Abstract
The two names most closely associated with phenomenology in early twentieth century Russia are Gustav Špet and Aleksej Losev. However, is that judgment warranted with regard to Losev? In just what way can we look on him as a phenomenologist? Losev himself, in the mid-1920s, employed the expression “dialectical phenomenology,” seeing phenomenology as an initial descriptive method to ascertain essences. He was sharply critical of its self-limitation in disavowing all explanation as metaphysical. Yet, earlier that decade Losev approved of Husserl’s opposition to reductionism and of his focus on essences and senses. In this way, the record is unclear: In the short span of a decade he moved from a position of qualified sympathy with phenomenology to an overtly unqualified insouciance. Looking at Losev’s criticisms, however, from the late 20s and early 30s, we find a logical anticipation of Husserl’s own move from a static to a genetic phenomenology.
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Notes
Špet, of course, stayed for a time in Göttingen to study under Husserl. Nikolai Hartmann and Boris Pasternak, as well as many others, went to Marburg to study under the neo-Kantians there.
For at least an initial attempt at such a reading, though it is much more than that, see Haardt (1993: 196–240).
One must at least applaud Losev’s sheer audacity here to write that dialectical materialism has long ago become obsolete.
See, for example, Špet (1991: 170).
The convoluted nature of this criticism lies in that whereas a case could be made for Husserl’s concern only with sense at the expense of “real being,” Špet never sought to sever philosophy from being. Actually, it was quite the contrary. See Losev (1991: 3). Again it constrains our credulity to think that Losev did not know Špet’s position here: Is this a personal attack on Špet, accusing him of a blatant inconsistency in his position or of an intellectual myopia or even blindness?
Haardt correctly notices that Losev in the Philosophy of the name gives no indication of recognizing the reduction. However, as we now see, Losev did know of it at least in 1929. It would be incredulous to think, then, that he only “discovered” Husserl’s phenomenological reduction after 1923, particularly since, as we shall see, Losev had some familiarity with Ideen I before that time.
Despite his incongruous but frequent charge of a dualism in Marburg neo-Kantianism, Losev later did acknowledge that “neo-Kantianism, and Marburg neo-Kantianism above all, is a struggle against any sort of dualism, subjectivism and metaphysics.” (Losev 1993c: 700).
If his examples are to serve as a guide, Losev has Schopenhauer in mind as the archetype of a metaphysical thinker.
That the dialectic is concerned with pure sense manifestly conflicts with his earlier criticisms of phenomenology for being concerned with sense at the expense of their respectively inseparable facts. Losev’s sheer verbosity was attained at the expense of precision and clarity.
The editor of this volume, in effect, provides grounds for proceeding with caution in accepting this as the exact date of the note. See Losev (2002: 641). In any case whether from May or June or even July is of little importance. Losev had some acquaintance with phenomenology at a remarkably early time.
Surely, during his time as a philosophy student at Moscow University before the Bolshevik Revolution he must have known Špet. Haardt even points out that “in the seminars of Čelpanov and Špet, Losev was introduced to Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen and Ideen I” (1993: 188). Yet despite their overlapping interests Losev rarely mentions Špet either in his own writings or in his correspondance, though the former did write to Špet on 30 May 1922 inquiring about a philosophy position in GAKhN (State Academy for the Study of the Arts), where Špet was then the director of the philosophy department (Takho-Godi 1997: 77).
We are left with many questions, then, concerning the composition of the work. In an essay accompanying the recent publication of the manuscript, Umrikhin fails to provide details on this “reconstruction,” or “restoration,” process. Nevertheless, that the discussion of Husserl contained in it dates from the 1910s appears beyond dispute and is a testimony to Losev’s engagement with phenomenology at a surprisingly early date. See Umrikhin (1999: 663). Such an early date together with the diary entry we saw from 1914 also sharply contrasts with the unfounded contention in another essay in the same volume that: “To the historian of borrowed words, Losev did not know of Husserl in 1916” (Bibikhin 1999: 674–675).
For Špet’s reply to Jakovenko’s criticisms of Husserl, see Špet (1991: 93–94).
Here and on several other points in the interpretation and the criticism of Husserl, Losev’s discussion is parasitic upon Jakovenko’s, albeit that the latter was without knowledge of Ideen I. See Jakovenko (1913: 141ff).
Losev here in this discussion alternates between speaking of essence and sense, thereby conveying the distinct impression that he equates the two. However, as De Boer writes: “The failure to distinguish sharply between essence and sense is one of the greatest causes of confusion in Husserl interpretation” (1978: 249f). To paraphrase Mohanty, “essence” is an ontological concept, whereas “sense” is a phenomenological one. See Mohanty (1985: 200).
For a broader treatment, see Haardt (1993: 196–211).
One cannot help but additionally concur with Haardt’s overall judgment that “while for Husserl phenomenology is an eidetic science, Losev emphasizes its pre-scientificity” (Haardt 1993: 228).
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Nemeth, T. The young Losev as phenomenologist. Stud East Eur Thought 67, 249–264 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-015-9241-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-015-9241-6