Abstract
The article presents possible applications of Paul Ricoeur’s theory in interpretation of legal texts and legally relevant human action. One should notice that Paul Ricoeur developed a comprehensive interpretation theory of two seemingly distant phenomena: literary texts and human action. When interrelating these issues, it becomes possible, on the basis of Ricoeur’s work, to construct a unified theory of the interpretation of legal texts and of legally relevant human action. What is provided by this theory for jurisprudence is the possibility of formulating a comprehensive theory of application of law, well established in the ontology of the recipient of the legal text. It should be emphasised that the resulting benefits, outlined in the article become particularly noticeable when set against the background of the methodological weaknesses of legal positivism, concerning both the interpretation of law and a syllogistic model of its application.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
The essence of this relation was presented by Ricoeur [48, pp. 144–167].
Syllogistic model is subjected to multithreaded criticism concerning the logical status of premises and the inference as well as the nature of the relationship between them. What also raises doubt is the multi-stage and multi-sequence nature of the process of syllogistic law application. This model was, firstly, criticised by the American legal realism, along with the concept of intuitive judicial decision (cf. Hutcheson Jr. [13, pp. 274–288]). Secondly, this criticism is connected with the demands of CLS for demystifying the theory and practice of law application (cf. Unger [60, pp. 5–15]). Thirdly, the syllogistic reasoning was criticised by the representatives of legal hermeneutics who rejected a subsumption model (cf. Kaufmann [20, p. 33]). Moreover, the criticism of the syllogistic method came from R. Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity (cf. Dworkin [10]). Additionally, the concept of legal syllogism was criticized by the legal logic, pointing to excessive simplification of legal argumentation formula (cf. Zieliński [64, p. 43ff.]). Accordingly, the issue of the construction of the abstract and the general legal norm as a major premise raises serious discussions (cf. Ziembiński [65, p. 123ff.]). In the abovementioned mainstream, the criticism of the syllogism formula is also associated with the attempts to build a deontic logic of law (cf. Soeteman [55]).
Ricoeur [49, p. 77]. Ricoeur refers here to: F. de Saussure, Course de lingustique générale.
The philosopher referred here, inter alia, to the works of J. Habermas, R. Alexy and R. Dworkin. Cf. Ricoeur [50, pp. 72–90].
The roots of the word hermeneutics lie in the Greek noun hermêneia, translated as “interpretation” and hermêneuein, translated as “to interpret”. Cf. Palmer [33, p. 12].
See, inter alia, Ricoeur [49, pp. 105–124]; [51, pp. 11–24]; Structure, Word, Event [41, pp. 116–126]; Creativity in Language [41, pp. 97–111]; Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics [41, pp. 95–110]; Explanation and Understanding [41, pp. 149–166; 42, pp. 182–193; 51, pp. 27–60; 51, pp. 61–76]. Cf. also Ricoeur’s lectures delivered at Texas Christian University [40].
Mark Van Hoecke distinguishes grammatical interpretation, focusing on the syntax of the legal language, and literal interpretation, which consists in referring the prima facie meaning of a given text to the reality. Van Hoecke [61, p. 140].
For example, in respect of the practical aspects of the distinction between static and dynamic interpretation see: Olsen and Toddington [31].
It is the interpretation undertaken by the entity that establishes a given norm. Cf. Jabłońska-Bonca [14, p. 178].
This is the interpretation undertaken by the entity authorised in a given legal system to provide a universally binding interpretation of normative acts. Cf. Jabłońska-Bonca [14].
Cf. below in section two. The model of a dynamic interpretation is opted for, inter alia, by R. Dworkin. Cf. Eskridge Jr. [11, pp. 1479–1555].
This interpretation is also referred to as the teleological one. Cf. Van Hoecke [61, pp. 144–145].
This is an interpretation undertaken by courts in the process of law application. Cf. Jabłońska-Bonca [14].
