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Sets and supersets

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You’re gonna need a bigger boat.

(Jaws)

Abstract

It is a commonplace of set theory to say that there is no set of all well-orderings nor a set of all sets. We are implored to accept this due to the threat of paradox and the ensuing descent into unintelligibility. In the absence of promising alternatives, we tend to take up a conservative stance and tow the line: there is no universe (Halmos, in: Naive set theory, 1960). In this paper, I am going to challenge this claim by taking seriously the idea that we can talk about the collection of all the sets and many more collections beyond that. A method of articulating this idea is offered through an indefinitely extending hierarchy of set theories. It is argued that this approach provides a natural extension to ordinary set theory and leaves ordinary mathematical practice untouched.

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Notes

  1. We should note that the formulation has some problems as discussed in Shapiro and Wright’s (2007), however, these issues can be largely ignored for the purposes of this paper.

  2. Indeed all discussion of reference to collections in this paper will be collective rather than distributive unless stated otherwise. It should also be noted that we shall sometimes use reference to pluralities in place of collective reference. For example, in speaking about the totality itself of natural numbers, we speak of referring to them rather than it. For our purposes, we take it that articulations of either kind are interchangeable, although we understand that this assumption is controversial (see Sect. 2.2).

  3. For further discussion of this and related points see (Dummett 1993, p. 439).

  4. For a detailed discussion of relativised notions of definiteness and their impact on indefinite extensibility see Shapiro and Wright (2007).

  5. This is a standard demand in a mainstream set theory like ZFC. In fact, the axiom of foundation prohibits there being any self-membered sets.

  6. If we had started this process with the empty set and continued as above, we would end up with the von Neumann ordinals.

  7. We can also see this problem emerging from the definition of indefinite extensibility. Let R be as above. Then R is a definite totality, so by reference to that totality we should be able to form a larger totality than R. Perhaps we try to form \(R\cup \{R\}\), which should also be a set. But this cannot be right. We can see that \(R\notin R\), so we must have \(R\cup \{R\}\supsetneq R\); and yet R already contains all the non-self-membered sets: this is impossible.

  8. Alternatively, we might take this problem as evidence that our collecting up of the natural numbers into a set is also problematic. Since the collecting failed for R, perhaps we should be suspicious of its abilities to collect the natural numbers too. This could then lead to an ultra-finitist position, which it outside the scope of considerations in this paper (Nelson 1986).

  9. Of course, his point is to head off talk of classes too. With regard to superset theories, he remarks, “I can’t believe that any such view on the nature of “\(\in \)” can possibly be correct. Are the reasons for which one believes in classes really strong enough to make one believe in the possibility of such a hierarchy?” Our answer is yes, but given Boolos’s nominalist tendencies and his paranoia about even set-sized entities, his reaction is understandable (Boolos 1998a).

  10. Similar work has been done with regard to the truth predicate by Halbach (1995).

  11. The difficulty here is not so much the internal axioms of each membership relation but how different membership relations are related.

  12. For a more up front adherence to the rejection response, Mayberry’s (1977) provides. Mayberry discusses a similar problem to the one we have been investigating. He observes that if we indulge in the effort to provide a metatheory for set theory, we appear to become stuck in a kind of regress. Mayberry’s solution is to stipulate that set theory should be the theory upon which our spade turns.

  13. The adherent of this approach should see no problem in this. While a plurality of objects may be quantified over using a single variable, this does not of itself entail that the plurality is an entity over and above its members.

  14. Reinhardt’s imagination based approach could also be thought of as modal (Reinhardt 1974).

  15. \(\kappa \) in this case will be inaccessible and thus we have—as we’ll define later—a natural model of ZFC.

  16. For some examples of attempts to get to grips with these problems, see Fine (2005) or Linnebo (2012a).

  17. It should be noted that Hellman’s approach from 1989 avoids talk of construction and is able to work within the simpler modality of S5.

  18. It should be noted that unlike a great deal of Forster’s work, this is not directly related to Quine’s NF.

  19. By taking limits of sequences of membership relations, as in the \(SETS\,\times \,SETS\) example, we can make theories which appear to capture this phenomenon, but which are still prey to Principle 1. No matter what, something seems to be left out. It is for this reason that we call Principle 1, philosophical rather than mathematical.

