Abstract
This study analyzes how the accumulation of knowledge takes place in para-scientific areas, focusing on the case of Analytic Philosophy. The theoretical framework chosen for the analysis is Kuhn’s theory of normal science. The methodology employed is qualitative citation context analysis. A sample of 60 papers published in leading Analytic Philosophy journals between 1950 and 2009 is analyzed, and a specific classificatory scheme is developed to classify citations according to their epistemological function. Compared to previous studies of citation context, this is the first paper that includes the temporal dimension into the analysis of citation context, in order to gain insights into the process of knowledge accumulation. Interestingly, the results show that Analytic Philosophy started accumulating after Second World War, but in a peculiar way. The accumulation was not matched by a corresponding rising consensus. This can be explained by the hypothesis that AP underwent a process of fragmentation in sub-fields during the second half of the century.
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Notes
In this study, no explicit definition of the term “knowledge” will be provided, since any definition is bound to raise difficult epistemological and, more broadly, philosophical problems. However, this study inscribes itself within an approach to knowledge that can be termed “anti-representationalism” (Hacking 1979). Anti-representationalism is rooted in Kant and Hegel’s philosophy of knowledge and at least some of its features have been embraced in the Twentieth century by Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn, and Foucault (see Popper 1979; Lakatos 1978; Kuhn 1970; Foucault 2002). Anti-representationalism considers knowledge as the product of the activity of the knowing subject (be it the individual or a collective entity such as the scientific community), not as a “true representation” of the “world out there” or as a set of “justified true beliefs” held by knowing subjects. According to anti-representationalism, the primary feature of knowledge is its being a (human) product. As a product, knowledge constitutes a “third world” (different from both the “first world”, the physical reality, and the “second world”, the mental reality) that is materially embodied in books, archives, databases and scientific papers (Popper 1979: ch. 3). From this point of view, saying that scientific knowledge grows is the same as saying that scientific literature grows. A full justification of anti-representationalism lies outside the scope of this paper. However, the main motivations for adopting it as a theoretical background are the following. First, it allows to avoid vast philosophical debates about truth and the definition of knowledge as “justified true belief” (an introduction to them can be found in Moran 2010: ch. 11). Second, it allows to focus on the phenomenon of accumulation of knowledge without raising the problem of the advancement towards the “truth” (see Bird 2007 for a recent discussion of the relationship between scientific progress and truth), that is particularly difficult in the case of philosophical knowledge. Finally, it allows to inquire the activity of accumulation of knowledge and track its changes over time, without assuming a teleological drive such as “truth” in the history of knowledge (Kuhn 1970: ch. 3; Bloor 1991).
Kuhn was very clear in distinguishing the accumulation process taking place in the normal science periods from the metaphysical notion of progress, conceived as a movement of approach to the truth. Indeed, he was quite wary about the very idea that science progresses towards the “truth”, because this seems to imply a teleological drive in the development of science—a claim that is difficult to test empirically (see Kuhn 1970: ch. 13; Bloor 1991).
Rarely, citations point out also to the “future”, in the case of references to “forthcoming” publications.
Clearly, this does not exclude the possibility that this research could be of interest for sociologists of science.
This is another feature of AP that suggests an approaching to the normal science style of intellectual production.
Buonomo and Petrovich (2018) discuss in detail how to select journals representative of mainstream and “high-quality” research in AP.
Search date: 29.08.2017.
Two papers originally ranked top ten were excluded and substituted with subsequent papers in the ranking: Anderson (1958) and Sen (1985). Even if they were published in philosophy journals, their subject falls outside AP (even in the broad sense), being respectively a result in formal logic for the first and economic welfare theory for the second.
See Chen (2013: ch. 6) for some arguments in favor of the assimilation of high-impact publications to Kuhnian paradigms.
The further question about the reasons an author may have to cite supplementary material (e.g. hidden social-networking purposes) is not pursued in this study.
In this study, only explicit citations were considered, i.e. citations pointing to specific documents. Proto-citations such as “I owe this point to Prof. X”, commonly used in acknowledgements section of recent papers, are not counted. For an interesting study of acknowledgements in philosophy, see the mentioned study conducted by Cronin et al. (2003).
It turned out that no citation could be attributed to more than three categories.
