Expert Knowledge and Human Wisdom: A Socratic Note on the Philosophy of Expertise

Abstract

In this paper we attempt to understand what Socrates says about expertise and virtue in Plato’s dialogue Laches in the light of Socrates’ idea of “human wisdom” in the Apology of Socrates (20d8, 23a7). Conducting a good life requires both “knowledge about good and bad things” (Laches), that is, knowledge about human well-being, and “human wisdom” (Apology). Socrates aspires to epistemic autonomy: Trust in your own reason, and don’t let any expert tell you anything about your own happiness.

Appendix: The Modus Operandi of Socratic Investigations

The aim of a Socratic What-is-F?-Question is an explicit definition. Of course, Plato does not have the modern concept of an adequate definition, but many dialogues, such as the Laches, show that an acceptable and sufficient answer to a Socratic What-is-F?-question is an explicit definition. For example, Socrates enquires in the Laches whether every case of the definiendum courage does in fact fall under the suggested definiens and vice versa (for a detailled analysis of the Laches cf. Hardy 2014).

A definition has a definiens and a definiendum. The definiens contains one or several universally quantified proposition(s) about what the definiendum is. And the definiens of an explanatory definition of F also states the necessary and sufficient conditions for the state of affairs F to obtain, such as the conditions for courageous actions. In the Euthyphro, which is about the definition of piety, Socrates characterises the object of his question as that which is “always the same with itself” in every pious (or not pious) action (5c8–d6). A general term “F”, such as “pious” refers not only to a particular, such as a particular pious action, but it always refers to one and the same general state of affairs, the universal/Platonic form F.

A precise formulation of an explicit definition takes the form of a universally quantified, biconditional proposition: for every X, X has the property F IFF X possesses the properties {E₁, …, E_n}. In Plato’s dialogues, definitions are mostly formulated in a declarative sentence, such as “courage is wise perseverance”, in which the grammatical subject refers to the definiendum, and the predicate refers to the definiens. A correct definition has a definiens and a definiendum which both the same extension and intension. The extension is the set of all the particulars that fall under the definiens. This is what Socrates refers to when he is talking about “what is the same in all instances of courage” in the Laches. The intension of a definition is its information; the intension is what one knows about F, if one understands the meaning of the definiens’ propositions. Both the extension and the intension of the definiens are what Socrates refers to, when he asks in the Laches “what faculty is the same whether in pleasure or in pain or in any of the things in which we said just now it was to be found, that we call courage” (Laches 192b). Understanding the meaning of a proposition is knowing its truth-conditions. If we understand the meaning of a definiens and thus know the truth-conditions of the propositions therein, then we also know the conditions for the correct use of the corresponding predicate, that is, the general term “F”. A definition of F is, in this respect, also an elucidation of a general term “F”. A definition of F also states the necessary and sufficient conditions of a certain state of affairs (or a certain situation) to which the definition of “F” applies. The particular states of affairs or situations which fall under the definition of F are instances of F. The object of a definition is, however, an universal (Laches 198c9–199a9).

In examining a hypothetical definition Socrates invokes two intellectual operations at once: on the one hand he asks whether certain instances of F show what the universal F is, and on the other he asks whether a certain particular is in fact an instance of F. Socrates starts from a twofold hypothesis: to begin with he assumes the universal F in question possesses certain properties and asks whether a possible instance of F has all these properties. Socrates also assumes that certain cases are in fact instances of F and asks whether the definition of F covers all these cases. Thus the interlocutors in the Laches examine, for one thing, whether actions by which a person faces a danger with wise perserverance show that courage consists in doing exactly that in every case. For another, they examine, for example, whether soldiers who fight with superior technology and in superior numbers with wise perseverance against their opponents, are really courageous (192b9–194c1). In other words: Socrates considers two questions at once: (1) What is F? (2) Is this particular X an instance of F? He seeks to find a reflective equilibrium between plausible hypothetical definitions and true beliefs about particular instances of F such as undoubtly courageous action.

The hypothetical definitions examined in Platos dialogues have this form: For every X: X has the property F IFF X has the properties {E₁, …, E_n}. An example is a definition of courage in Laches 192b–d: A person is courageous IFF she faces a danger with perseverance and her conduct is both wise and praiseworthy. Let us construe two examples: if a person is courageous IFF she faces a danger with perseverance and her conduct is both wise and praiseworthy; and if every person who undergoes prolonged medical treatment faces a danger with perseverance (the danger arising from her medical condition) and this conduct is both wise and praiseworthy, then everybody who undergoes prolonged medical treatment is courageous. If a captain undertakes a dangerous voyage from Venice to Cyprus, steers the ship with nautical prudence and his seafaring is praiseworthy (for example because he brings Othello to Cyprus), then he acts courageously.

From the definitional principle mentioned above another principle can be derived that Socrates applies in refuting definitions: If there is at least one X that has some, but not all of the F defining properties {E₁, …, E_n}, then it is not true that every X has the property F. Socrates invokes this principle together with the logical rule of the reductio ad absurdum, combining two contradictory assumptions to which his interlocutor agrees and concluding that the definition is false. The discussion between Socrates and Laches contains two examples of this model of refutation (Laches 192b–193d). Socrates and Laches agree upon the assumption that every courageous action is—above all—praiseworthy (kalon). According to Laches’ first definition, one is courageous IFF one faces danger with perseverance. But some of those actions are not praiseworthy. Therefore it is not true that every person is courageous when she faces danger with perseverance. The second, revised suggestion says that a person is courageous IFF she faces danger with wise perseverance. But some of those actions are (again) not praiseworthy. Therefore it is not true that every person is courageous IFF she faces danger with wise perseverance.¹⁴