  20. See the Appendix for a detailed axiomatisation of \(SET\,+\,SETS\). It is, however, worth observing a certain deviance in the axiomatisation. Consider the proper \(\eta \)-set, \(V^{\in }\), of all the \(\in \)-sets and the proper \(\eta \)-set, \(On^{\in }\), of all the \(\in \)-ordinals. \(V^{\in }\) and \(On^{\in }\) are objects in our theory and as such we might expect that the axiom of pairing for \(\in \) to give us some z such that \(V^{\in }\in z\) and \(On^{\in }\in z\). This cannot occur in the theory of SETS \(+\) SETS; thus, the full axiom of pairing fails. While there will be some y such that \(V^{\in }\eta y\) and \(On^{\in }\eta y\), some damage to our intuitive understanding of pairing has been done.

  21. A full axiomatisation can be found in Bourbaki (1972).

  22. We should note that the universe axiom is equivalent to the existence of unboundedly many strongly inaccessible cardinals, so the theory here is noticeably stronger than ZFC. However, generalising Cohen’s trick with standard models, Feferman has shown that theory with seemingly cosmetic differences to Grothendieck’s is equiconsistent with ZFC (Cohen 1966; Feferman and Kreisel 1969). As we shall see, this is not surprising given that inaccessible cardinals are comparatively weak and are not known to have any tangible effects on combinatorial questions of palpable mathematics. In particular, McLarty has shown that Fermat’s theorem can actually be proven in finite order arithmetic, which is very much weaker than ZFC.

  23. Reinhardt and Ackermann also developed set theories along similar lines, see Reinhardt (1974). While there are important technical differences between these approaches, they share the same philosophical shortcomings from our superset theory point of view.

  24. I thank the referee for this particularly succinct way of putting the problem.

  25. An explicit axiomatisation can be found in Halbach (2011).

  26. More formally, \(\textit{T(PA)}\vdash T_{0}\ulcorner 0=0\urcorner \) where \(\ulcorner \cdot \urcorner \) is a coding function.

  27. More formally, \(\textit{T(PA)}\nvdash T_{0}\ulcorner T_{0}\ulcorner 0=0\urcorner \urcorner \). Indeed, depending on the coding function used, we may be able to show that \(\textit{T(PA)}\vdash \lnot T_{0}\ulcorner T_{0}\ulcorner 0=0\urcorner \urcorner \).

  28. In 1995, Halbach explores theories involving transfinite sequences of truth predicates. He bounds them at \(\omega _{1}^{CK}\) the supremum of the recursive well-orderings, however, the only reason to stop there is a bound on what a reasonable language should be like.

  29. Leading proponents of non-classical approaches include Priest (1979), Beall (2009) and Field (2008). Rather than admitting an indefinitely extending hierarchy of truth predicates, these approaches revise our logical resources in order to avoid the difficulties of the liar paradox. The dialetheists among them, go so far as to argue that the liar sentence is both truth and false.

  30. The resultant fixed point construction can be understood through the strong Kleene logic, which is non-classical. So there is a sense in which the two approaches enjoy some overlap. However, the underlying methodology of Kripke’s approach is rooted in the inductive construction, not the logic. Indeed there are fully classical variations which have been developed along the same lines (Leitgeb 2005).

  31. This has been explored by Glanzberg in 2004, however, the construction is relatively straightforward. We use the inductive construction to define an extension for \(T_{0}\) and then fixing that interpretation we run Kripke’s construction again to get an extension for \(T_{1}\). It should, however, be noted that there are alternatives to introducing a hierarchy of truth predicates. In response to revenge problems: Cook has thoroughly investigated the use of a transfinite hierarchy of truth values; and Schlenker has investigated transfinite hierarchies of negation operators and their relationship with transfinite truth approaches (Cook 2007; Schlenker 2010). Nonetheless, the underlying theme here is that in order to respond to revenge a semantic concept ends up being stratified in a manner contrary to our initial expectations.