For example, if a reference was mentioned 3 times in the same article, but it played always the same function, it scored 1 point, and not 3 points. On the other hand, if it was mentioned 3 times, each time with a different function, its point was equally divided among the functions it played.
The overall proportion of Critical citations (Table 2) is higher than the result reported by Cullars in his study of philosophy monographs, where 11.1% of citations were classified as critical (Cullars 1998: 62). This is probably due to the fact that papers are more narrow-focused than books, and therefore devote more space to criticism and argumentation.
Unless very loosely, by showing that the author is legitimated to contribute to the debate because she is up-to-date.
As a Reviewer suggested, another hypothesis can be advanced to explain these results, namely that the fragmentation of the field is simply the consequence of the massive amount of information analytic philosophers have to confront with. As Quinn (1987) says: «Having limited time and energy at their disposal, individual philosophers have to focus rather narrowly to keep up with rapid developments in their areas of specialization» (111). A similar idea can be found in Marconi (2014) and Schwartz (1995), both linking the trend towards specialization to the growth of the literature available in AP. This hypothesis is worth considering because it brings into the picture an important factor influencing the citing behavior (i.e. the increase of the available literature). However, we believe this is not in contrast with the hypothesis advanced in this study (i.e. the normalization of AP in the form of the progressive delineation of a background structure of the field): normalization and specialization could be indeed two mutually reinforcing factors shaping contemporary AP. This interpretation is also consistent with Kuhn’s late theory of science (see Kuhn 2000, where the philosopher explicitly linked specialization and normal science; see also Wray 2011). A possible way to check the weight of the different factors could be, as a Reviewer suggested, to classify the contexts citing the 60 articles under consideration, and see if the proportions of categories change over time and across different sub-fields. We leave this for a future work.
However, it is also possible that the understanding of “perfunctory/supplementary” citations used in this study is different from the one employed in previous ones.
I thank an anonymous Reviewer for the expression “soft paradigm”.
I thank an anonymous Reviewer for this suggestion.
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Acknowledgements
My gratitude goes first to Ludo Waltman (CWTS Leiden), who was my supervisor during my visiting period at CWTS, for very helpful advice and precious insights. I would like to thank also my advisor Luca Guzzardi and my colleagues in the Doctoral School in Philosophy and Human Sciences at the University of Milan (especially Valerio Buonomo, Daniele Cassaghi and Emiliano Tolusso) for discussing with me several parts of this research. I would finally like to thank Giulia Petrovich for linguistic revision and two anonymous reviewers for providing useful suggestions.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Sample metadata
