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Justifying the Distinction Between Justifications and Power (Justifications vs. Power)

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Abstract

The paper suggests that there are two different ways in which a legal system restricts an individual’s rights. It can either grant a power that revokes the legal protection of the right or it can acknowledge the infringement of a legal right and yet justify such an infringement by means of a criminal law justification. The distinction proposed by the paper has both expressive and practical implications and is useful in solving dilemmas arising in emergencies when constitutional constraints make it impossible to grant the power to revoke legal protection of a basic right. In some of these situations a criminal law justification might support infringement of such a right. This claim is demonstrated by analyzing the ruling of the German Constitutional Court concerning the shooting down of a hijacked airplane in circumstances similar to those of September 11.

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Notes

  1. But see Berman 2003, p. 9.

  2. See discussion infra “The Importance of Distinguishing between Legal Power and Criminal Law Justifications”.

  3. Robinson's approach was explicitly criticized by George Fletcher (1975). See also Husak (1989, pp. 504–517); Thorburn (2008, pp. 1086–1089); Gardner (2007, pp. 92–120); Duff (2007, pp. 277–284).

  4. A different approach will be discussed infra Justifying the Wrongdoing.

  5. For the distinction between the offense definition and justifications see Fletcher (1975, pp. 308–310); Gardner (2007, pp. 216–228); Campbell (1987, pp. 73–86).

  6. See the discussion at “The Importance of Distinguishing between Legal Power and Criminal Law Justifications” infra.

  7. For the power of police officer to arrest a suspect without a judicial warrant, see 18 United States Code Annotated § 3052 (2006) (regarding FBI agents); Model Penal Code § 120.1; United States v. Watson (1976); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001).

  8. Locke (1967, § 181), Uniacke (1994, pp. 196–208), Leverick (2006, pp. 61–63) claim that aggressors forfeit their right to life. This approach is rejected by Fletcher (1980, pp. 135–155), Kadish (1976, pp. 883–886), Kaufman (2004, pp. 23–24), Segev (2005, p. 407). This paper adopts the last approach and assumes that aggressors do not lose their right of life by virtue of their unlawful aggression.

  9. In various states, the offense itself is labeled as "unlawful imprisonment" (New York Penal Law §§135.05-10; Revised Code of Washington, § 9A.40.040).

  10. However, 18 United States Code Annotated § 1111 (2006), defines murder as "the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought".

  11. The example is analyzed by Campbell (1987, p. 83), and cited by Gardner (2007, p. 145).

  12. See supra note 8.

  13. See Ibid.

  14. See supra note 8.

  15. Model Penal code § 3.03 grants the justification in executing official tasks to both the officials and private individuals who assist them.

  16. Fletcher (1978 pp. 698–707), on the other hand, argues that the woman's lack of consent should not be classified as an element of rape, but rather as a justification.

  17. Baker (2009) explains the rationale of limiting the scope of consent as a criminal law justification.

  18. See supra Criminal Law Justifications.

  19. See supra text accompanying note 4.

  20. See supra Justifying the Wrongdoing.

  21. Model Penal Code § 3.01(2) provides: “The fact that a conduct is justifiable under this Article does not abolish or impair any remedy for such conduct which is available in any civil action”.

  22. Alternatively, compensation could be based on restitution (Virgo 1999, p. 312; Rogers 2006, p. 1096).

  23. Supra note 8.

  24. Supra Self-Defense and the Right to Life.

  25. See supra note 8.

  26. Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) (2006) the United States is not liable for “Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation …”.

  27. Several states in the United States enacted statutes granting limited compensation for wrongly convicted prisoners who were released. In 2007, though, most of those wrongfully incarcerated received no compensation (Bernhard 2009; Entin 2005, p. 161).

  28. Note that we are discussing compensation for the reasonable exercises of power, parallel to the compensations for justified infringement of rights. Some legal systems go further and deny compensation even for the negligent exercise of the power (Dobbs 2000, pp. 702–704; Booth and Squires 2006, pp. 589–590).

  29. Robinson (1996) presents an opposite view.

  30. Even with regard to official power, the official may sometimes decide to exercise the power to change individual's rights and carry out the decision herself, for example a police officer arresting a suspect on reasonable grounds.

  31. The sentencing guidelines in the UK are determined by The Sentencing Guidelines Council, see http://www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk.

  32. The German Court based its ruling on constitutional considerations under the German Basic Law; the Court did not discuss the law of war.

  33. For the opposite view, according to which “the passengers’ lives are not being targeted as a means of thwarting the hijackers”, see: Kleinig and Kasachkoff 2010; Hörnle (2007, pp. 606–607); Zamir and Medina (2008, pp. 375–376).

  34. I elaborated on that distinction in a different article (Gur-Arye 1986).

  35. See supra Justifying the Wrongdoing.

  36. Hörnle (2007, pp. 600–604) analyzes such a scenario to find that a private pilot who has shot down the airplane will be granted an excuse; the shooting down of the airplane by a state official is justified.

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  1. Faculty of Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

    Miriam Gur-Arye

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  1. Miriam Gur-Arye
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Correspondence to Miriam Gur-Arye.

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Gur-Arye, M. Justifying the Distinction Between Justifications and Power (Justifications vs. Power). Criminal Law, Philosophy 5, 293–313 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-010-9110-9

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