Abstract
This article presents an argument for veganism, using a formal-axiomatic approach: a list of twenty axioms (basic definitions, normative assumptions and empirical facts) are explicitly stated. These axioms are all necessary conditions to derive the conclusion that veganism is a moral duty. The presented argument is a minimalist or core argument for veganism, because it is as parsimonious as possible, using the weakest conditions, the narrowest definitions, the most reliable empirical facts and the minimal assumptions necessary to reach the conclusion. If someone does not accept the conclusion, logical consistency requires that s/he should be able to point at axiom(s) on which s/he disagrees. The argument exposes hidden assumptions and provides a framework for an overview of the philosophical literature on animal rights and vegetarianism / veganism.
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Notes
Veganism is broadly defined as avoiding the consumption of bodily products from sentient beings. Of course the conclusion of the argument will point at a more specific meaning of veganism. Hence, the argument does not say anything about some animals (e.g., zooplankton or oysters) nor about some kind of uses of animal products (e.g., collecting feathers in the woods or eating road kill). The argument focuses on the most common cases of buying meat, fish, dairy and eggs.
Engel (2000) also presented a lengthy argument, but I will not discuss the strengths and weaknesses of is argument compared to mine.
Regan refers to a more general ‘use as merely a means’, Francione refers to ‘treatment as property’. These basic rights are Kantian in nature, because they refer to a means-ends relationship.
Explicitly referring to mentally disabled humans is of course the well-known argument from marginal cases (e.g., Dombrowski 1997).
Some argue that mentally disabled humans should get rights because we could become mentally disabled in the future and then we would want our rights to be respected (see e.g., Wreen 1984). However, we cannot become a mentally disabled human who was never mentally abled before.
This is an often heard argument to grant rights to non-moral agents such as children who have a potential to become moral agents in the future (e.g., Melden 1980). Still, some mentally disabled humans have as little potential as non-human animals.
See the genetic basis of moral agency (Liao 2010).
See Gunnarsson (2008).
Narveson (1987) used an argument that reflects this condition of kinship with other individuals.
According to Narveson (1977), one of the reasons why we give rights to mentally disabled humans is because of feelings of sympathy on the basis of superficial similarities. This sympathy is merely triggered by similarities, and should not be confused with empathy. Also Wreen (1984) uses the argument that we identify ourselves with human non-persons.
This refers to a possible reply to the super-chimp (Kumar 2008) or super-cat (Wreen 1984) examples: a highly intelligent mutant super-cat would not get rights if rights are based on species normality (what most members of the species have). This seems counter-intuitive because this unique cat is rational. So the reply goes that this super-cat must belong to another species than Felis domestica (even if it can still interbreed with other cats). But then a same reasoning allows to conclude that a mentally disabled human with an exceptional property is no longer a Homo sapiens.
This counters the argument of ‘moral sociability as a precondition to justice’ (Barilan 2005). A subject has no moral sociability if its right to life is incompatible with the right to life of someone else.
Narveson (1987) tried to avoid the conclusion that use of mentally disabled humans is permissible by claiming that their use would not be as beneficial for us after all.
This refers to a condition proposed by Barilan (2005) for non-human species, but hereby translated to mentally disabled humans.
This refers to the least harm argument against vegetarianism proposed by Davis (2003), but hereby applied to mentally disabled humans.
This refers to the argument against vegetarianism/veganism that livestock farming allows us to use resources such as grazing land that otherwise remain unavailable for direct consumption.
See e.g., Young (1984), for whom the morality of killing X depends on others who have an interest in X’s continued existence. But also Scruton (2006) refers to the sentiments of others about the way we are allowed to treat someone. The impermissibility of using mentally disabled humans merely due to us being disturbed by that idea is like the prohibition of eating e.g., human cultured meat, plants that have a symbolic (e.g., religious) meaning or alcoholic beverages that are considered taboo in some cultures. These prohibitions have nothing to do with rights violations.
E.g. Goldman (2001) referred to moral intuitions that excluded animals.
E.g. Levy (2004).
This refers to the normality argument: moral agency is normal for humans because most humans possess moral agency. E.g. Thomas (2010).
This refers to the predation argument: we are allowed to eat animals when some animals eat other animals for survival.
This refers to the human prejudice argument (Williams 2006): in the absence of an impartial point of view, we could (as humans) be partial in favour of other humans, from our own particular (human) point of view.
Both Francione (2000, 2008) and Regan (1983) argued for veganism based on a Kantian basic right, but Regan (in his earlier work) used ‘subject-of-a-life’ as morally relevant criterion whereas Francione explicitly rejects that and argues that sentience is sufficient for a being to hold the right not to be treated as a resource. Subject-of-a-life is a narrower criterion than sentience, as it requires not only sentience but also preference autonomy (an ability to initiate action to pursue goals) and temporal consciousness (memory and a sense of one’s own future). Hence, my argument can be considered as a polishing and structuring of Francione’s work.
Note that this use is not a use as merely a means if plants do not possess a will and cannot be used against their will. Hence, this right is broader than the basic right in definition 1.
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Bruers, S. The Core Argument for Veganism. Philosophia 43, 271–290 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9595-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9595-5