# | Author | PY | Title | Source | Volume | Issue | First page | End page |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1950–1959 | ||||||||
1 | GRICE, HP | 1957 | MEANING | Philos. Rev. | 66 | 3 | 377 | 388 |
2 | VENDLER, Z | 1957 | VERBS AND TIMES | Philos. Rev. | 66 | 2 | 143 | 160 |
3 | SMART, JJC | 1959 | SENSATIONS AND BRAIN PROCESSES | Philos. Rev. | 68 | 2 | 141 | 156 |
4 | RAWLS, J | 1958 | JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS | Philos. Rev. | 67 | 2 | 164 | 194 |
5 | QUINE, WV | 1956 | QUANTIFIERS AND PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES | J. Philos. | 53 | 5 | 177 | 187 |
6 | SEARLE, JR | 1958 | PROPER NAMES | Mind | 67 | 266 | 166 | 173 |
7 | FREGE, G | 1956 | THE THOUGHT—A LOGICAL INQUIRY | Mind | 65 | 259 | 289 | 311 |
8 | SIBLEY, F | 1959 | AESTHETIC CONCEPTS | Philos. Rev. | 68 | 4 | 421 | 450 |
9 | GRICE, HP; STRAWSON, PF | 1956 | IN DEFENSE OF A DOGMA | Philos. Rev. | 65 | 2 | 141 | 158 |
10 | DUMMETT, M | 1959 | WITTGENSTEIN PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS | Philos. Rev. | 68 | 3 | 324 | 348 |
1960–1969 | ||||||||
1 | DONNELLAN, KS | 1966 | REFERENCE AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS | Philos. Rev. | 75 | 3 | 281 | 304 |
2 | DAVIDSON, D | 1963 | ACTIONS, REASONS, AND CAUSES—SYMPOSIUM | J. Philos. | 60 | 23 | 685 | 700 |
3 | FRANKFURT, HG | 1969 | ALTERNATE POSSIBILITIES AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY | J. Philos. | 66 | 23 | 829 | 839 |
4 | HARMAN, GH | 1965 | THE INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION | Philos. Rev. | 74 | 1 | 88 | 95 |
5 | GRICE, HP | 1969 | UTTERERS MEANING AND INTENTIONS | Philos. Rev. | 78 | 2 | 147 | 177 |
6 | LEWIS, DK | 1968 | COUNTERPART THEORY AND QUANTIFIED MODAL LOGIC | J. Philos. | 65 | 5 | 113 | 126 |
7 | DANTO, A | 1964 | THE ARTWORLD | J. Philos. | 61 | 19 | 571 | 584 |
8 | BENACERRAF, P | 1965 | WHAT NUMBERS COULD NOT BE | Philos. Rev. | 74 | 1 | 47 | 73 |
9 | STRAWSON, PF | 1964 | INTENTION AND CONVENTION IN SPEECH ACTS | Philos. Rev. | 73 | 4 | 439 | 460 |
10 | GEACH, PT | 1965 | ASSERTION | Philos. Rev. | 74 | 4 | 449 | 465 |
1970–1979 | ||||||||
1 | NAGEL, T | 1974 | WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A BAT | Philos. Rev. | 83 | 4 | 435 | 450 |
2 | KRIPKE, S | 1975 | OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF TRUTH | J. Philos. | 72 | 19 | 690 | 716 |
3 | PERRY, J | 1979 | PROBLEM OF THE ESSENTIAL INDEXICAL | Nous | 13 | 1 | 3 | 21 |
4 | CUMMINS, R | 1975 | FUNCTIONAL-ANALYSIS | J. Philos. | 72 | 20 | 741 | 765 |
5 | LEWIS, D | 1979 | ATTITUDES DE-DICTO AND DE-SE | Philos. Rev. | 88 | 4 | 513 | 543 |
6 | GOLDMAN, AI | 1976 | DISCRIMINATION AND PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE | J. Philos. | 73 | 20 | 771 | 791 |
7 | LEWIS, D | 1979 | COUNTERFACTUAL DEPENDENCE AND TIMES ARROW | Nous | 13 | 4 | 455 | 476 |
8 | DRETSKE, FI | 1970 | EPISTEMIC OPERATORS | J. Philos. | 67 | 24 | 1007 | 1023 |
9 | LEWIS, D | 1976 | PROBABILITIES OF CONDITIONALS AND CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES | Philos. Rev. | 85 | 3 | 297 | 315 |
10 | WRIGHT, L | 1973 | FUNCTIONS | Philos. Rev. | 82 | 2 | 139 | 168 |
1980–1989 | ||||||||
1 | CHURCHLAND, PM | 1981 | ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM AND THE PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES | J. Philos. | 78 | 2 | 67 | 90 |
