Abstract
Klein’s account of epistemic justification, infinitism, supplies a novel solution to the regress problem. We argue that concentrating on the normative aspect of justification exposes a number of unpalatable consequences for infinitism, all of which warrant rejecting the position. As an intermediary step, we develop a stronger version of the ‘finite minds’ objection.
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Podlaskowski, A.C., Smith, J.A. Infinitism and epistemic normativity. Synthese 178, 515–527 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9654-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9654-1