Abstract
In this paper I critically discuss what has come to be known as the consensus or standard view of interpersonal forgiveness noting some of the paradoxes it appears to generate, how its conceptual resources seem unable to help illuminate several other varieties of forgiveness that are either themselves instances of interpersonal forgiving or at least types of forgiveness that a theory of interpersonal forgiveness should be able to shed some light upon. In the final section I offer some remarks on the nature of revenge, which has recently come to be seen by some philosophers as a morally acceptable alternative to forgiving wrongdoers, note some of the puzzles to which it gives rise, and conclude that while both types of responses to wrongdoers remain morally complex, there is good reason to think that forgiveness is the morally more appropriate response to having been wronged.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
But See Griswold 2012, where he distinguishes between the two: “I am talking about the desire to take revenge, not the desire to avenge wrongs,” (p.80).
In his recent essay “The Economic Model of Forgiveness,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2014), Brandon Warmke lists John Kekes, Linda Radzik, and Leo Zaibert as philosophers who have labeled this the “standard” view of interpersonal forgiveness, which refers as well to the views of Jeffrie Murphy, Norvin Richards, and others.
Alston (2005). See also Jeffrey G. Murphy’s similarly titled essay “Two Cheers for Vindictiveness,” Punishment and Society 2(2), April, 2000, reprinted as chapter two of Murphy, Getting Even: Forgiveness and its Limits, Oxford University Press, 2003.
Ibid. p.63.
Ibid., p.588
Pettigrove, op. cit., argues that because people other than the primary victim of wrong can feel deeply indignant (resentful) over that wrong it is not necessarily the case that in forgiving the wrongdoer these third parties are overcoming such feelings for their having been wronged, but may be forgiving on behalf of the primary victim. See Pettigrove, pps. 589–590.
Griswold, like other proponents of the consensus view, not only assumes that forgiveness can be tendered only to living wrongdoers, but that revenge can only be taken on the living when he claims that “one is robbed of revenge if, say, the wrongdoer is indifferent to the harm the vengeful victim inflicts on him, or is dead, or never knows who inflicted the harm, or doesn’t know why the harm was inflicted”. (“The Nature and Ethics of Vengeful Anger,” p.87). I think, however, that posthumous “payback” is possible, as I note below.
For an account of how the dead may be wronged, harmed, or even benefited see George Pitcher, “The Misfortunes of the Dead”. American Philosophical Quarterly 21.2 (April 1984):183–88.
In his Political Forgiveness, (Cornell University Press, 2001) P. E. Digeser makes this argument.
Pettigrove, op. cit. argues that if third parties have the standing to forgive on behalf of primary victims of wrong, then the class of potential forgivers can be “expanded” to include not only those who exhibit “hostile reactive attitudes” on behalf of the primary victim, but also to those in a position to restore relationships that have been compromised by wrongdoing, or to those in a position to re-evaluate the character of the wrongdoer, and if anyone is in all of these positions at the same time then they meet “a sufficient condition for forgiving”. (p.593). Since Pettigrove gives no reason to suppose that political actors cannot meet this condition, then it follows that there may be a form of “political” forgiveness that is analogous to interpersonal forgiveness.
See for example Murphy (2009). See also Zaibert (2009). Zaibert claims that in On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (London, Routledge, 2001) Jacques Derrida uses the notion of “unforgivable” wrongs as wrongdoing that should not in principle be forgiven, not wrongs that are somehow not capable of being forgiven.
I discuss this point in more detail in “On Forgiving Oneself: A Reply to Snow,” Journal of Value Inquiry, 28 (1994): 557–560.
USA Today, April 22, 2014, p.4A
See Garcia,op.cit, pps. 13–16, for a discussion of both of these options for handling “unforgivable” wrongs.
See Zaibert, op.cit., for the contrary view that forgiveness is the deliberate refusal to punish, which implies that forgiveness is incompatible with punishment.
See Konstan, op.cit,, pp.157–159, for a discussion of this puzzle by Joanna North in which she draws the conclusion that given the various ways people may overcome the resentment caused by having been wronged we can do without the notion of interpersonal forgiveness altogether.
For a compelling account of the ongoing identity politics in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide see Hilsum 2013.
The phrase “magical thinking” is from Nussbaum, ”Transitional Anger,” op.cit. Nussbaum distinguishes between anger directed at revenge, which she claims is irrational, and anger that seeks to restore a person’s honor, and claims that the latter does sometimes make sense.
This paper was originally presented at The Workshop on the Ethics of Forgiveness and Revenge sponsored by the Philosophy Department at Union College in Schenectady, New York, on May 22–23, 2014. I am grateful to Krisanna Scheiter, her philosophy department colleagues, fellow workshop participants, and members of the audience for their many insightful questions and comments.
References
Alston, W. (2005). Two cheers for mystery! In A. Dole & A. Chignell (Eds.), God and the ethics of belief: New essays in philosophy of religion (pp. 99–114). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Aristotle (1984). Nicomachean ethics. In J. Barnes (Ed), The complete works of Aristotle (p. 1777), Volume 2, 1126a1.
Dostoyevsky, F. (1986). The brothers Karamazov (p. 238). New York: Penguin.
French, P., et al. (1982). Forgiveness and resentment. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 7, 503–516.
Garcia, E. (2011). Bishop Butler on forgiveness and resentment. Philosophers’ Imprint, 11(10), 1–19.
Garner, B. A. ed. (1999). Black’s law dictionary, 7th edition. St. Paul, MN: West Group Publishing, p.1413.
Griswold, C. (2007). Forgiveness: A philosophical exploration. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Griswold, C. (2013). The nature and ethics of vengeful anger. In Passions and Emotions: Nomos LIII, Yearbook, etc (p. 80). New York: New York University Press.
Hilsum, L. (2013). The rainy season. Granta, 125, 7–34.
Hughes, P. (1993). What is involved in forgiving? Journal of Value Inquiry, 27, 331–340.
Hughes, P. (1995). Moral anger, forgiving, and condoning. Journal of Social Philosophy, 26(1), 103–118.
Konstan, D. (2010). Before forgiveness: The origins of a moral idea. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Murphy, J. (2009). The case of Dostoevsky’s general: some ruminations on forgiving the unforgivable. The Monist, 92(4), 556–582.
Murphy, C. (2010). A moral theory of political reconciliation. Cambridge University Press.
Murphy, J., & Hampton, J. eds. (1988). Forgiveness and mercy. New York, NT: Cambridge University Press.
Nussbaum, M. (2015). Transitional anger. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1(1), 41–56.
Pettigrove, G. (2009). The standing to forgive. The Monist, 92(4), 583–603.
Rosenbaum, T. (2013, March 26). Eye for an eye: the case for revenge. The Chronicle of Higher Education, pp. 1–18.
Vining, J. (1978). Legal identity: The coming of age of public law (p. 55). New Haven: Yale University Press.
Zaibert, L. (2009). The paradox of forgiveness. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 6, 365–393.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Hughes, P.M. Two Cheers for Forgiveness (and Even Fewer for Revenge). Philosophia 44, 361–380 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9671-x
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9671-x