  32. We should also note that some set theorists are not so adverse to proper classes and indeed some important results are difficult to state without their aid. For example, Kunen’s theorem tells us that there can be no non-trivial elementary embedding from the universe to itself. Without saying too much about its content, we may note that it has both philosophical and mathematical importance: it provided a devastating blow to Rheinhardt’s large cardinal programme; and it provides a regularly used tool in the theory of large cardinals. However, an elementary embedding—albeit non-existent—from the universe to itself is so large that it can only be represented by a proper class. Thus, it seems that in order to even state the result, we need to move into the world of supersets. That said, there is a way of stating the essential content of this theorem without using classes. The important information about the embedding can be coded into a set and the following theorem suffices:

    Theorem There is no \(j:V_{\lambda +2}\prec V_{\lambda +2}\) for any \(\lambda \).

    Nonetheless, there does seems to be something more natural about its proper class form. Should a set theorist prefer the class form without irony, I think we should accept that they are adopting a form of superset theory. Overall, this is good for an argument supporting superset theory: even if we adopt a naturalistic outlook there are set theorists to whom we may defer. However, there is also room to be somewhat reserved about this kind of evidence in that this says little about whether supersets were really required in these cases. Moreover, these forays into superset theory generally flounder at the level of proper classes or, at most, a level or so above that.

    Other plausible examples of superset theory include: Easton’s use of class forcing to code just any reasonable relationship we like between the \(\beth \hbox {s}\) and the \(\aleph \hbox {s}\); and the \(\Sigma _{2}\) well-ordering of mice—which exceeds the length of the ordinals—used in the construction of the core model K.

  33. This was first established by Wang in 1952. The truth predicate is defined here in the quite weak sense that we can prove the T-schema for any sentence of the (truth-free) fragment of the language of set theory. Interestingly, NBG is a conservative extension of ZFC, so one might be concerned that the truth predicate would permit a consistency proof of ZFC to be conducted. However, NBG is not strong enough to carry out the further argument, where a theory like MK would suffice, although this is overkill (Wang 1952). For example, consistency can be established more economically by admitting class terms into the Replacement and Separation axioms. Similar remarks apply in the domain of arithmetic where \(ACA_{0}\) can be used to define a truth predicate while consistency cannot be established.

  34. Shapiro (1991) shows how to do something very similar.

  35. Less natural models are offered in the Appendix which show that a couple of examples of superset theories are actually equiconsistent with ZFC.

  36. More strictly, ZFC does not allow us to prove the existence of any object whose transitive closure has cardinality greater than \(\kappa \).

  37. Strictly, those x whose transitive closure has cardinality less than \(\kappa \).

  38. We should note that a model’s being natural is still quite a weak requirement in that we have said nothing about what sentences are true in such a model. For example, if \(\kappa \) is inaccessible then the set of subsets of \(\kappa \) of cardinality \(<\kappa \) provides the domain of a natural structure, although it is not our real focus. For that we also need to know that our theory is satisfied there. Naturalness is being used here to ensure that some of the desirable properties of a model of set theory, but which are beyond the expressive capacities of first order logic, are still captured.

  39. Of course, another seemingly reasonable requirement of naturalness would be that the model of ZFC should exhaust the ordinals. That is, after all, what it is intended to do. However, if we make this move then we could not provide models of the superset theories since they are intended to go beyond the ordinary ordinals provided by ZFC. This is just a limitation of ZFC to furnish the ontological resources for a thoroughly natural model of a superset theory. I think the right way to understand this situation is that this is as much naturalness as ZFC can accommodate.

  40. Indeed, this insight gives us an indication of how we might form a simpler axiomatisation of the superset theories. Rather than using a multiplicity of membership relations each extending their predecessors, we might just start with the axiom of infinity that would give us a natural model for these membership relations. All of this can be done within the language of \({\mathscr {L}}=\{\in \}\). The multiplicity of subsidiary membership relations can then be recovered afterward.

  41. The fact that the existence of such prima facie large objects increases our theoretical leverage on problems in the more worldly field of analysis is one of the more fascinating features of set theoretical research; a feature which currently lacks thoroughgoing philosophical explanation and understanding.

