Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Conscious belief as constructed memory: an empirical challenge to dispositionalism

  • Published:
Mind & Society Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

There is an emerging consensus that human behavior is governed by two types of processes: System 1 processes, which are quicker, automatic, and run in parallel, and System 2 (S2) processes, which are slower, more conscious, and run in serial. Among such “dual-process” theorists, however, there is disagreement about whether the premises we use in our conscious, S2 reasoning should be considered as beliefs. In this exchange, one facet that has been largely overlooked is how conscious beliefs are structurally and functionally similar to episodic memories. This article will argue that the similarities between beliefs and episodic memories, specifically in light of Daniel Schacter’s widely influential constructive memory framework, highlight a heretofore unexamined empirical weakness of dispositional accounts of S2 beliefs. In addition, this perspective helps situate beliefs within our broader understanding of how information is encoded and retrieved in the brain.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. For a more complete treatment, see Carruthers (2013a), for responses, see Frankish (2012).

  2. For Carruthers analysis of these findings, see 2011: 325–367.

References

  • Bartlett FC (1932) Remembering. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

  • Bower GH, Black JB, Turner TJ (1979) Scripts in memory for text. Cogn Psychol 11:177–220

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brehm J (1956) Postdecision changes in the desirability of alternatives. J Abnorm Soc Psychol 52:384–389

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brinol P, Petty R (2003) Overt head movements and persuasion: a self-validation analysis. J Personal Soc Psychol 84:1123–1139

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burgess PW, Shallice T (1996) Confabulation and the control of recollection. Memory 4:359–411

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carruthers P (2011) The opacity of mind: an integrative theory of self-knowledge. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Carruthers P (2013a) On knowing your own beliefs: a representationalist account. In: Nottelmann N (ed) New essays on belief: structure, constitution and content. Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp 145–165

    Google Scholar 

  • Carruthers P (2013b) Mindreading the self. In: Baron-Cohen S, Lombardo M, Tager-Flusberg H (eds) Understanding other minds: perspectives from developmental social neuroscience, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 467–486

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Damasio AR (1989) Time-locked multiregional retroactivation: a systems-level proposal for the neural substrates of recall and recognition. Cognition 33:25–62

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Brigard F (2014) Is Memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of episodic hypothetical thnking. Synthese 191(2):155–185

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Estes WK (1997) Processes of memory loss, recovery, and distortion. Psychol Rev 104:148–169

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eysenck MW, MacLeod C, Matthews A (1987) Cognitive functioning in anxiety. Psychol Res 49(2–3):189–195

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Festinger L, Carlsmith JM (1959) Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. J Abnorm Soc Psychol 58:203–210

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frankish K (2004) Mind and supermind. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Frankish K (2009) Systems and levels: dual-system theories and the personal-subpersonal distinction. In: Evans J, Frankish K (eds) In two minds: dual processes and beyond. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 89–107

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Frankish K (2012) Dual systems and dual attitudes. Mind Soc 11:41–51

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frankish K, Evans J (2009) The duality of mind: an historical perspective. In: Evans J, Frankish K (eds) In two minds: dual processes and beyond. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 1–35

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Gertler B (2011) Self-knowledge and the transparency of belief. In: Hatzimoysis A (ed) Self-knowledge. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 125–145

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Godden D, Baddeley AD (1980) When does context influence recognition memory? Brit J Psychol 71:99–104

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goodwin DW, Powell B, Bremer D, Hoine H, Stern J (1969) Alcohol and recall: state dependent effects in man. Science 163:1358

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hunsaker MR, Kesner RP (2013) The operation of pattern separation and pattern completion processes associated with different attributes or domains of memory. Neurosci Biobehav R 37(1):36–58

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huttenlocher J, Hedges LV, Prohaska V (1992) Memory for day of the week: a 5 + 2 day cycle. J Exp Psychol Gen 121:313–325

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huttenlocher J, Hedges LV, Vevea J (2000) Why do categories affect stimulus judgments? J Exp Psychol Gen 129:220–241

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson MK, Hashtroudi S, Lindsay DS (1993) Source monitoring. Psychol Bull 114:3–28