Meaning an interpretation undertaken by the representatives of the legal doctrine. Cf. Jabłońska-Bonca [14].
Modern criticism of the positivist version of legal syllogism led, among others, to replacing such a “simple syllogism” with more complex structures in which the decision is a consequence of a number of interrelated premises (the so-called the-legs-of-a-chair-syllogism). Cf. Summers and Taruffo [59], cf. MacCormick [28, pp. 33–49].
Among its concerns is the difference, raised in the so-called Jørgensen’s dilemma, between the nature of the normative statement (major premise) and the descriptive statement (minor premise) in the syllogism and the resulting hybrid nature of the inference (individual and specific legal norm expressed in the operative part of the judgment). Cf. Jørgensen [15, pp. 288–296]. Cf. Stelmach and Brożek [58, p. 40]. See also Sartor [52, pp. 108–136], and other essays in this compilation.
These views are reflected in the opposing concepts of static and dynamic interpretation developed in the theory of law. According to the former, the main goal of interpretation is to provide the highest level of legal stability and certainty. In order to guarantee it one needs to assume the unchanging meaning of the legal text, while the task of the interpreter is to merely reconstruct this meaning from the legal text. This unchanging meaning of the legal text is the sense given by the legislator. Thus, it is the will of the legislator that should be analysed to determine the proper meaning of the text of the legal act, regulation, etc. In turn, the main objective of the dynamic interpretation is to adapt law to constantly changing social and economic reality. Therefore, the interpreter should not seek to recreate the meaning of the text according to the legislator’s understanding, but he must determine it in accordance with the current requirements of life. The proponents of the dynamic theory argue that the meaning of the legal text is constantly evolving in order to meet the challenge of changing social conditions, the system of values, language, etc. What should be noted in this context is the similarity of the dynamic theory of interpretation to the concept of the autonomy of the legal text developed by Ricoeur (with respect to the author, the circumstances of the creation and the original recipient of the text). Cf. Stelmach and Sarkowicz [57, pp. 85–86].
These directives constitute the canon of the interpretative rules concerning the legal text, postulated by legal positivism. Cf. Morawski [29].
The alternative nature of the proposed concept to A. Kaufmann’s views is not expressed in the radical difference but in balancing the emphasis in convergent hermeneutic perspective. The general similarities relate to the philosophical basis of Ricoeur’s and Kaufmann’s theories, provided by H.-G. Gadamer’s hermeneutics. The convergence also applies to Kantianism, which in the case of Ricoeur constitutes a reference point for the concept of the “little ethics”, while in Kaufmann’s works it comes to the fore by G. Radbruch’s axiological neo-Kantianism. Moreover, Ricoeur and Kaufmann (though to varying degrees) reach to Aristotle’s achievements and are inspired by the existential philosophy (in particular by K. Jaspers’ achievements). The fundamental similarity is here the importance of the interpretation and the concept of a person with regard to its role in the process of applying (realization) of the law. From the perspective of both theories, “there is no law before interpretation” undertaken at a particular time by a particular person. At the same time, both philosophers reject the idea of “still Cogito” and they claim that a person can be regarded as a dynamic phenomenon, constituting the ontological basis of the validity of real law. However, the originality of Ricoeur’s concept consists in that it places particular emphasis on the interpersonal relationship which can be regarded as a paradigm for the rule of reciprocity, fundamental for the law. At this point it is crucial to note a further differentiation between the perspectives adopted by Kaufmann and Ricoeur. Kaufmann as a judge and law theorist, marked by the experience of the law of the third Reich, places the proposed theory in the macro-scale of the dispute between legal positivism and natural law. His reasoning goes from the general to the particular (the so-called top-down reasoning), eventually relating real law (Recht) with the ontology of a person. In contrast, Ricoeur, by proposing the so-called “little ethics”, takes the opposite perspective (bottom-up reasoning), going