Abstract
Any empirical physical theory must have implications for observable events at the scale of everyday life, even though that scale plays no special role in the basic ontology of the theory itself. The fundamental physical scales are microscopic for the “local beables” of the theory and universal scale for the non-local beables (if any). This situation creates strong demands for any precise quantum theory. This paper examines those constraints, and illustrates some ways in which they can be met.
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Maudlin, T. The Universal and the Local in Quantum Theory. Topoi 34, 349–358 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9301-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9301-z