Abstract
This paper queries the logic of the structure of hierarchical philosophical systems. Following the Indian tradition of siddhānta, Tibetan Buddhist traditions articulate a hierarchy of philosophical views. The ‘Middle Way’ philosophy or Madhyamaka—the view that holds that the ultimate truth is emptiness—is, in general, held to be the highest view in the systematic depictions of philosophies in Tibet, and is contrasted with realist schools of thought, Buddhist and non-Buddhist. But why should an antirealist or nominalist position be said to be ‘better’ than a realist position? What is the criterion for this claim and is it, or can it, be more than a criterion that is tradition-specific for only Tibetan Buddhists? In this paper, I will look at the criteria to evaluate Buddhist philosophical traditions, particularly as articulated in what came to be referred as the ‘nonsectarian’ (ris med) tradition. I draw from the recent work of Jorge Ferrer to query the assumptions of the hierarchical structures of ‘nonsectarian’ traditions and attempt to articulate an evaluative criteria for a nonsectarian stance that are not based solely on metaphysical or tradition-specific claims.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
See, for instance, José Cabezón, A Dose of Emptiness, 217.
Kongtrül Encyclopedia of Knowledge (shes bya kun khyab), 41; English trans. in Elizabeth Callahan, The Treasury of Philosophy: Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 2007), 74.
For instance, Getsé Paṇchen (dge rtse pa ṇ chen, ’gyur med tshe dbang mchog grub, 1761–1829), stated that ‘The abiding mode of the Great Perfection singly accords with the Great Middle Way of other-emptiness.’ Getsé Paṇchen, Ornament of Buddha-Nature, 95.4: rdzogs pa chen po’i bzhugs tshul dang/ gzhan stong dbu ma chen po gcig tu mthun. Getsé Paṇchen, Ornament of Buddha-Nature: A Discourse Ascertaining the Manner of the Definitive Meaning Middle Way (nges don dbu ma chen po’i tshul rnam par nges pa’i gtam bde gshegs snying po’i rgyan). Collected Works, vol. 1, 75–104.
Mipam, Words That Delight Guru Mañjughosa, 76; English trans. in Doctor, Speech of Delight 85. Mipam, Beacon of Certainty, 19; English trans. in Pettit, Mipam’s Beacon of Certainty 209. See Duckworth, Mipam on Buddha-Nature, 39.
Prāsangika-Madhyamaka is variously represented by different traditions in Tibet, and Mipam characterized Prāsangika-Madhyamaka as ‘discourse that emphasizes the uncategorized ultimate free from assertions.’ The ‘uncategorized ultimate’ is the nonconceptual ultimate, in contrast to the ‘categorized ultimate,’ which is a conceptual understanding of the ultimate, a concept or idea of emptiness. See Mipam, Words That Delight Guru Mañjughosa, 99; English trans. in Doctor, Speech of Delight 117. See also Duckworth, Mipam on Buddha-Nature, 33.
For instance, one way this plays out is stated in the works of a Nyingma scholar, Lochen Dharmaśrī, who suggests that Prāsangika-Madhyamaka can be said to be ‘better’ than the Madhyamaka of other-emptiness if the criterion is set to be the one that is the best means for establishing the ultimate nature things as free from conceptual constructs in study. However, if the criterion is the one that is the best means of setting forth the way ultimate reality is understood as an experiential presence in meditation, other-emptiness is better. Lochen Dharmaśrī states: “If one thinks, ‘In the scriptures such as the Treasury of Philosophies and the root and [auto-]commentary of the Wish-Fulfilling Treasury, is it not a contradiction that: (1) in the context of identifying what is to be ascertained by means of study, Prāsangika-Madhyamaka is established as the pinnacle of the Causal Vehicle of Mahāyāna, and (2) in the contexts of ascertainment by means of meditative experience, individual reflexive wisdom free from perceived-perceiver [duality] is asserted?’ There is no contradiction because it is difficult for an ordinary being to deconstruct the reifications of the mind at the time of ascertaining the view by means of study and contemplation. Therefore, in negating these [reifications of the mind] through the supreme knowledge that arises through study and contemplation, Prāsangika is a sharper awareness that cuts through superimpositions. Also, at the time of ascertaining by experience [the supreme knowledge] that arises in meditation, the view of the Middle Way taught in the last wheel itself is profound and much better because: (1) the naturally pure expanse, the ultimate truth that is the self-existing wisdom, is itself the primordial mode of reality of all phenomena, and (2) it is also in accord with the practice of the view that is accepted in the profound tantras of Secret Mantra.” Lochen Dharmaśrī, Cluster of Supreme Intentions: Commentary on ‘Ascertaining the Three Vows’ (sdom pa gsum rnam par nges pa’i ’grel pa legs bshad ngo mtshar dpag bsam gyi snye ma), (Bylakuppe: Ngagyur Nyingma Institute, n.d.), 377.4-378.4.