from micro-scale concept of being oneself in ipse sense to the level of “dialectics of great genres”. One could say that Kaufmann’s concept ends and Ricoeur’s concept begins in the ontology of a person who realizes law. Moreover, Ricoeur starts with analytical research of a micro scale of the text, while Kaufmann begins with the universal problem of the interrelations between Recht and Gesetz. The originality of Ricoeur’s views is expressed in the theory of semantic autonomy of the text vis-à-vis its author, the original recipient and the social conditions of its creation. From the perspective of Kaufmann’s position, these views allow for an in-depth analysis of the interrelations between Recht and Gesetz in the interpretative situation of a particular person. The specificity of Ricoeur’s achievements as compared to Kaufmann’s position is also apparent from the adopted narrative paradigm. Ricoeur believes that in the sphere of the subject, his narrative removes an artificially created boundary between being and duty. Meanwhile, as noted by M. Piechowiak, Kaufmann advocates the separation of the spheres of being and duty which, by means of adequacy relationship, are unified in a personalized interpretation of reality and norm. Although both philosophers similarly characterized the process of mutual “approaching” of facts and norms, Kaufmann rejects the subsumption model, while Ricoeur expressed positive views about R. Dworkin’s practical syllogism. The difference also refers to the conception of truth postulated by the philosophers. Kaufmann assumes the so-called convergent theory, which aims to preserve the concept of the objective truth in the law. Meanwhile, according to Ricoeur, the truth can be regarded as a correlative of a narrativised process of argumentation and interpretation. The philosophers, therefore, provide different answers to the question of the objective validity of the law. Cf. Kaufmann’s publications: [17–19, 21–23]. See also Piechowiak [34], Skąpska and Stelmach [54], Zajadło [63], Grote [12].
See below.
Ricoeur [44, pp. 58–59]. Ricoeur analyses the said issue in relation to Mimesis I.
This issue was touched upon from the hermeneutic perspective in the first section.
Cf. the comment made in the first section and referring to the interrelation of the language understood as a potential system of signs and the language materialised in a discourse.
The concept of just institutions is discussed by Ricoeur in Soi-même comme un autre, where it refers to the broadest level in which the entity realises its ethical aspiration. Ricoeur defines this aspiration as the intention of a good life with and for others in just institutions. Cf. Ricoeur [45, pp. 199–236].
The impact of a “grand narrative” on ontology and, as a result, on the operation of the entity can be explained by the concept of “narrative unity of life”, borrowed by Ricoeur from Alasdair McIntyre. Cf. [45, pp. 186–193, 206–211].
The similarity between Dworkin’s and Ricoeur’s views is also based on the fact that Dworkin advocates a dynamic theory of interpretation. Cf. Dworkin [10, pp. 313–354].
Ricoeur does not mean the legal text here, but the law as a phenomenon in itself.
Cf. Sect. 1.
These are articulated in the said “Jørgensen’s dilemma”.
See for example, Ricoeur [42, p. 134], where the author refers to J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words.
A strict relation between the legal interpretation with the ontology of the entity also constitutes a key assumption of the concept of legal hermeneutics developed by A. Kaufmann. Cf. Rasmussen [37, pp. 160–172].
Cf. Pieniążek [35, pp. 95–108].
The leading example is the concept of “little ethics”, in which Ricoeur uses the elements taken from I. Kant’s deontological ethics and Aristotle’s teleological ethics. Cf. [45, ch. VII–IX (pp. 199–278)].
References
Altman, Rick. 2008. A theory of narrative. New York: Columbia University Press.
Aristotle. 1968. Poetics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Austin, John. 1957. Ifs and cans: Proceedings of the British Academy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Austin, John. 1962. How to do things with words. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Betti, Emilio. 1967. Allgemeine Auslegungslehre als Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr.
Coing, Helmut. 1972. Juristische Methodenlehre. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Dauenhauer, Bernard. 2000. Paul Ricoeur: The promise and risk of politics. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1947. Le Monde de l’Esprit. Paris: Aubier.
