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Closure and Underdetermination Again

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Abstract

In contemporary epistemology, sceptical arguments are motivated either by the closure principle or the underdetermination principle. Therefore, it is very important to figure out the structure of the sceptical argument before coming up with an anti-sceptic strategy. With a review of the debate on the relationship between the two principles from Anthony Brueckner to Kevin McCain, it is argued that while maintaining the weak closed justification (WCJ*), closure and underdetermination are not logically equivalent. As a result, two independent responses are needed to answer the sceptical problem satisfactorily. Also, in order to secure a philosophically significant notion of justification and evidence, reasons are given to hold WCJ*, as opposed to rejecting it. This understanding of the sceptical argument would help to focus the real challenge of scepticism.

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Notes

  1. See Brueckner (1986), Brueckner (1994), Vogel (2004), Yalcin (1992), Pritchard (2002) and Pritchard (2005).

  2. This formulation is mainly from Duncan Pritchard (2005). And earlier discussions see Dretske (1970) and Cohen (1999).

  3. This formulation is slightly different from Anthony Brueckner (1994) and Duncan Pritchard (2005).

  4. Brueckner’s argument appears in his footnote, but is rather not detailed.

  5. McCain explicitly admits (1)-(4), but I think (5) is also implicitly assumed in his argument.

  6. This principle is slightly but unimportantly different from Pritchard (2005)’s (WCJ). Similar principles see McCain (2013)’s principle (INC*) and Cohen (1998)’s (INC). INC makes no claim that S should be aware of the relationship between propositions, while (INC*) limits in propositional justification.

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Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Duncan Pritchard, Natalie Ashton for helpful discussions on this topic. My research is funded by China Scholarship Council and University of Edinburgh.

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  1. School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK

    Ju Wang

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  1. Ju Wang
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Correspondence to Ju Wang.

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Wang, J. Closure and Underdetermination Again. Philosophia 42, 1129–1140 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9523-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9523-0

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