For space reasons, I shall not discuss the standard objections to the project of theodicy. Despite all drawbacks that have been pointed out, it is this project, as traditionally conceived since Hume, say, that is the object of my analysis.
The term ‘meta-theodicy’ was used for the first time by Peterson (1983: 321) to refer to the structural analysis of arguments from evil.
In the course of the paper, I shall use the logical symbols ∧, ¬, and → with their usual meaning. As is customary, I omit the brackets in the case of unitary sets.
Notice the similarity with Plantinga’s well-known characterization of how a defence is supposed to answer the logical problem of evil (1977: 26). The only formal difference is R⊬S, which is there to guarantee that G is indeed a relevant component of (T); Γ⊬α is an abbreviation for ‘it is not the case that Γ⊢α.’
I am here relying on an intuitive understanding of the notion of evidential support. This however does not mean that specific aspects of it, like the two above mentioned, do not find support in existing theories of non-deductive inference. More on that later.
Two comments on my use of propositions in this paper. First, I shall overlook the conceptual differences that exist between propositions on the one hand and sentences and statements on the other. Second, I shall use the same symbol to refer to both a proposition and the state of affairs expressed by it. Given a proposition named A, for instance, I use the symbol ‘A’ not only to refer to the proposition it names, as when I say that A is true, but also to refer to the state of affairs expressed by the proposition, as when I say that A is the case.
As the word ‘factual’ tries to point out, the content of h refers to the world, in a wide sense of the term; in particular, h possibly says something about the moral value of human actions.
This condition has appeared in Hick (1981: 39) and Trakakis (2007: 243). Although neither Hick nor Tratakis elaborate on the rationale of this condition, it is not difficult to see why it must be there. First, if ⊢ is classical logic inferential relation, then if (2) is not satisfied, {G, R, h} would be an inconsistent set and (1) true by vacuity (in classical logic, an inconsistent set Γ is such that Γ⊢α for every α). From a more general perspective, and considering the case where ⊢ might be an inductive inferential relation, (2) means that G disproves R; but what is the point of bringing R into scene to help G explaining S if R is proved to be false in the presence of G?
Needless to say, in the case ⊢ is classical logic’s inferential relation, (2) and (3) are equivalent. Although (3) is not found in the literature, for the sake of symmetry, I think there must be an evidential counterpart to (2). For its rationale, I can restate the justification given for (2) in terms of an evidential relation: (3) means that G serves as evidence against R; but what is the point of bringing R into scene to help G explaining S if R is made implausible in the presence of G?
Here, while h would roughly correspond to R; ‘theism’ means the same as G.
This is the cut property, which in general holds in deductive logics and is seen as a desirable property of commonsense and non-monotonic reasoning. See Makinson (1994: 39).
The fourth condition, corresponding to S 1, is condition (1).
The most notable exception is of course relevant logic.
The numbering inside the brackets is mine.
Theodicies which make use of this idea are called greater-good theodicies. Since this is by far the most traditional type of theodicy, for space reasons, I have decided to focus exclusively on it and neglect other types of theodicies which follow different paths in their attempts to justify why God allows evil and suffering in our world.
See Rowe (1979: 336).
We use the expression ‘a good is expressed in R’ in the usual sense of a state of affairs A being expressed in a proposition P; if P is true then A is necessarily the case.
By using this presupposition, I am adopting a strategy similar to the one I have adopted regarding ⊢. In the same way that my analysis does not depend on an existing satisfactory theory of inference, it does not depend either on a satisfactory theory for explaining the expression ‘good x is greater than an evil y.’ As far as my analysis is concerned, ⊢ and ‘good x is greater than an evil y’ can be understood, for instance, as unanalysed notions whose use relies on their common sense meaning. The same applies to the expressions ‘worse than or as bad’ and ‘necessarily true’ in condition (10). About this later, although I am deliberately avoiding technical discussions such as which logical framework better captures a specific notion, a minimal interpretation for ‘necessarily true’ is one that takes α as necessary if α is true in all possible worlds under consideration.
Hick’s criterion of possibility is our internal consistency condition (2).
It might be that despite G⊬¬R and W⊬¬R, when taken together G and W evidentially imply ¬R.
Recall that (2) is implied by (3).
Abbreviation for ‘if and only if.’
Due to the already mentioned semi-formal character of my approach (2) is only partially fulfilled, and I do believe it is simple enough to say (4) has been fulfilled.
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Silvestre, R.S. On the Concept of Theodicy. SOPHIA 56, 207–225 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-017-0609-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-017-0609-6