  42. Strictly, I should mention the sharps here. However, these are not large cardinals but very special sets of natural numbers. While distracting, this point is still worth noting: see Jech (2003, Chap. 18). For a possible counterexample to the claim above, we might consider Solovay’s proof that given an inaccessible cardinal, there is a forcing extension V[G] of the universe V that contains an inner model M in which, for example, every set of reals enjoys the perfect set property (Kanamori 2003, Chap. 11). There are a couple of things to say here. First, among the smaller large cardinals, inaccessibility is a particularly natural combinatorial property. Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that it can have concrete (i.e., not merely logical) effects. But second, we should note that while the result above is stated in a model theoretic fashion, the use of forcing to get the inner model makes this a relative consistency result—not a straightforwardly combinatorial one.

  43. This is actually weaker or stronger than measurability depending on whether we show weak or strong compactness for the infinitary language. A notion of medium compactness fits measurability correctly (Chang and Keisler 1973).

  44. A set of sequences of natural numbers is colloquially known as a set of logician’s real numbers. The space of such sequences is homeomorphic with the irrational numbers: hence the relationship with the reals (Moschovakis 1980).

  45. It should also be noted that if determinacy held for every sets of sequences of natural numbers A, then major distortions to set theoretic foundations would occur: e.g., the axiom of choice would fail to be true.

  46. Sets of reals definable in this way are usually known as analytic or coanalytic and are denoted as \(\varvec{\Sigma _{1}^{1}}\) or \(\varvec{\Pi _{1}^{1}}\) respectively (Jech 2003).

  47. These results can be extended with further large cardinals using the work of Martin and Steel (1989). For example, in the presence of a even larger large cardinals, we may show that all the games on sets of sequences definable in the theory of the real numbers are determined.

  48. We should note that not all axiomatisations of superset theories imply the existence of large cardinals. For example, MK set theory (a set theory for a single layer of proper classes beyond ordinary sets) does not imply the existence of an inaccessible cardinal. Within MK we are able to prove that ZFC has a model, but the model could be unnatural. However, if we add an axiom to MK stating that ZFC has a natural model, then the existence of an inaccessible cardinal follows. Similar remarks apply to the theories \(\Gamma _{SETS\,+\,SETS}\) and \(\Gamma _{SETS\,\times \,SETS}\) discussed in the Appendix.

  49. A function \(f:\lambda \rightarrow \lambda \) is normal if: it is increasing in the sense that for \(\alpha <\beta \), \(f(\alpha )<f(\beta )\); and continuous in the sense that for limit ordinals \(\beta \), \(f(\beta )=\bigcup _{\alpha <\beta }f(\alpha )\).

  50. Of course, we may want to countenance stronger superset theories than those based on merely ZFC. For example, we may decide the existence of a measurable cardinal is true and thus, should be an axiom of our system. If we then form a superset theory on this basis, Principle 2 would demand that there must be a measurable cardinal for every notion of membership utilised by the superset theory. In this case, a single measurable cardinal located in the lowest universe would suffice. After that, analogous natural models to those in the previous discussion will work for the ensuing universes and their membership relations. However, no signficant increase in strength will be gained over the original measurable cardinal assumption. This is, however, a relatively simply large cardinal assumption. It would be interesting to get a clearer picture of what would happen if, say, a proper class of supercompact or strong cardinals was demaned. Nonetheless, the phenomena above illustrates that the kind of transcendence given by these powerful large cardinals will not be made provided by natural models of superset theories.

  51. This axiom isn’t strictly necessary as it’s implied by (5), however, in the absence of (5) it could provide a pleasing weakening of the system.

  52. In ordinary set theory, the rank function takes a set x to the least \(\alpha \) such that \(x\in V_{\alpha +1}\). This can be represented by a term, rank, whose definition can then be relativised to obtain \(rank^{\eta }\) by replacing all instances of \(\in \) by \(\eta \).

  53. Of course this follows more directly from (6) and \(\in \)-Foundation.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Zach Weber, Øystein Linnebo, Carrie Jenkins, James Studd, Stephen Read, Volker Halbach, Jc Beall, Dan Isaacson, Torfinn Huvenes and Kentaro Fujimoto for providing invaluable assistance in the development of this paper. I would also like to thank Oxford University and the University of St Andrews for giving me the opportunity to present these ideas. Finally, I would like to thank two anonymous referees for their incisive comments and suggestions for the paper.