2 | RAWLS, J | 1980 | RATIONAL AND FULL AUTONOMY | J. Philos. | 77 | 9 | 515 | 535 |
3 | JACKSON, F | 1986 | WHAT MARY DIDNT KNOW + KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT AGAINST PHYSICALISM | J. Philos. | 83 | 5 | 291 | 295 |
4 | RAILTON, P | 1986 | MORAL REALISM + A FORM OF ETHICAL NATURALISM | Philos. Rev. | 95 | 2 | 163 | 207 |
5 | WOLF, S | 1982 | MORAL SAINTS + IMPLICATIONS FOR MORAL-PHILOSOPHY | J. Philos. | 79 | 8 | 419 | 439 |
6 | BURGE, T | 1986 | INDIVIDUALISM AND PSYCHOLOGY | Philos. Rev. | 95 | 1 | 3 | 45 |
7 | KIM, J | 1984 | CONCEPTS OF SUPERVENIENCE | Philos. Phenomenol. Res. | 45 | 2 | 153 | 176 |
8 | BURGE, T | 1988 | INDIVIDUALISM AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE | J. Philos. | 85 | 11 | 649 | 663 |
9 | MCGINN, C | 1989 | CAN WE SOLVE THE MIND BODY PROBLEM | Mind | 98 | 391 | 349 | 366 |
10 | BOGEN, J; WOODWARD, J | 1988 | SAVING THE PHENOMENA | Philos. Rev. | 97 | 3 | 303 | 352 |
1990–1999 | ||||||||
1 | DEROSE, K | 1995 | SOLVING THE SKEPTICAL PROBLEM | Philos. Rev. | 104 | 1 | 1 | 52 |
2 | BRATMAN, ME | 1992 | SHARED COOPERATIVE ACTIVITY | Philos. Rev. | 101 | 2 | 327 | 340 |
3 | BURGE, T | 1993 | CONTENT PRESERVATION | Philos. Rev. | 102 | 4 | 457 | 488 |
4 | YABLO, S | 1992 | MENTAL CAUSATION | Philos. Rev. | 101 | 2 | 245 | 280 |
5 | DENNETT, DC | 1991 | REAL PATTERNS | J. Philos. | 88 | 1 | 27 | 51 |
6 | EDGINGTON, D | 1995 | ON CONDITIONALS | Mind | 104 | 414 | 235 | 329 |
7 | DAVIDSON, D | 1990 | THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF TRUTH | J. Philos. | 87 | 6 | 279 | 328 |
8 | LEWIS, D | 1994 | CHANCE AND CREDENCE—HUMEAN SUPERVENIENCE DEBUGGED | Mind | 103 | 412 | 473 | 490 |
9 | DEROSE, K | 1992 | CONTEXTUALISM AND KNOWLEDGE ATTRIBUTIONS | Philos. Phenomenol. Res. | 52 | 4 | 913 | 929 |
10 | GRIFFITHS, PE; GRAY, RD | 1994 | DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEMS AND EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION | J. Philos. | 91 | 6 | 277 | 304 |
2000–2009 | ||||||||
1 | Pryor, J | 2000 | The skeptic and the dogmatist | Nous | 34 | 4 | 517 | 549 |
2 | Stanley, J; Williamson, T | 2001 | Knowing how | J. Philos. | 98 | 8 | 411 | 444 |
3 | Lewis, D | 2000 | Causation as influence | J. Philos. | 97 | 4 | 182 | 197 |
4 | Kolodny, N | 2005 | Why be rational? | Mind | 114 | 455 | 509 | 563 |
5 | Elga, A | 2007 | Reflection and disagreement | Nous | 41 | 3 | 478 | 502 |
6 | Nichols, S; Knobe, J | 2007 | Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions | Nous | 41 | 4 | 663 | 685 |
7 | Chalmers, DJ; Jackson, F | 2001 | Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation | Philos. Rev. | 110 | 3 | 315 | 360 |
8 | Rupert, RD | 2004 | Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition | J. Philos. | 101 | 8 | 389 | 428 |
9 | Christensen, D | 2007 | Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News | Philos. Rev. | 116 | 2 | 187 | 217 |
10 | Byrne, A | 2001 | Intentionalism defended | Philos. Rev. | 110 | 2 | 199 | 240 |
Appendix 2: Examples of categories of citation
In this appendix, examples of categories of citations (see Table 1) are reported. However, one should keep in mind that generally it is necessary to consider the whole content of the paper in order to classify plausibly the function of the citations. Very often, in the case of AP the “context” of the citation turns out to be the entire paper.
