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Comments on: Games with a permission structure - A survey on generalizations and applications

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Notes

  1. A collection of formable coalitions is accessible if for every formable coalition \(E \ne \varnothing \), there exists \(i \in E\), such that \(E {\setminus } \{ i \}\) is formable as well.

  2. The cooperative nature of the human economy has been emphasised throughout history. I refer to, e.g., Plato (2007), Seabright (2010), Bowles and Gintis (2011), and Sun (2012) for empirical support of human sociality and the history of these ideas.

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  1. Economics Group, Management School, Queen’s University of Belfast, Riddel Hall, 185 Stranmillis Road, Belfast, BT9 5EE, UK

    Robert P. Gilles

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This comment refers to the invited paper available at doi:10.1007/s11750-017-0440-9.

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Gilles, R.P. Comments on: Games with a permission structure - A survey on generalizations and applications. TOP 25, 34–38 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-017-0442-7

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