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Understanding as representation manipulability

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Abstract

Claims pertaining to understanding are made in a variety of contexts and ways. As a result, few in the philosophical literature have made an attempt to precisely characterize the state that is y understanding x. This paper builds an account that does just that. The account is motivated by two main observations. First, understanding x is somehow related to being able to manipulate x. Second, understanding is a mental phenomenon, and so what manipulations are required to be an understander must only be mental manipulations. Combining these two insights, the paper builds an account (URM) of understanding as a certain representational capacity—specifically, understanding x involves possessing a representation of x that could be manipulated in useful ways. By tying understanding to representation, the account correctly identifies that understanding is a fundamentally cognitive achievement. However, by also demanding that which representations count as understanding-conferring be determined by their practical effects, URM captures the insight that understanding is vitally connected to practice. URM is fully general, and can apply equally well to understanding states of affairs, understanding events, and even understanding people and works of art. The ultimate test of URM is its applicability in actual scientific and philosophical discourse. To that end the paper discusses the importance of understanding in the philosophy of science, psychology, and computer science.

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  1. The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA

    Daniel A. Wilkenfeld

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  1. Daniel A. Wilkenfeld
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Correspondence to Daniel A. Wilkenfeld.

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Wilkenfeld, D.A. Understanding as representation manipulability. Synthese 190, 997–1016 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0055-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0055-x

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