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Correspondence to Toby Meadows.

Appendix: axiomatising superset theories

Appendix: axiomatising superset theories

In this appendix, we state axiomatisations and some basic results for SETS \(+\) SETS and \(SETS\,\times \, SETS\).

1.1 An axiomatisation of SETS \(+\) SETS

Recall that we want to build one notion of membership \(\eta \) on top of another \(\in \). As we’ve discussed earlier, it is probably easier to visualise what we are doing by thinking of \(\in \) as being about a lower universe. Moreover, we could have introduced a constant symbol U, in the manner of Feferman and Kreisel (1969) or Bourbaki (1972) and produced an axiomatisation from there. This would have worked and, indeed, we’ll exploit this relationship below; however, we opted against this in our official axiomatisation in order to emphasise that the ambiguity of supersets is located in notion of membership itself.

Let \({\mathscr {L}}_{\in ,\eta }=\{\in ,\eta \}\).

Definition 2

Let us say that x is an \(\in \) -set if

$$\begin{aligned} \exists y\ x\in y. \end{aligned}$$

Otherwise, we shall say that x is a proper \(\eta \) -class.

Remark 3

The idea here is that x is an \(\in \)-set if it can be, so to speak, covered using the \(\in \) relation. We’ll place further constraints on \(\in \)-sets in the axioms below.

Write \(\forall ^{\in }x\ \varphi (x)\) in place of \(\forall x(x \text{ is } \text{ an } \in \text{-set }\rightarrow \varphi (x))\).

Let \(ZFC(\in )\) be the result of writing out the axioms of ZFC and using \(\forall ^{\in }\) instead of \(\forall \).

Let \(ZFC(\eta )\) be the result of writing out the axiom of ZFC with \(\eta \) replacing \(\in \). If t is any (defined) term of ordinary set theory, let \(t^{\eta }\) be the result of defining it with \(\eta \) instead of \(\in \).

Let our theory \(\Gamma _{SETS\,+\,SETS}\) consist of the following axioms:

  1. (1)

    \(ZFC(\in )\).

  2. (2)

    \(ZFC(\eta )\).

  3. (3)

    \(\forall x\forall y(x\in y\rightarrow x\eta y)\) (Cumulativity).

  4. (4)

    \(\forall x\forall y(x\in y\ \wedge \ x \text{ is } \text{ an } \in \text{-set }\rightarrow y \text{ is } \text{ an } \in \text{-set })\) (End-extension). Footnote 51

  5. (5)

    \(\forall x\forall y(rank^{\eta }(x)\le ^{\eta }rank{}^{\eta }(y)\wedge y \text{ is } \text{ an } \in \text{-set }\ \rightarrow \ x \text{ is } \text{ an } \in \text{-set })\) (Top extension).Footnote 52

  6. (6)

    \(\exists x(\forall ^{\in }y\ y\eta x)\) (Closure).

Lemma 4

(i) There is an r such that for all \(\in \)-sets y

$$\begin{aligned} y\eta r\ \leftrightarrow \ y\notin y. \end{aligned}$$

Proof

By (6), let u, be such that \(\forall ^{\in }y\ y\eta u\). Using \(\eta \)-separation, we see that there is some r such thatFootnote 53

$$\begin{aligned} \forall y(y\eta r\ \leftrightarrow \ y\eta u\wedge \lnot y\eta y). \end{aligned}$$

\(\square \)

Theorem 5

Suppose there are two inaccessible cardinals \(\kappa _{1}<\kappa _{2}\). Let \({\mathscr {M}}=\langle V_{\kappa _{2}},\in \upharpoonright (V_{\kappa _{1}}\times V_{\kappa _{1}}),\in \upharpoonright (V_{\kappa _{2}}\times V_{\kappa _{2}})\rangle \). Then \({\mathscr {M}}\) is a natural model and

$$\begin{aligned} {\mathscr {M}}\models \Gamma _{SETS\,+\,SETS.} \end{aligned}$$

In fact, if we forgo the restriction to natural models, consistency may be established more easily via an adaptation of a trick from Feferman and Cohen (1966, 1969).

