Abstract
Tiddy Smith, Philosophia, 42, 173–179 (2014) has recently argued that there is an enlightenment problem for Millianism. In this paper I show that Smith’s argument rests on a misunderstanding, and that the enlightenment problem can be solved according to standard versions of Millianism. In fact, the problem can be solved according to Nathan Salmon’s (1986) version of Millianism, which is one of Smith’s main targets.
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Notes
More formally, Salmon’s theory is that belief ascriptions of the form ‘A believes p’ can be analyzed as ‘∃x(A grasps p under x & BEL(A, p, x))’. The quantifier here ranges over guises. The predicate ‘BEL’ expresses a ternary relation that holds between agents, propositions, and guises: An agent A stands in BEL to a proposition p and a guise x if and only if A accepts p when grasped under x. It is often said that belief is a ternary relation according to Salmon’s theory. Indeed, Smith (2014: 174) attributes this very view to Salmon. But this is a misinterpretation of Salmon’s theory. As Salmon has stressed, belief is a binary relation according to his theory. It is a binary relation that holds between agents and propositions: A stands in the belief relation to p if and only if there is a guises x such that A grasps p under x and A stands in BEL to p and x.
In fact, Smith could have stuck with the Superman story. For Superman himself is known by three names: ‘Superman’, ‘Clark Kent’, and ‘Kal-El’, the latter of which is his Kryptonian birth name.
Indeed, the above account of enlightenment leads to problems that Smith fails to notice. Consider cases of suspended judgment, such as the following: Jimmy Olsen is in a situation similar to Lois’s situation before she becomes enlightened, except that Jimmy suspends judgment about whether Superman is Clark Kent. So, Jimmy does not assent to (3) and he does not dissent from (3). Correspondingly, Jimmy does not assent to ‘Superman is not Clark Kent’ and he does not dissent from ‘Superman is not Clark Kent’. Now, it seems clear in this case that Jimmy believes <<Superman, Superman>, IDENTITY>, since there are guises, associated with (1) and (2), under which Jimmy accepts this proposition. But there is no guise under which Jimmy accepts <<<Superman, Superman>, IDENTITY>, NEGATION>, which means that Jimmy does not believe <<<Superman, Superman>, IDENTITY>, NEGATION>. This, of course, leads to a problem. For suppose that Jimmy comes across the following headline: ‘Superman’s Secret Identity Revealed: Clark Kent is the Man of Steel!’ Upon reading this headline, Jimmy surely becomes enlightened about Superman’s identity. But Jimmy’s enlightenment cannot consist in the fact that he ceases to believe <<<Superman, Superman>, IDENTITY>, NEGATION>. For Jimmy did not believe this proposition in the first place!
See Salmon (1993). But note that in this paper Salmon is concerned mainly with sentential a priority and sentential a posteriority, which he regards as derivative notions but nonetheless legitimate notions.
In conversation I have heard Salmon speak of “revelatory guises.” If I am not mistaken, revelatory guises are guises that reveal the identity of someone or something. To my knowledge, Salmon has never mentioned revelatory guises in print, but they are obviously similar to enlightening guises, in my sense. Indeed, I am inclined to say that revelatory guises are enlightening guises. But I will not attribute this view to Salmon.
The point here is quite general. It is easy to imagine scenarios in which Lois, for example, comes to accept <<Superman, Superman>, IDENTITY> under a new guise, but in which Lois does not, in any way, becomes enlightened about Superman’s identity. Suppose that Lois is assigned to investigate the possibility of extraterrestrial intelligence, and that, in the course of her investigations, she discovers the Fortress of Solitude, whose walls are engraved with the name ‘Kal-El’. She surmises that ‘Kal-El’ is the name of an intelligent alien, but she does not connect this name with the handsome superhero, nor with the dull reporter. In this scenario Lois would surely come to accept <<Superman, Superman>, IDENTITY> under a new guise, corresponding to the sentence ‘Kal-El is Kal-El’. But this guise is no more enlightening than those corresponding to (1) and (2). So, Lois comes to accept <<Superman, Superman>, IDENTITY> under a new guise, but she does not become enlightened about anyone’s identity.
The only thing that is clear about the nature of guises is that guises cannot be identified with sentences, for reasons having to do with the Paderewski puzzle. This has been pointed out by Nathan Salmon (1993: 87–88) and David Braun (1998: 568), among others. Note that nowhere in my paper have I presupposed that guises are sentences, though I have presupposed that guises are associated with sentences.
The most popular strategy is probably the pragmatic strategy, which attempts to explain anti-Millian intuitions in terms of pragmatic phenomena. Salmon (1986) is a proponent of this strategy. See specifically Salmon (1986: 114–118). There is also the psychological strategy, which attempts to explain anti-Millian intuitions entirely in terms of guises, without appealing to pragmatic phenomena. Braun (1998) is a proponent of this strategy.
For example, Gary Ostertag (2005) and Stephen Schiffer (2006) have raised doubts about whether guises can in every case enable the rational and enlightened speaker to avoid contradicting himself when ascribing beliefs. This, I think, is a more significant problem for Millianism. That is not to say, of course, that it is an unsolvable problem for Millianism. Indeed, it seems to me that Salmon (2006) has already satisfactorily addressed the issues raised by Schiffer. But a thorough discussion of these issues is far beyond the scope of this paper. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for mentioning these issues and providing references.
References
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Schiffer, S. (2006). A problem for a direct-reference theory of belief reports. Noûs, 40, 361–368.
Smith, T. (2014). An enlightenment problem for Millianism. Philosophia, 42, 173–179. doi:10.1007/s11406-013-9472-z
Wong, K. (1991). A priority and ways of grasping a proposition. Philosophical Studies, 62, 151–164.
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Atkins, P. How to Become an Enlightened Millian Heir. Philosophia 42, 927–934 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9546-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9546-6