Dunne, Joseph. 1996. Beyond sovereignty and deconstruction: The storied self. In Paul Ricoeur: The hermeneutics of action, ed. Richard Kearney, 137–157. London: SAGE Publications.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1986. Law’s empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Eskridge, William Jr. 1987. Dynamic statutory interpretation. Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository 135: 1479–1555.
Grote, Stefan. 2006. Auf der Suche nach einem „dritten Weg”: Die Rechtsphilosophie Arthur Kaufmanns. Baden-Baden: Nomos Yerlag.
Hutcheson, Joseph Jr. 1929. The judgment intuitive: The function of the hunch in judicial decision. Cornell Law Quarterly 14: 274–288.
Jabłońska-Bonca, Jolanta. 2008. Wprowadzenie do prawa [Introduction to Law]. Warszawa: LexisNexis.
Jørgensen, Jesper. 1937/1938. Imperatives and logic. Erkenntnis 7: 288–296.
Kaplan, David. 2003. Ricoeur’s critical theory. New York: State University of New York Press.
Kaufmann, Arthur. 1957. Naturrecht und Geschichtlichkeit. Tübingen: Mohr Verlag.
Kaufmann, Arthur. 1961. Das Schuldprinzip: Eine strafrechtlich—rechtsphilosophische Untersuchung. Heidelberg: Winters Verlag.
Kaufmann, Arthur. 1962. Gesetz und Recht. In Existenz und Ordnung. Festschrifi für Erik Wolf zum 60. Geburtstag, eds. Würtenberger, Thomas, Maihofer, Werner and Hollerbach, Alexander. Frankfurt a. Main: Klostermann Verlag Universität Saarbrücken.
Kaufmann, Arthur. 1965. Analogie und “Natur der Sache”. Karlsruhe: C.F. Müller.
Kaufmann, Arthur. 1986. Vorüberlegungen zu einer juristischen Logik und Ontologie der Relationen. Grundlegung einer personalen Rechtstheorie. Rechtstheorie 17.
Kaufmann, Arthur. 1989. Prozedurale Theorien der Gerechtigkeit. München: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Kaufmann, Arthur. 1997. Rechtsphilosophie. Munich: Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung.
Kearney, Richard. 1996. Narrative imagination: Between ethics and politics. In Paul Ricoeur: The hermeneutics of action, ed. Richard Kearney, 173–190. London: SAGE Publications.
Kelsen, Hans. 1960. Reine Rechtslehre. Vienna: Deuticke.
Kelsen, Hans. 1979. Allgemeine Theorie der Normen. Vienna: Manz.
Larenz, Karl. 1960. Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft. Heidelberg: Mehrfache Neuauflagen.
MacCormick, Neil. 2005. Rhetoric and the rule of law: A theory of legal reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Morawski, Lech. 2002. Wykładnia w orzecznictwie sądów [Interpretation in court jurisprudence]. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Dom Organizatora.
Ochs, Elinor, and Lisa Capps. 1996. Narrating the self. Annual Review of Anthropology 25: 19–43.
Olsen, Henrik, and Stuart Toddington. 2014. End of an era: Static and dynamic interpretation in international courts. International Criminal Law Review 14(4–5): 920–943.
Ormiston, Gayle, and Alan Schrift (eds.). 1990. The hermeneutic tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur. New York: State University of New York Press.
Palmer, Richard. 1969. Hermeneutics: Interpretation theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Piechowiak, Marek. 1992. W poszukiwaniu ontologicznych podstaw prawa. Arthura Kaufmanna teoria sprawiedliwości [In search of the ontological foundations of law: Arthur Kaufmann’s theory of justice]. Poznań-Warszawa: Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN.
Pieniążek, Marcin. 2014. Paul Ricoeur’s thought as the basis for the political theory of the European Union. In Law, politics and constitution: New perspectives from legal and political theory, ed. Antonia Geisler, Michael Hein, and Siri Hummel. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang.