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klein SB, Lax ML (2010) The unanticipated resilience of trait self-knowledge in the face of neural damage. Memory 18:918–948

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klein SB, Loftus J, Kihlstrom JF (1996) Self-knowledge of an amnesic patient: toward a neuropsychology of personality and social psychology. J Exp Psychol Gen 125:250–260

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Loftus EF, Davis D (2006) Recovered Memories. Annu Rev Clin Psychol 2:469–498

  • Loftus EF, Pickrell JE (1995) The formation of false memories. Psychiatr Ann 25:720–725

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McClelland JL, McNaughton BL, O’Reilly RC (1995) Why there are complementary learning systems in the hippocampus and neocortex: insights from the successes and failures of connectionist models of learning and memory. Psychol Rev 102:419–457

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mills J (1958) Changes in moral attitudes following temptation. J Personal 26(4):517–531

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Morris LW, Liebert RM (1970) Relationship of cognitive and emotional components of text anxiety to physiological arousal and academic performance. J Consult Clin Psychol 35:332–337

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moscovitch M (1994) Memory and working with-memory: evaluation of a component process model and comparisons with other models. In: Schacter DL, Tulving E (eds) Memory systems. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 269–310

    Google Scholar 

  • Norman DA, Bobrow DG (1979) Descriptions: an intermediate stage in memory retrieval. Cogn Psychol 11:107–123

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Read JD (1996) From a passing thought to a false memory in 2 minutes: confusing real and illusory events. Psychonom Bull Rev 3:105–111

  • Roediger HL III, McDermott KB (1995) Creating false memories: remembering words not presented in lists. J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 21:803–814

  • Rumelhart DE, Norman DA (1985) Representation of knowledge. In: Aitkenhead AM, Slack JM (eds) Issues in cognitive modeling. Lawrence Erlbaum Associate Ltd, Hove, pp 15–62

    Google Scholar 

  • Schacter DL (1989) Memory. In: Posner MI (ed) Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 683–725

    Google Scholar 

  • Schacter DL, Addis DR (2007) The cognitive neuroscience of constructive memory: remembering the past and imagining the future. Phil Trans R Soc B 362:773–786

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schacter DL, Norman KA, Koutstaal W (1998) The cognitive neuroscience of constructive memory. Annu Rev Psychol 49:289–318

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schwitzgebel E (2002) A phenomenal, dispositional account of belief. Nous 36(2):249–275

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Simon L, Greenberg J, Brehm J (1995) Trivialization: the forgotten mode of dissonance reduction. J Personal Soc Psychol 68:247–260

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Squire LR (1992) Memory and the hippocampus: a synthesis from findings with rats, monkeys, and humans. Psychol Rev 99:195–231

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Starzyk K, Fabrigar L, Soryal A, Fanning J (2009) A painful reminder: the role of level and salience of attitude importance in cognitive dissonance. Personal Sol Psychol B 35:126–137

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Steyvers M, Hemmer P (2012) Reconstruction from memory in naturalistic environments. In: Ross BH (ed) The psychology of learning and motivation, vol 56. Elsevier Publishing, Amsterdam, pp 126–144

    Google Scholar 

  • Teasdale JD, Fogarty SJ (1979) Differential effects of induced mood on retrieval of pleasant and unpleasant events from episodic memory. J Abnorm Psychol 88:248–257

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tulving E (1993) Self-knowledge of an amnesic individual is represented abstractly. In: Srull TK, Wyer RS (eds) Advances in social cognition. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, pp 147–156

    Google Scholar 

  • Tulving E, Thomson DM (1973) Encoding specificity and retrieval processes in episodic memory. Psychol Rev 80:352–373

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wilson TD, Kraft D (1993) Why do I love thee?: effects of repeated introspections about a dating relationship on attitudes toward the relationship. Pers Soc Psychol B 19:409–418

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1425 Harrison St, Apt 231, Oakland, CA, 94612, USA

    Vishnu Sridharan

Authors
  1. Vishnu Sridharan
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Vishnu Sridharan.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Sridharan, V. Conscious belief as constructed memory: an empirical challenge to dispositionalism. Mind Soc 14, 21–33 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-014-0156-6

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-014-0156-6

Keywords

Search

Navigation