Abstract
In his topical article, Andrew Cling claims that the best extant formulation of the so-called epistemic regress problem rests on five assumptions that are too strong. Cling offers an improved version that rests on a different set of three core epistemic assumptions, each of which he argues for. Despite of owing a great deal to Cling’s ideas, I argue that the epistemic regress problem surfaces from more fundamental assumptions than those offered by Cling. There are ultimately two core assumptions—in fact two contradictory strands within the concept of epistemic support—which jointly create a powerful challenge for our pursuit of paramount epistemic values.
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Notes
Aikin (2005, 195-196) argues that the analogy is not very apt. See, however, Sanford (1975) for an interesting way of uncovering the general structure of regress arguments. According to Sanford, regress arguments dealing respectively with an infinite extent of time and with the infinite divisibility of time and space share a similar structure. Arguably, arguments dealing respectively with an infinite stretch of train carriages and with epistemic justification may have the same structure as well. Sanford’s solution to the regress arguments is based on the idea of conceptual vagueness. I shall not enter into this approach here, since its application to the epistemic regress problem does not sound too promising to me.
Here I agree with Klein (1999, 299), who holds that some foundationalists could consistently maintain both that some propositions are self-supporting reasons and that reasons must be supported. An additional argument is needed to block out self-support. One might, for instance, invoke the assumption that genuine support is not circular, or that genuine support is irreflexive. Either assumption suffices to preclude situations in which a supported proposition is included in its own evidential ancestry.
Aikin (2005, 198) has reported that a specific kind of simplification argument, due to Oakley (1976, 227-228) and Foley (1978, 313), works as an argument against reflexivity in support-relations. If reflexivity is allowed, repeated application of a simplification rule for conjunction leads to an absurdity. Applying the simplification rule, we get the sequence S 4 = 〈P 0, (P 0 and P 1), (P 0 and P 1 and P 2), …〉. However, we can replace P 0 with ~P 0 in S 4 without any trouble. Hence irreflexivity of evidential support. The force of this argument might be objected, though, by arguing that implication is not sufficient for support (e.g. Cling 2008, 402).
Bergmann has argued that the lack of reasons is not sufficient for arbitrariness. According to Bergmann, basic beliefs—beliefs that share some feature F—can be non-inferentially justified. Suppose I believe that P 0, and P 0 in fact has the feature F. According to Bergmann (2004, 164), my belief is justified provided P 0 in fact is basic; no inference needed. I may even believe that all beliefs having F are non-inferentially justified, but this belief plays no role in the justification of my belief P 0. The justification of my belief P 0 depends on the truth of the claim that all beliefs having F are non-inferentially justified, not on my justifiedly believing this claim or having any reason for it. (Bergmann 2004, 164.) Klein has replied that non-inferentially justified propositions, those that purportedly have autonomous warrant, do not terminate the threatening regress in a satisfactory way. Perhaps P 0 in fact has autonomous warrant, but this possibility does not increase the warrant that I have for P 0 if I doubt whether P 0 is true. (Klein 2004, 169-171.) I agree with Klein, at least insofar as I believe that if I am skeptical about P 0, the possibility that P 0 enjoys autonomous warrant does not give me any comfort whatsoever. In that case P 0 is, from my point of view, arbitrary.
Incidentally, Cling (2008, 415) sets forth an argument to the effect that self-support is not really support-affording by appealing to the assumption that support is irreflexive. It is not very clear to me whether Cling himself defends this argument, but if he does, the trio expands into a quartet again.
Of course, the assumption (4) in this quartet may be worked into the assumption (1), but for the sake of clarity I shall here formulate an additional assumption to Cling’s trio.
I would like to thank Olli Koistinen, Juho Ritola, Krister Talvinen, and two anonymous referees of Philosophia for criticism and comments. My work on this paper has been financially supported by the Academy of Finland (grant 8114178).
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Kajamies, T. A Quintet, a Quartet, a Trio, a Duo? The Epistemic Regress Problem, Evidential Support, and Skepticism. Philosophia 37, 525–534 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-009-9181-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-009-9181-9