I have taken this thought experiment from Jorge Ferrer, Revisioning Transpersonal Theory, 63.
Ferrer, ‘Spiritual Knowing as Participatory Enaction, 149.
Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6.521.
Empirical validity, as Ferrer points out, is not reducible to objective (third person) verification or falsification, but encompasses intersubjective verification (and falsification) as well as disciplined introspection. See Ferrer, Revisioning Transpersonal Theory, chapter 2.
Ferrer, ‘Spiritual Knowing as Participatory Enaction,’ 155.
Ferrer, Revisioning Transpersonal Theory, 94.
Ferrer, ‘Participation, Metaphysics, and Enlightenment: Reflections on Ken Wilber's Recent Work,’ 8; see also Ferrer, Revisioning Transpersonal Theory, 164–5.
For Deleuze (and Guattari) on the rhizome, see, for instance, their A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. by Brain Massumi (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 21.
Ferrer, ‘Participation, Metaphysics, and Enlightenment: Reflections on Ken Wilber's Recent Work,’ 7.
Ferrer, ‘Spiritual Knowing as Participatory Enaction,’ 153.
Ferrer, ‘Spiritual Knowing as Participatory Enaction,’ 153.
Ferrer, ‘Participatory Spirituality and Transpersonal Theory: A Ten-Year Retrospective,’ 3.
Ferrer, ‘Participatory Spirituality and Transpersonal Theory: A Ten-Year Retrospective,’ 7.
See John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 240–46.
See Mark Heim, Salvations: Truth and Difference in Religions.
Ferrer, Revisioning Transpersonal Theory, 215n27.
Ferrer, ‘Spiritual Knowing as Participatory Enaction,’ 165–66n49.
Ferrer, Revisioning Transpersonal Theory, 151.
Ferrer, ‘Spiritual Knowing as Participatory Enaction,’ 168n63.
Nāgārjuna, Vigrahavyāvartanī v. 29: ‘If I had a thesis, I would have fault; since I have no thesis, I am only faultless,’ and Mūlamadhyāmakakārikā XIII.8: ‘The Victorious Ones have proclaimed emptiness as that which relinquishes all views; but those who hold emptiness as a view are incurable.’
See Kristen Kiblinger, Buddhist Inclusivism: Attitudes toward Religious Others (England: Ashgate Publications, 2005).
See Uttaratantra I.157. See also, Duckworth, Mipam on Buddha-nature, 136–7.
See John Makransky (2008) for a defense of Buddhist inclusivism that sustains multiple ends for different religious traditions, but asserts a distinctive Buddhist end (for its distinct path).
See Ferrer, ‘Participation, Metaphysics, and Enlightenment: Reflections on Ken Wilber's Recent Work,’ 16–19.
A similar project to reconstruct a modern Buddhist stance toward religious others are taken up in J. Abraham Vélez de Cea, The Buddha and Religious Diversity (New York: Routledge, 2013).
References
Cabezón, J. (1992). A dose of emptiness: an annotated translation of the stong thun chen mo of mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang. Albany: SUNY Press.