Theorem 6

\(Con(ZFC)\rightarrow Con(\Gamma _{SETS\,+\,SETS})\).

Proof

To prove this we first observe that \(\Gamma _{SETS\,+\,SETS}\) is mutually interpretable with the theory, \(\Delta \), articulated in the a language \({\mathscr {L}}=\{\in ,U\}\) which admits a constant for universes, and consisting of the following axioms:

  1. (1)

    ZFC;

  2. (2)

    ZFC(U) - where we restrict all of the quantifiers in axioms to U; and

  3. (3)

    \(\exists \alpha \ U=V_{\alpha }\).

Thus, it suffices to show that \(Con(ZFC)\rightarrow Con(\Delta )\). Suppose not, then Con(ZFC) and for some finite \(\Lambda \subseteq \Delta \), \(\Lambda \) is unsatisfiable. Let \(\Lambda =\Lambda _{0}\cup \Lambda _{1}\cup \{\exists \alpha \ U=V_{\alpha }\}\) where \(\Lambda _{0}\subseteq ZFC\) and \(\Lambda _{1}\subseteq ZFC(U)\). Since Con(ZFC) we may fix some \({\mathscr {M}}\models ZFC\). Clearly, \({\mathscr {M}}\not \models \Lambda \).

Let \(\Lambda _{1}^{\dagger }\) be the result of substituting ordinary quantifiers for the restricted quantifiers in \(\Lambda _{1}\). Then, using reflection we know that \(ZFC\vdash ``\exists \alpha \ V_{\alpha }\models \Lambda _{1}^{\dagger }\)”. Thus, it can be easily seen that \({\mathscr {M}}\models \Lambda \): contradiction. \(\square \)

1.2 An axiomatisation of \(SETS\,\times \, SETS\)

Recall that we are trying to stack indefinitely many membership relations on top of each other and that we are indexing our membership relation to do this.

Let \({\mathscr {L}}=\{\in \}\) where \(\in \) is now a three-place predicate, where the third argument is written as a subscript on \(\in \).

Definition 7

  1. (i)

    For all xy

    $$\begin{aligned} x\ll y\ \leftrightarrow \ \exists z\ x\in _{z}y. \end{aligned}$$

    This gives us a notion of universal membership: membership according to any relativisation.

  2. (ii)

    x is a super ordinal, abbreviated SupOn(y), if there is some y such that x is \(\in _{y}\)-transitive and an \(\in _{y}\)-linear order. We are going to use the super ordinals to index the membership relation.

  3. (iii)

    If x is a super ordinal, we say that y is an \(\in _{x}\) -set if

    $$\begin{aligned} \exists z\ y\in _{x}z. \end{aligned}$$

The idea here is that y is an \(\in _{x}\)-set if it can, so to speak, be covered using the \(\in _{x}\) relation.

Let us write \(\forall ^{y}z\,\varphi (z)\) for

$$\begin{aligned} \forall z(z \text{ is } \text{ a } \in _{y}\text{-set } \rightarrow \varphi (z)). \end{aligned}$$

Let \(\forall y(SupOn(y)\rightarrow ZFC(\in _{y}))\) be the result taking each axiom of ZFC:

  • adding the subscript \(_{y}\) to each \(\in \);

  • changing quantifiers to \(\forall ^{y}\); and

  • substituting that into the space in \(\forall y(SupOn(y)\rightarrow \)...).

Remark

We should note that \(\forall y(SupOn(y)\rightarrow ZFC(\in _{y}))\) is not a single sentence but an infinite collection of sentences.

Let \(ZFC(\ll )\) be the result of replacing \(\in \) by \(\ll \) in every axiom of ZFC. Let \(\Gamma _{SETS\,\times \, SETS}\) comprise of the following axioms:

  1. (1)

    If \(x\in _{z}y\), then z is a super-ordinal.

  2. (2)

    There is some x such that for all y and for all z, \(x\notin _{y}z\), which we denote \(\emptyset \).

  3. (3)

    \(\emptyset \) is a super-ordinal.

  4. (4)

    \(\forall y(SupOn(y)\rightarrow ZFC(\in _{y})\) for all y.

  5. (5)

    \(ZFC(\ll )\).

