Abstract
Color relationalism holds that the colors are constituted by relations to subjects. The introspective rejoinder against this view claims that it is opposed to our phenomenally-informed, pre-theoretic intuitions. The rejoinder seems to be correct about how colors appear when looking at how participants respond to an item about the metaphysical nature of color but not when looking at an item about the ascription of colors. The present article expands the properties investigated to sound and taste and inspects the mentioned asymmetry, with a particular focus on the principle of charity. Using a metaphysical item, we find that color and sound are no different from shape, our control for a clearly anti-relational property. Taste, on the other hand, is no different from likability, our control for a clearly relational property. Importantly, we find that the disparity between metaphysical and ascription items is due to participants using a principle of charity to interpret disagreement cases such that both parties can be correct.
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Notes
It is important to recognize that there is dissent. It has been argued that it is misguided to say that the contemporary dispositionalist view holds that relations to subjects constitute the colors (Roberts et al. 2014).
We use a very inclusive sense of ‘intuition.’ We use it to be synonymous with ‘judgment.’ Importantly, we do not use it in such a way that being non-inferential or non-deliberative would be a necessary condition for being an intuition. [More generally, we are inclined to think that it is unproblematic to use a fairly unrestricted sense of ‘intuition’ when doing experimental philosophy work on intuitions for reasons similar to those given in Andow (2015)].
We understand that there are debates about the value of intuitions in metaphysics currently underway (Ladyman and Ross 2007; Dorr 2010, and Maclaurin and Dyke 2012). We cannot engage in this metaphilosophical debate in this article. Our opposition does not question the value of intuitions in metaphysics.
As the ascription item uses the word ‘correct,’ the principle of charity to which we appeal is formulated using this word. We used ‘correct’ over ‘truth,’ because there is a concern with using the latter: the folk are known to sometimes interpret ‘truth’ in a different way from philosophers (Fain and Kaelin 1960).
We used the determinable shapes n-sided instead of determinate shapes like square. People do not know many determinate shape names, and we needed shapes that were different enough from each other to create our large and small disagreement cases.
We chose this likert design to allow for easy comparison with Roberts et al. (2014). We also wanted to avoid a neutral stage. We did not want participants with weak intuitions not to express them.
The analyses for both parametric and non-parametric statistics yield the same results, qualitatively.
The means for shape are 7.8 for large disagreement and 8 for small, for color (8.4 large/8.7 small), sound (8.1 large/8.4 small), taste (7.7 large/8.3 small), and likability (6 large/7 small).
We would like Keith Allen for this helpful comment.
It is perhaps possible to read ‘the colour of the object’ not to imply that the object has some color. This is not the natural reading, especially given that the context in which the question is asked is one in which there is a disagreement between two parties about which color the object is. However, perhaps the irrealists in our study who disagree with the metaphysical item read it so as not to imply that the object has a color.
The same five by two by two ANOVA was run but without participants who expressed irrealist intuitions. The same results obtain. The between-subjects analyses find a significant effect of property (\(F(4, 244) =\) 26.45, \(p< 0.001\), \(\eta ^{2 }=0.30\)) with the same pairwise differences. The within-subjects analyses find an interaction between disagreement size and order (\(F(4, 244) = 16.26\), \(p < 0.001\), \(\eta ^{2 }=0.06\)) with the same pairwise differences. No other significant differences emerge.
This seems true for likability as well. So, we suspect that there is a tendency for the metaphysical item to be affected by disagreement size for this property too. Descriptively, this is exactly what we find. This said, as likability was not affected by disagreement size for the ascription item either, we suspect that there is something more going on. We speculate about why the ascription item for likability was not affected by disagreement size later.
It is worth pointing out that there are going to be obvious practical limitations with designing a study that eliminates the possibility of participants being biased, especially if the idea of ‘bias’ is extended to include biases that participants have but are unaware of having.
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Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Keith Allen, James Andow, and four anonymous referees for helpful advice.
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Appendix
Appendix
Note the first disagreement case always spoke of Alex and Harry and the second always spoke of Tom and David.
Large disagreement | Small disagreement | |
|---|---|---|
Cases | ||
Shape | Alex and Harry examine an object’s shape. Alex and Harry examine the object in typical lighting from the same position. They are both fluent English speakers and have normal eyesight. Alex says that the object is three-sided while Harry says that the very same object is twenty-sided | Alex and Harry examine an object’s shape. Alex and Harry examine the object in typical lighting from the same position. They are both fluent English speakers and have normal eyesight. Alex says that the object is nineteen-sided while Harry says that the very same object is twenty-sided |
Color | Alex and Harry examine an object’s colour. Alex and Harry examine the object in typical lighting from the same position. They are both fluent English speakers and have normal eyesight. Alex says that the object is entirely yellow while Harry says that the very same object is entirely blue | Alex and Harry examine an object’s colour. Alex and Harry examine the object in typical lighting from the same position. They are both fluent English speakers and have normal eyesight. Alex says that the object is entirely black while Harry says that the very same object is entirely dark-blue |
Sound | Alex and Harry examine an object’s sound. Alex and Harry listen to the object in a studio room from the same position. They are both fluent English speakers and have normal hearing. Alex says that the object is only moaning, while Harry says that the very same object is only beeping | Alex and Harry listen to an object’s sound. Alex and Harry listen to the object in a studio room from the same position. They are both fluent English speakers and have normal hearing. Alex says that the object is only honking, while Harry says that the very same object is only beeping |
Taste | Alex and Harry examine an object’s taste. Alex and Harry clear their palate and then taste the object in typical conditions. They are both fluent English speakers and have normal taste perception. Alex says that the object is only plasticy, while Harry says that the very same object is only almondy | Alex and Harry examine an object’s taste. Alex and Harry clear their palate and then taste the object in typical conditions. They are both fluent English speakers and have normal taste perception. Alex says that the object is only walnuty while Harry says that the very same object is only almondy |
Likability | Alex and Harry examine an object’s taste. Alex and Harry both clear their palate and then taste the object in typical conditions. They are both fluent English speakers and have normal taste perception. Alex says that the object is disgusting, while Harry says that the very same object is very likable | Alex and Harry examine an object’s taste. Alex and Harry both clear their palate and then taste the object in typical conditions. They are both fluent English speakers and have normal taste perception. Alex says that the object is only okay, while Harry says that the very same object is very likable |