State of the art citations
Almost all the extensive recent literature seeking alternatives to the orthodox approach – I would mention especially the writings of Bas an Fraassen and Robert L. Martin – agrees on a single basic idea… [Kripke 1975: 698]
For the classic discussion of these problems, see [12] [Perry 1979: 21]
A survey of the recent philosophical literature on the nature of functional analysis and explanation, beginning with the classic essays of Hempel in 1959 and Nagel in 1961, reveals that… [note] [Cummins 1975: 741]
Some philosophers have claimed that people have incompatibilist intuitions (e.g. Kane 1999, 218; Strawson 1986, 30; Vargas 2006); others have challenged this claim and suggested that people’s intuitions actually fit with compatibilism (Nahmias et al. 2015) [Nichols and Knobe 2007: 663]
Supporting citations
I follow Arthur Smullyan’s treatment of scope ambiguity in modal sentences, given in ‘Modality and Description’, Journal of Symbolic Logic, XIII, 1 (March 1948): 31–37, as qualified by Wilson’s objection, in The Concept of Language… [Lewis 1968: 120]
The influence of H. P. Grice’s ‘Meaning’, The Philosophical Review, LXVI (1957): 377–388 will be evident here [Davidson 1992: 311]
Supplementary citations
For my former view, see the treatment of preemption in ‘Postscript E to ‘Causation’’, in my Philosophical Papers, Volume II (New York: Oxford, 1986), pp. 193–212. [Lewis 2000: 1983, in footnote]
Acknowledgement citations
In thinking about the problem of essential indexical, I have been greatly helped by the writings of Hector-Neri Castaneda on indexicality and related topics. Castaneda focused attention on these problems, and made many of the points made here, in [1], [2] and [3] [Perry 1979: 21]
Critical citations
The difficulty one gets into by a mechanical application of the theory of games to moral philosophy can be brought out by considering among several possible examples, R. B. Braithwaite’s study, Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher (Cambridge 1955) […] Braithwaite’s use of the theory of games, insofar as it is intended to analyze the concept of fairness, is, I think, mistaken [Rawls 1958: 176–177]
W. V. Quine, for one, explicitly denies that anything need to be done other than provide a progression to serve as the numbers. In Word and Object (London, 1960, pp. 262–263, he states […] I would disagree [Benacerraf 1965: 51]
Documental citations
While the assimilation is implicit in Bentham’s and Sidgwick’s moral theory, explicit statements of it as applied to justice are relatively rare. One clear instance in The Principles of Morals and Legislation occurs in ch. X, footnote 2 to section XL: […] [Rawls 1958: 184]
Appendix 3: Raw data
In the following table, percentage of citation categories, divided by paper and decade, are reported. Papers’ profiles are available on-line in Petrovich (2018).
# Paper | 1950–1959 (%) | 1960–1969 (%) | 1970–1979 (%) | 1980–1989 (%) | 1990–1999 (%) | 2000–2009 (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Supporting citations | ||||||
1 | 0.00 | 8.33 | 42.31 | 52.94 | 18.84 | 21.01 |
2 | 66.67 | 5.56 | 54.55 | 20.00 | 31.37 | 31.25 |
3 | 87.50 | 0.00 | 30.77 | 42.86 | 46.00 | 61.54 |
4 | 32.29 | 100.00 | 33.33 | 52.38 | 36.05 | 22.62 |
5 | 100.00 | 50.00 | 39.13 | 0.00 | 56.25 | 32.86 |
6 | 50.00 | 38.64 | 28.13 | 66.67 | 14.22 | 21.74 |
7 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 42.86 | 24.19 | 35.96 | 25.00 |
8 | 35.71 | 30.00 | 100.00 | 61.54 | 50.00 | 40.74 |
9 | 0.00 | 50.00 | 55.00 | 87.50 | 13.16 | 66.67 |
10 | 0.00 | 8.33 | 27.27 | 35.23 | 60.00 | 26.86 |
MEAN | 37.22 | 29.09 | 45.33 | 44.33 | 36.19 | 35.03 |
MEDIAN | 34.00 | 19.17 | 40.72 | 47.62 | 36.01 | 29.06 |
MAX | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 87.50 | 60.00 | 66.67 |
MIN | 0.00 | 0.00 | 27.27 | 0.00 | 13.16 | 21.01 |
Critical citations | ||||||
1 | 100.00 | 50.00 | 38.46 | 47.06 | 23.91 | 2.17 |
2 | 16.67 | 94.44 | 18.18 | 26.67 | 7.84 | 25.00 |
3 | 8.33 | 0.00 | 7.69 | 57.14 | 20.67 | 0.00 |
4 | 15.63 | 0.00 | 26.67 | 14.29 | 0.00 | 26.19 |
5 | 0.00 | 50.00 | 8.70 | 7.14 | 16.67 | 0.00 |
6 | 25.00 | 0.00 | 40.63 | 22.22 | 5.60 | 0.00 |
7 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 33.33 | 6.45 | 22.81 | 21.15 |
8 | 28.57 | 30.00 | 0.00 | 23.08 | 38.24 | 9.26 |
9 | 100.00 | 25.00 | 40.00 | 0.00 | 10.53 | 9.52 |
10 | 12.50 | 91.67 | 36.36 | 22.35 | 13.33 | 10.36 |
MEAN | 30.67 | 34.11 | 25.00 | 22.64 | 15.96 | 10.37 |
MEDIAN | 16.15 | 27.50 | 30.00 | 22.29 | 15.00 | 9.39 |