  6. (6)

    If x and y are super-ordinals, and \(x\ll y\), then \(\forall u\forall w(u\in _{x}w\rightarrow u\in _{y}w)\) (Cumulativity).

  7. (7)

    If \(rank^{\ll }(x)\,\le ^{\ll }\, rank^{\ll }(y)\) and y is a \(\in _{z}\)-set, then x is a \(\in _{z}\)-set (Top extension).

  8. (8)

    If x is a super-ordinal, then there is some super-ordinal \(y\gg x\) and some u such that \(\forall _{x}z\ z\in _{y}u\); moreover, for every \(y\gg x\) there is such a u (Closure).

Proposition 8

  1. (i)

    Any ordinary ordinal (i.e., \(\in _{\emptyset }\)-ordinal) \(\alpha \) is a super ordinal.

  2. (ii)

    For all super-ordinals x, there is a Russell’s set.

Theorem 9

Let \(\kappa \) be an inaccessible limit of inaccessible cardinals and let \(\langle \lambda _{\alpha }|\alpha <\kappa \rangle \) enumerate all the inaccessible cardinals below \(\kappa \). Then

$$\begin{aligned} \langle V_{\kappa },E\rangle \models \Gamma _{SETS\,\times \, SETS} \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} E=\{(x,y,\alpha )\in V_{\kappa }\times V_{\kappa }\times On^{V_{\kappa }}\ |\ \alpha \text{ is } \text{ inaccessible } \wedge x\in y\wedge rank(y)<\lambda _{\alpha }\}. \end{aligned}$$

Moreover, this is the smallest natural model of \(\Gamma _{SETS\,\times \, SETS}\).

Again, if we forgo the natural models requirement, the theory is no stronger than ZFC.

Theorem 10

\(Con(ZFC)\rightarrow Con(\Gamma _{SETS\,\times \, SETS})\).

Proof

As with \(\Gamma _{SETS\,+\,SETS}\), we first note that \(\Gamma _{SETS\,\times \, SETS}\) is mutually interpretable with a theory that it a little easier to work with. Let \(\Delta \) be a theory articulated in \({\mathscr {L}}=\{\in ,u\}\) where u is a one-place function symbol. Let \(\Delta \) consist of the following sentences:

  1. (1)

    ZFC;

  2. (2)

    \(\forall \alpha \ \varphi ^{u(\alpha )}\) where \(\varphi \) is an axiom of ZFC;

  3. (3)

    \(\forall \alpha \exists \kappa \ u(\alpha )=V_{\kappa }\).

  4. (4)

    \(\forall \alpha <\beta \ u(\alpha )\subsetneq u(\beta )\).

It then suffices to show that \(Con(ZFC)\rightarrow Con(\Delta )\). Suppose not. Then Con(ZFC) and there is some finite \(\Lambda \subseteq \Delta \) such that \(\Lambda \) is unsatisfiable. Let \(\Lambda =\Lambda _{0}\cup \Lambda _{1}\cup \{\forall \alpha \exists \kappa \ u(\alpha )=V_{\kappa },\forall \alpha <\beta \ u(\alpha )\subsetneq u(\beta )\}\) where \(\Lambda _{0}\subseteq ZFC\) and \(\Lambda \subseteq \{\forall \alpha \varphi ^{u(\alpha )}\ |\alpha \in On\wedge \varphi \in ZFC\}\). Using our assumption, fix some \({\mathscr {M}}\) such that \({\mathscr {M}}\models ZFC\). Then clearly \({\mathscr {M}}\not \models \Lambda \).

Let \(\Lambda _{1}^{\dagger }\) be the result removing the initial \(\forall \alpha \) and replacing the restricted quantifiers by ordinary quantifiers for sentences in \(\Lambda _{1}\). By reflection, we know that \(ZFC\vdash ``\forall \alpha \exists \beta >\alpha \ V_{\alpha }\models \Lambda _{1}^{\dagger }\)”. Use this to fix the interpretation of u function. Then from here it can be shown that \({\mathscr {M}}\models \Lambda \): contradiction. \(\square \)

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Meadows, T. Sets and supersets. Synthese 193, 1875–1907 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0818-x

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