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On the relationship between the number of a broker’s real estate listings and transaction outcomes

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Abstract

This paper documents that sellers who employ brokerage offices that list a large number of properties (“active brokerages”) obtain higher selling prices, smaller negotiated discounts from the corresponding list prices, and shorter times on the market for their listed properties. Sellers who employ active brokerages list their properties at prices that are closer to our hedonic model’s predicted prices. Interestingly, properties that are listed at discounts relative to their predicted prices are snapped up more quickly only if they are associated with brokerages that list a relatively small number of properties. In addition, properties listed by active brokerages are less likely to be listed “as is” and are more likely to have their defects repaired prior to being listed. Moreover, because the efficacy of brokerage services varies across brokerage offices, the results also suggest that the use of an indicator variable for the use of brokerage services is not sufficient to capture the complete impact of the use of a real estate broker on transaction outcomes. In addition, the Appendix discusses the concern for potential endogeneities between the number of brokerage listings and transaction outcomes. It documents that the Durban–Wu–Hausman test indicates that exogeneity cannot be rejected.

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Notes

  1. Baryla and Zumpano (1995) and Elder et al. (1999) both find that real estate brokers reduce the search time for buyers.

  2. However, listing a property involves costs which are unobservable to a researcher and, thus, are not included in our data. We cannot conclude that listing a property with an active brokerage dominates employing a less active brokerage because these costs may be correlated with the brokerage's number of listings.

  3. For an excellent detailed survey of the literature, see Benjamin et al. (2000a, b).

  4. However, Bernheim and Meer (2013) find a positive impact on transaction price when a property is listed by one of the two busiest brokers.

  5. Unfortunately, we do not have access to comparable data from later periods. That being said, we believe that our high-quality data and strong results yield important lessons that extend across a variety of time periods.

  6. Previous studies, such as Huang and Rutherford (2007), use a single variable for the number of bathrooms. However, in our sample the impacts of full and half bathrooms differ from one another.

  7. See Asabere et al. (1993) for the sub-optimal transaction outcomes consequences of a sub-optimal list price. Kang and Gardner (1989) demonstrate that overpricing by sellers is not a successful strategy and leads to more days on market. Miller and Sklarz (1987) argue that the optimal pricing strategy is to list a property at a price equal to or slightly above an appropriate price. They find that listing a property at either substantially above or below its value is not optimal.

  8. Since the seller also chooses the real estate agent, there was a concern for potential endogeneity between LLISTINGS and LIST, however a Durbin–Wu–Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity between LIST and LLISTINGS. Please see the “Appendix” for details.

  9. Since days on market is always an integer in our data, as a robustness check, we also ran the analysis using a Poisson regression analysis. The results were qualitatively similar.

  10. A VIF analysis indicates no evidence of multicollinearity among our many property characteristics.

  11. A VIF analysis indicates no evidence of multicollinearity among our many property characteristics.

  12. LRES may have two components: pricing errors and the impact of characteristics that are not captured well by the standard (MLS) description of the property (e.g., the condition of the house). Because LRES captures characteristics that are not included in the standard MLS description, its coefficient is highly significant, and including LRES substantially reduces the standard errors of the coefficients for all of the other explanatory variables. In addition, since LRES is orthogonal to all the other explanatory variables (including LLISTINGS) it has no impact on the coefficient point estimates.

  13. Since the seller also chooses the real estate agent, there is a concern for potential endogeneity between LLISTINGS and SALE, however a Durbin–Wu–Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity between SALE and LLISTINGS. Please see the “Appendix” for details.

  14. Since the seller also chooses the real estate agent, there was a concern for potential endogeneity between LLISTINGS and SOVERL, however a Durbin–Wu–Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. Please see the “Appendix” for details.

  15. See Miller and Slarz (1987) and Asabere et al. (1993).

  16. The error in our hedonic pricing model represents, in part, the broker’s pricing error and in part the impact of characteristics that are not included in the MLS description of the property.

  17. For robustness, we examined an alternative specification where the absolute value of the ratio replaces the square of the ratio. The estimates are very similar.

  18. A specification using the logarithm of (LRES/L)2 as the dependent variable yielded qualitatively similar results.

  19. Note that this is a conservative estimate because, as indicated by the results in Table 6, a brokerage that has only one listing is likely to make a pricing error that is (in absolute value) larger than the average pricing error.

  20. Consistent with Dallon (2002) and the results we report in Table 4.

  21. See Ge and Whitmore (2010) for a good review of the use of probit analysis in the accounting and finance literature.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Ivan Brick, Michael Long, Xing Zhou, Jin-Mo Kim, Michael Seiler and the seminar participants at Rutgers University, Louisiana State University, Villanova University, University of International Business and Economics, the University of Tokyo, two anonymous referees, and especially the editor C. F. Lee, for their valuable comments. Any errors or omissions remain ours. Oded Palmon acknowledges the financial support of the Sanger Chair of Banking and Risk Management.

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Correspondence to Ben J. Sopranzetti.