MAX | 100.00 | 94.44 | 40.63 | 57.14 | 38.24 | 26.19 |
MIN | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
State of the art citations | ||||||
1 | 0.00 | 8.33 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 42.75 | 63.04 |
2 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 18.18 | 9.17 | 54.90 | 21.88 |
3 | 4.17 | 0.00 | 23.08 | 0.00 | 22.67 | 23.08 |
4 | 18.75 | 0.00 | 40.00 | 0.00 | 54.65 | 39.29 |
5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 36.96 | 64.29 | 12.50 | 44.29 |
6 | 25.00 | 31.82 | 25.00 | 13.89 | 58.19 | 56.52 |
7 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 19.05 | 53.23 | 14.91 | 42.31 |
8 | 35.71 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 23.08 | 2.94 | 34.26 |
9 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 12.50 | 68.42 | 23.81 |
10 | 50.00 | 0.00 | 36.36 | 17.80 | 23.33 | 53.56 |
MEAN | 13.36 | 4.02 | 19.86 | 19.40 | 35.53 | 40.20 |
MEDIAN | 2.09 | 0.00 | 21.06 | 13.20 | 33.04 | 40.80 |
MAX | 50.00 | 31.82 | 40.00 | 64.29 | 68.42 | 63.04 |
MIN | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.94 | 21.88 |
Supplementary/perfunctory citations | ||||||
1 | 0.00 | 16.67 | 11.54 | 0.00 | 8.70 | 9.42 |
2 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 20.00 | 0.00 | 12.50 |
3 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.00 | 15.38 |
4 | 18.75 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.76 | 4.65 | 7.14 |
5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.35 | 14.29 | 4.17 | 14.29 |
6 | 0.00 | 9.09 | 6.25 | 5.56 | 3.88 | 15.22 |
7 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.76 | 0.00 | 7.02 | 11.54 |
8 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 7.69 | 5.88 | 9.26 |
9 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
10 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 20.08 | 2.22 | 5.34 |
MEAN | 1.88 | 2.58 | 2.69 | 7.24 | 4.05 | 10.01 |
MEDIAN | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 5.16 | 4.08 | 10.48 |
MAX | 18.75 | 16.67 | 11.54 | 20.08 | 8.70 | 15.38 |
MIN | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Acknowledgment citations | ||||||
1 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 5.80 | 0.00 |
2 | 16.67 | 0.00 | 9.09 | 5.00 | 5.88 | 0.00 |
3 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 38.46 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
4 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 19.05 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 6.52 | 7.14 | 8.33 | 8.57 |
6 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 5.56 | 3.45 | 0.00 |
7 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.84 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
8 | 0.00 | 40.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.94 | 0.00 |
9 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 5.00 | 0.00 | 7.89 | 0.00 |
10 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.11 | 0.00 |
MEAN | 1.67 | 4.00 | 5.91 | 4.16 | 3.54 | 0.86 |
MEDIAN | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.42 | 3.19 | 0.00 |
MAX | 16.67 | 40.00 | 38.46 | 19.05 | 8.33 | 8.57 |
MIN | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Documental citations | ||||||
1 | 0.00 | 16.67 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
2 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 19.17 | 0.00 | 6.25 |
3 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 6.67 | 0.00 |
4 | 14.58 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 9.52 | 4.65 | 0.00 |
5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 7.14 | 2.08 | 0.00 |
6 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.59 | 0.00 |
7 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 11.29 | 19.30 | 0.00 |
8 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 7.69 | 0.00 | 6.48 |
9 | 0.00 | 25.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
10 | 37.50 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.55 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
MEAN | 5.21 | 4.17 | 0.00 | 5.94 | 3.53 | 1.27 |
MEDIAN | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 5.84 | 1.04 | 0.00 |
MAX | 37.50 | 25.00 | 0.00 | 19.17 | 19.30 | 6.48 |
MIN | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
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Petrovich, E. Accumulation of knowledge in para-scientific areas: the case of analytic philosophy. Scientometrics 116, 1123–1151 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-018-2796-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-018-2796-5