Callahan, E. (2007). The treasury of philosophy: frameworks of Buddhist philosophy. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications.
Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1987). A thousand plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Translated by Brain Massumi.
Doctor, T. (2004). Speech of delight: Mipham's commentary on Śāntarakṣita's ornament of the middle way. Ithaca: Snow Lion.
Duckworth, D. (2008). Mipam on Buddha-nature. Albany: SUNY Press.
Ferrer, J. (2002). Revisioning transpersonal theory: a participatory vision of human spirituality. Albany: SUNY Press.
Ferrer, J. (2008). Spiritual knowing as participatory enaction. In J. Ferrer & J. Sherman (Eds.), The Participatory Turn: Spirituality, Mysticism, Religious studies (pp. 135–69). Albany: SUNY Press.
Ferrer, J. (2011a). Participatory spirituality and transpersonal theory: a ten-year retrospective. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 43, 1.
Ferrer, J. (2011b). Participation, metaphysics, and enlightenment: reflections on Ken Wilber's recent work. Transpersonal Psychology Review, 14(2), 3–24.
Getsé Paṇchen (dge rtse paṇ chen, ’gyur med tshe dbang mchog grub, 1761–1829) (2001). Ornament of Buddha-Nature: A Discourse Ascertaining the Manner of the Definitive Meaning Middle Way (nges don dbu ma chen po’i tshul rnam par nges pa’i gtam bde gshegs snying po’i rgyan). Collected Works, vol. 1, 75–104. Chengdu, China: People's Press.
Heim, S. M. (1995). Salvations: truth and difference in religion. Mary Knoll: Orbis Books.
Hick, J. (1989). An interpretation of religion. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Kiblinger, K. (2005). Buddhist inclusivism: attitudes toward religious others. England: Ashgate Publications.
Kongtrül (kong sprul blo gros mtha’ yas, 1813–1899) (2002). Encyclopedia of Knowledge (shes bya kun khyab). Beijing, China: Nationalities Press.
Lochen Dharmaśrī (lo chen dharmaśrī, 1654–1717). Cluster of Supreme Intentions: Commentary on “Ascertaining the Three Vows” (sdom pa gsum rnam par nges pa’i ’grel pa legs bshad ngo mtshar dpag bsam gyi snye ma). Bylakuppe: Ngagyur Nyingma Institute, n.d.
Maitreya (1957). Uttaratantra (theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos). In Suzuki, D. T. (Ed.), The Tibetan Tripitika, Peking edition (#5525, vol. 108). Tokyo, Japan: Tibetan Tripitika Research Institute.
Makranskxy, J. (2008). Buddhist inclusivism: reflections toward a contemporary theology of religions. In P. Schmidt-Leukel (Ed.), Buddhist attitudes toward other religions (pp. 47–68). Germany: EOS.
Mipam (’ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912). Words That Delight Guru Mañjughosa: Commentary on the ‘Ornament of the Middle Way’ (dbu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad ’jam byangs bla ma dgyes pa’i zhal lung). Published in dbu ma rgyan rtsa ’grel. Sichuan, China: Nationalities Press, 1990.
Nāgārjuna (1957). Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (dbu ma rtsa ba’i shes rab). In Suzuki, D. T. (Ed.), The Tibetan Tripitika, Peking edition (#5224, vol. 95). Tokyo, Japan: Tibetan Tripitika Research Institute.
Nāgārjuna (1957). Vigrahavyāvartanī (rtsod zlog). In Suzuki, D. T. (Ed.), The Tibetan Tripitika, Peking edition (#5228, vol. 95). Tokyo, Japan: Tibetan Tripitika Research Institute.
Vélez, A. J. (2013). The Buddha and religious diversity. New York: Routledge.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Duckworth, D. How Nonsectarian is ‘Nonsectarian’?: Jorge Ferrer's Pluralist Alternative to Tibetan Buddhist Inclusivism. SOPHIA 53, 339–348 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-013-0398-5
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-013-0398-5