Abstract
Martha C. Nussbaum, in the context of ancient philosophy, formulated ethics of human development based on 10 basic human capabilities (and opportunities) as a precondition of meaningful human development, i.e. the ability to live a dignified human life. The paper, thus, deals with a capabilities approach with the aim of analysing the content of the idea of human dignity in Nussbaum’s understanding and its place in the conception of ethics of human development, since human dignity is the very core of the conception in question.
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Notes
Nussbaum stems directly from Kant, which can be seen when comparing her statement to that by Kant. Nussbaum states: “The principle of each person as end that I make central to the view from Women and Human Development onward is a version of Kant’s idea of the duty to respect humanity as an end, and never to treat it as a mere means” (Nussbaum 2011: 94). In Kant, one can find a similar idea in the following form: “[M]an as a person, i.e., as the subject of morally-practical reason, is exalted above all price. For as such a one (homo noumenon) he is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of other people, or even to his own ends, but is to be prized as an end in himself. This is to say, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) whereby he exacts the respect of all other rational beings in the world, can measure himself against each member of his species, and can esteem himself on a footing of equality with them” (Kant 1797/1983: 97).
Since Nussbaum’s starting points are multiple and her work abundant, the scope of the contribution does not allow for their analysis and general assessment. That is why I will use Amartya Sen’s claim about Nussbaum that her work, in combination with the solid engagement in the development of the “capabilities approach”, greatly assisted the progress of this theory, including the study of its interconnection with classical Aristotelian ideas regarding a good life, as well as the issue of human development, gender studies and human rights (Sen 2009: xxiii-xxiv).
Nevertheless, Konrad Banicki believes that all three (including Pierre Hadot’s) models are not that different and even claims there is space for their systematic conciliation and fruitful cooperation (Banicki 2015: 625).
Nussbaum also supports non-utilitarian consequentialism – Mill’s version. The starting point for my reasoning is ethics of social consequences which is a version of non-utilitarian consequentialism following John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick and George Edward Moore (Dubiel-Zielińska 2016; Gluchman 2017a; Kalajtzidis 2013, 2018; Misseri 2015; Simut 2016; Švaňa 2015). Within this approach, one can reason about two aspects of human dignity. The first relates to the value of life, which deserves respect and appreciation, from which positive social consequences follow, i.e. positive social consequences are the function of human dignity. The other one regards human dignity being a function of positive social consequences following our behaviour and actions, which are to prevail over negative social consequences (Gluchman 2017b; Gluchmanová 2013; Losyk 2014; Petrufová Joppová 2018; Polomská 2018; Sachdev 2015). What is concerned here is the basis for attributing a qualitative, or additional, value of human dignity to a moral agent. When reasoning about unconscious human beings and potential moral agents, the first aspect of human dignity dominates, in assessments regarding moral agents, on the contrary, the second aspect of human dignity dominates. Dignity, including human dignity, of unconscious human beings is, from the viewpoint of the first aspect, a set of certain features and values worthy of respect and appreciation. What follows from this aspect is the imperative character of the correlative duties of moral agents towards the bearers, or holders, of human dignity. Human dignity of a moral agent (the second aspect of dignity) is the reflection, or function, of values and attributes pursued through actions and behaviour, especially by means of consequences that follow for other moral agents, or for the broader social and moral community of which he is a member which, as a result, also applies to the morality of society. The other aspect of human dignity bears a conditional character of correlative duties of moral agents to bearers, or holders, of this human dignity.
See Footnote 4.
See Footnote 4.
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Gluchman, V. Human Dignity as the Essence of Nussbaum’s Ethics of Human Development. Philosophia 47, 1127–1140 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-0034-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-0034-2