Pieniążek, Marcin. 2014. On Paul Ricoeur’s tribute to legal philosophical issues of recognition and reciprocity. In Towards recognition of minority groups: Legal and communication strategies, ed. Karolina Cern, Bartosz Wojciechowski, and Marek Zirk-Sadowski. London: Ashgate.
Rasmussen, David. 1996. Rethinking subjectivity: Narrative identity and the self. In Paul Ricoeur: The hermeneutics of action, ed. Richard Kearney, 159–172. London: SAGE Publications.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1971. From existentialism to the philosophy of language. Criterion 10: 14–18.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1973. From existentialism to the philosophy of language. Philosophy Today 17: 2.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1976. Interpretation theory: Discourse and the surplus of meaning. Texas: Fort Worth.
Ricoeur, Paul, Charles Regan, and David Stewart (eds.). 1978. The philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An anthology of his work. Boston: Beacon Press.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1981. Hermeneutics and the human sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1983. Temps et récit. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1984. Time and narrative, vol. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1990. Soi-même comme un autre. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
Ricoeur, Paul. 2003. Just. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ricoeur, Paul. 2004. Parcours de la reconnaissance: Trois etudes. Paris: Gallimard, Éditions Stock.
Ricoeur, Paul. 2007. From text to action: Essays in hermeneutics. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Ricoeur, Paul. 2007. From text to action: Essays in hermeneutics II. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Ricoeur, Paul. 2007. Reflections on the just. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Ricoeur, Paul. 2011. The Conflict of interpretations. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.
Sartor, Giovanni. 2012. Defeasibility in legal reasoning. In The logic of legal requirements: Essays on defeasibility, eds. Beltrán Jordi, Ratti Giovanni. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Searle, John. 1969. Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skąpska, Grażyna, Stelmach, Jerzy. 1988/89. Stare i nowe interpretacje filozofii prawa Arthura Kaufmanna, [Old and new interpretations of Arthur Kaufmann’s philosophy of law]. Colloquia Communia 6/1: 41–42.
Soeteman, Arend. 1989. Logic in law: Remarks on logic and rationality in normative reasoning, especially in law. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
St. Augustine. 1961. Confessions. New York: Penguin Books.
Stelmach, Jerzy, and Ryszard Sarkowicz. 1996. Teoria prawa [Theory of law]. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.
Stelmach, Jerzy, and Brożek Bartosz. 2006. Methods of legal reasoning. Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media.
Summers, Robert, Taruffo, Michele. 1991. Interpretation and comparative analysis. In Interpreting statutes: A comparative study, eds. Neil MacCormick, Robert Summers. Dartmouth: Aldershot.
Unger, Roberto. 1983. The critical legal studies movement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Van Hoecke, Mark. 2002. Law as communication. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Wolicka, Elżbieta. 2010. Narracja i egzystencja. ‘Droga okrężna’ Paula Ricoeura od hermeneutyki do ontoantropologii [Narrative and Existence. Paul Ricoeur’s ‘Roundabout Route’ from Hermeneutics to Ontoanthropology]. Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL.
Zajadło, Jerzy. 1987. Filozofia prawa Arthura Kaufmanna [Arthur Kaufmann’s philosophy of law]. Annales UMCS. Sectio G Ius: 389–409.
Zieliński, Maciej. 2010. Wykładnia prawa. Zasady, reguły, wskazówki [Legal interpretation: Principles, rules, guidelines]. Warszawa: Lexis Nexis.
Ziembiński, Zygmunt. 1966. Logiczne podstawy prawoznawstwa [Logical basis of jurisprudence]. Warszawa, Wydawn: Prawnicze.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Pieniążek, M. The Application of Paul Ricoeur’s Theory in Interpretation of Legal Texts and Legally Relevant Human Action. Int J Semiot Law 28, 627–646 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-015-9403-3
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-015-9403-3