Metaphysical items | ||
Shape | In reality, there is an absolute fact of the matter about the shape of the object regardless of how it appears to Alex and Harry and regardless of what they think, say, or do | In reality, there is an absolute fact of the matter about the shape of the object regardless of how it appears to Alex and Harry and regardless of what they think, say, or do |
Color | In reality, there is an absolute fact of the matter about the colour of the object regardless of how it appears to Alex and Harry and regardless of what they think, say, or do | In reality, there is an absolute fact of the matter about the colour of the object regardless of how it appears to Alex and Harry and regardless of what they think, say, or do |
Sound | In reality, there is an absolute fact of the matter about the sound of the object regardless of how it appears to Alex and Harry and regardless of what they think, say, or do | In reality, there is an absolute fact of the matter about the sound of the object regardless of how it appears to Alex and Harry and regardless of what they think, say, or do |
Taste | In reality, there is an absolute fact of the matter about the taste of the object regardless of how it appears to Alex and Harry and regardless of what they think, say, or do | In reality, there is an absolute fact of the matter about the taste of the object regardless of how it appears to Alex and Harry and regardless of what they think, say, or do |
Likability | In reality, there is an absolute fact of the matter about the likability of the object’s taste regardless of how it appears to Alex and Harry and regardless of what they think, say, or do | In reality, there is an absolute fact of the matter about the likability of the object’s taste regardless of how it appears to Alex and Harry and regardless of what they think, say, or do |
Ascription items | ||
Shape | Alex is correct when he says that the object is three-sided, and in addition Harry is correct when he says the object is twenty-sided. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims are correct | Alex is correct when he says that the object is nineteen-sided, and in addition Harry is correct when he says the object is twenty-sided. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims are correct |
Color | Alex is correct when he says that the object is entirely yellow, and in addition Harry is correct when he says the object is entirely blue. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims are correct | Alex is correct when he says that the object is entirely black, and in addition Harry is correct when he says the object is entirely dark-blue. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims are correct |
Sound | Alex is correct when he says that the object is only moaning and in addition Harry is correct when he says the object is only beeping. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims are correct | Alex is correct when he says that the object is only honking and in addition Harry is correct when he says the object is only beeping. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims are correct |
Taste | Alex is correct when he says that the object is only plasticy, and in addition Harry is correct when he says the object is only almondy. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims are correct | Alex is correct when he says that the object is only walnuty, and in addition Harry is correct when he says the object is only almondy. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims are correct |
Likability | Alex is correct when he says that the object’s taste is disgusting, and in addition Harry is correct when he says the object’s taste is very likable. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims are correct | Alex is correct when he says that the object’s taste is only okay, and in addition Harry is correct when he says the object’s taste is very likable. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims are correct |
Realism items | ||
Shape | The object really has a shape (or shapes) | The object really has a shape (or shapes) |
Color | The object really has a colour (or colours) | The object really has a colour (or colours) |
Sound | The object really has a sound (or sounds) | The object really has a sound (or sounds) |
Taste | The object really has a taste (or tastes) | The object really has a taste (or tastes) |
Likability | The object really has a likability (or likabilities) | The object really has a likability (or likabilities) |
Correspondence items | ||
Shape | Alex’s statement corresponds with how things are when he says the object is three-sided, and in addition Harry’s statement corresponds with the way things are when he says the object is twenty-sided. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims correspond with the way things are | Alex’s statement corresponds with how things are when he says the object is nineteen-sided, and in addition Harry’s statement corresponds with the way things are when he says the object is twenty-sided. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims correspond with the way things are |
Color | Alex’s statement corresponds with how things are when he says that the object is entirely yellow, and in addition Harry’s claim corresponds with how things are when he says the object is entirely blue. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims correspond with how things are | Alex’s statement corresponds with how things are when he says that the object is entirely black, and in addition Harry’s claim corresponds with how things are when he says the object is entirely dark-blue. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims correspond with how things are |
Sound | Alex’s statement corresponds with how things are when he says that the object is only moaning and in addition Harry’s statement corresponds with how things are when he says the object is only beeping. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims correspond with how things are | Alex’s statement corresponds with how things are when he says that the object is only honking and in addition Harry’s statement corresponds with how things are when he says the object is only beeping. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims correspond with how things are |
Taste | Alex’s statement corresponds with how things are when he says that the object is only plasticy, and in addition Harry’s statement corresponds with how things are when he says the object is only almondy. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims correspond with how things are | Alex’s statement corresponds with how things are when he says that the object is only walnuty, and in addition Harry’s statement corresponds with how things are when he says the object is only almondy. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims correspond with how things are |
Likability | Alex’s statement corresponds with how things are when he says that the object’s taste is disgusting, and in addition Harry’s statement corresponds with how things are when he says the object’s taste is very likable. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims correspond with how things are | Alex’s statement corresponds with how things are when he says that the object’s taste is only okay, and in addition Harry’s statement corresponds with how things are when he says the object’s taste is very likable. In other words, both Alex and Harry’s claims correspond with how things are |
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Roberts, P., Schmidtke, K.A. Relationalism about perceptible properties and the principle of charity. Synthese 193, 2779–2803 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0886-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0886-y