Abstract
A virtue account is focused on the character of those who argue. It is frequently assumed, however, that virtues are not action guiding, since they describe how to be and so fail to give us specific actions to take in a sticky situation. In terms of argumentation, we might say that being a charitable arguer is virtuous, but knowing so provides no details about how to argue successfully. To close this gap, I develop a parallel with the thick-thin distinction from ethics and use Hursthouse’s notion of “v-rules”. I also draw heavily from the work in argumentation by Daniel Cohen to develop Wayne Brockriede’s notion of arguing lovingly. But “argue lovingly” has a delicious ambiguity. For Brockriede it describes how we engage with others arguers. It can also mean, however, a loving attachment to knowledge, understanding, and truth. Applying the thick-thin distinction to argumentation in general and loving argumentation in particular shows that a virtue theoretic approach to argumentation is valuable for two reasons: it can provide one articulation of what it means to be a virtuous arguer and provide some insights into how to become one.
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Notes
Another way to express this is to say that there is a gap between “good arguer” and “good argumentation”. It might be similar to the gap between “good soldier” and “good soldiering”. We think of a good soldier in virtue terms such as courageous and loyal. But “good soldiering” defeats the enemy. Below I develop a notion of “good argumentation” that rejects the rules and strategies/military metaphors approach to argumentation.
There are three, fairly standard questions for virtue accounts: (1) Are virtues defined by a telos? (2) Are virtues identified a priori or a posteriori? (3) Are argumentative virtues necessarily moral virtues? Below I will discuss several parallels with virtue ethics, but I will not claim that argumentative virtues are necessarily moral virtues. The account I develop here will allow the thick/thin distinction to be applied no matter how that issue is resolved. So too, what I say here about the thick/thin distinction will be workable for either answer to the first two questions.
I focus on Annas and Hursthouse, but there are several philosophers applying a virtue framework to action. There is a philosopher in particular I want to highlight. Christine Swanton has developed a virtue-ethical account of right action in Virtue Ethics: A pluralistic view (2003). Snow draws on social psychology to examine virtues as a subset of enduring traits of individuals in Virtue as Social Intelligence. (2010).
Julia Annas claims that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are not thin concepts. To illustrate this is so, she suggests we consider the different content in “Be a good girl” versus “Be a good boy”. Since the content carried in ‘good’ changes from one sentence to the next, Annas considers ‘good’ to be a thick concept.
Kirchin credits Bernard Williams with coining “thick concept”, but Gilbert Ryle used the “thick description” to indicate the specific, full-blooded description needed to categorize actions. See Kirchin 2013c, 60.
This is a contentious claim. Some ethicists argue that thick and thin differ in kind. For a short summary of the arguments on both sides, see Kirchin 2013b, 2–6.
Wayne Brockriede recognized the distinction between thick and thin concepts in his 1972 article “Arguers as Lovers”. At the very beginning of his article he states: “Perhaps as good a way as any to distinguish the study of logic from the study of argument is to understand that logicians can safely ignore the influence of people on the transaction; arguers cannot”. (1) I take it that this means logic doesn’t need a virtue approach, but argumentation does.
For a substantial discussion on separatism and non-separatism, see Kirchin 2013a.
Cohen (2009) argues that “proportionality” is a virtue that is needed in conjunction with open mindedness to avoid vices. It is possible to think of ‘proportionality’ as a virtue. Here, however, I consider proportionality to be the recognition that virtue is the mean between vices. One advantage of taking this Aristotelian approach is that proportionality is a part of every virtue and need not be discussed separately.
This tripartite approach is as old as Aristotle, but I use Cohen’s description here.
Brockriede says that arguing requires logic, an arguer, and relationships among those who argue (1972). It would seem that he focuses on only the first two of these elements. His discussion of the relationship between arguers, however, includes a sense of rhetoric in the way Cohen uses it here.
For ease of statement, I focus on bilateral relationships here. Sometimes, however, arguers are in a multi-lateral relationship. I discuss group deliberative virtues below.
Brockriede distinguishes between arguers as rapists and arguers as seducers. The difference between the two is important for thinking about vice in argumentation. Since my focus here is virtuous argumentation, I have conflated them. If we think of rape and seduction on the excess side of vice, we might think of abstinence on the side of deficiency. Not being willing to reason with a coarguer would be a different sort of vice, although also related to power.
Aikin and Clanton’s list of deliberative virtues is insightful, in part because they also discuss deliberative vices. An entire manual of v-rules could be produced from their (2010).
Above I said that knowing why is part of the motivation to be virtuous. But knowing why is part of being in an epistemic community because it is part of the expertise in the community practice of giving and asking for reasons.
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Thorson, J.K. Thick, Thin, and Becoming a Virtuous Arguer. Topoi 35, 359–366 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9320-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9320-9