Abstract
The normative character of meaning creates deep problems for the attempt to give a reductive explanation of the constitution of meaning. I identify and critically examine an increasingly popular Carnap-style position, which I call Internalized Meaning Factualism (versions of which I argue are defended by, e.g., Robert Brandom, Paul Horwich and Huw Price), that promises to solve the problems. According to this position, the problem of meaning can be solved by prohibiting an external perspective on meaning constituting properties. The idea is that if we stick to a perspective on meaning that is internal to meaning discourse, then we can preserve the normativity of meaning and yet locate meaning in the natural world. I develop a generic motivation for this position, but argue that, since this motivation is consistent with the Ramsey–Carnap–Lewis–Jackson reductionist strategy, internalized meaning factualism is unstable. The problems about the normativity of meaning can therefore not be sidestepped in this way.
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Notes
Here I am trying to give the flavour of Kripke’s influential arguments about rule-following, Kripke (1982).
See, e.g., Boghossian (1989).
Horwich’s account is explicitly reductive, though, of course, in such a way that the paradox will not arise. Brandom explicitly distances his position from Platonism. Price’s position is designed to avoid the paradox while also avoiding Platonist non-naturalism.
Another internalizing strategy would be of a more idealist bend, see, e.g., [McDowell (1977, 1994)]. I do not discuss this here since it seems to me to get rid of the tension between physics and semantics by denying that there are any non-normative facts at all. We also find something like the internalizing strategy in Davidson’s writings, e.g., Davidson (1990), where, e.g., interpretation is explained via the metaphor of triangulation which seems to exclude an external perspective. And Wittgenstein (1953), §201 suggests the same: that there is a way of following a rule which is not based on interpretation of a given rule.
It is perhaps difficult to see how Horwich’s deflationism suggests this kind of reading. The thought is that it is this kind of internalist allegiance to standards which allows us to make sense of the right hand side of the deflationary schemas for ‘refers’ and ‘true’: (y)[N refers to y iff N = y] and (y)[predicative concept F is true of y iff Fy]. Contrast this to the standard-independent inflationary schemas: (x)(y)[singular concept x refers to y iff Cxy] and (x)(y)[x is true of y iff Rxy], where ‘C’ and ‘R’ are some substantial (e.g., causal) relations (see Horwich, 1998, p. 108).
Had we been discussing whether ‘wallaby’ has a meaning, then M would contain not the relevant segment of discourse about dogs, but an appropriate segment of discourse about medium sized marsupials.
Steps (1)–(6) follows Lewis, (1972). I have suppressed some of the issues concerning this type of reduction, e.g., whether there has to be a unique realiser (see also Lewis 1994).
For a systematic account of these notions of defining the topic and locating properties, see Jackson (1998).
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Hohwy, J. Internalized Meaning Factualism. Philosophia 34, 325–336 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-006-9027-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-006-9027-7