Appendix: Test for potential endogeneity

Appendix: Test for potential endogeneity

A concern for potential endogeneity between LLISTINGS and the dependent variables (LIST, SALE, and SOVERL) arises because the identity of the broker is chosen by the seller. Econometrically, endogeneity exists when one or more of the explanatory variables is correlated with the error term. Note that the residuals are, by construction, orthogonal to all the explanatory variables. However, the theoretical specification may be such that the error term (what should be attributed to all things other than the specified function of the explanatory variables) is correlated with one of the explanatory variables. If endogeneity exists, then ordinary least squares regressions (OLS) would yield inconsistent estimates, and the use of instrumental variables techniques (IV) would be appropriate. To test for endogeneity between LLISTINGS and our dependent variables, we implement the Durban–Wu–Hausman Test.

The Durbin–Wu–Hausman test takes its name from James Durbin, De-Min Wu, and Jerry Hausman for their seminal work in the field of econometrics (see Durbin 1954; Wu 1973; Hausman 1978). The test is often used to determine whether a given estimator, in our case, OLS, is consistent relative to a second estimator, IV, when IV is known to be consistent, but less efficient. In other words, the Durban–Wu–Hausman test determines whether the existence of endogeneity warrants the use of IV rather than OLS. Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) interpret the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test as an examination of whether possible endogeneity of the right-hand-side variables not contained in the instruments has any significant impact on the coefficient estimates: whether an IV regression is inefficient relative to OLS. This test is implemented by using an IV regression to test the null hypothesis that an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent estimates. A rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the effects of endogeneity on the OLS estimates are meaningful, and that IV methods are required.

The original OLS specifications for LIST, SALE, and SOVERL are given in Eqs. (1), (3), and (4), respectively. To perform the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test, we estimate a new IV structural model as follows:

$$y = \alpha + \varvec{BX} + \gamma \hat{u} + \varepsilon$$

where y is either LIST, SALE, or SOVERL, the vector X includes the explanatory variables in Eqs. (1), (3), and (4), respectively. Since we wish to test endogeneity between LLISTINGS and the three dependent variables, the additional instrumental variable \(\hat{u}\) represents the residuals from the following regression:

$$\begin{aligned} LLISTINGS_{i} & = \alpha + \beta_{1} FT_{i} + \beta_{2} AGE_{i} + \beta_{3} LOT_{i} + \beta_{4} BED_{i} + \beta_{5} FULL_{i} + \beta_{6} HALF_{i} \\ & \quad + \beta_{7} POOL_{i} + \beta_{8} ASIS_{i} + \beta_{9} DEFECT_{i} + \beta_{10} L900_{i} + u_{i} \\ \end{aligned}$$
(7)

where the first nine explanatory variables are discussed in Table 1 and L900 is an indicator variable that equals one if the property’s list price ends in the digits “900”. Palmon et al. (2004) find that this last variable, L900, is correlated with LLISTINGS, but does not have any significant impact on the transaction prices. The inclusion of L900 is important to identify the reduced form equation for LLISTINGS, since the other explanatory variables also are included in X.

The Durban–Wu–Hausman test examines whether employing an IV regression technique improves the efficiency of the estimators relative to OLS estimates. In our case, if the LLRESID coefficient is significantly different from zero, then the OLS estimates are also not consistent and an IV technique should be employed. The only way that LLISTINGS could be endogenous to y (and hence correlated with ε) is if and only if u is correlated with ε. If u is correlated with ε, then the coefficient on LLRESID should be significantly different from zero in the IV regression. The Durban–Wu–Hausman null hypothesis is that the coefficient on LLRESID is zero, which implies that LLISTINGS is not correlated with the error term, and thus exogenous with y (LIST, SALE, or SOVERL). A rejection of the null hypothesis implies that OLS is consistent.

To implement the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test, we extract the residuals, called “LLRESID,” from regression (7). The results of this regression for LLISTINGS are reported in Table 8. We next append LLRESID to the specifications for LIST, SALE, and SOVERL [Eqs. (1), (3), and (4), respectively]; that is, LLRESID is included along with LLISTINGS in each of the regressions. As a result, Eq. (1) becomes:

$$\begin{aligned} LIST_{i} & = \alpha_{i} + \beta_{1} LLISTINGS_{i} + \beta_{2} FT_{i} + \beta_{3} AGE_{i} + \beta_{4} LOT_{i} + \beta_{5} BED_{i} \\ & \quad + \beta_{6} FULL_{i} + \beta_{7} HALF_{i} + \beta_{8} POOL_{i} + \beta_{9} FC_{i} + \beta_{10} ASIS_{i} + \beta_{11} DEFECT_{i} \\ & \quad + \beta_{12} REPAIR_{i} + \beta_{13} TIME_{i} + \beta_{14} NEW_{i} + \beta_{15} NEW1_{i} + \beta_{16} SUMMER_{i} \\ & \quad + \beta_{17} LLRESID_{i} + \varepsilon_{i} \\ \end{aligned}$$
(8)

Equation (3) becomes

$$\begin{aligned} SALE_{i} & = \alpha_{i} + \beta_{1} LLISTINGS_{i} + \beta_{2} FT_{i} + \beta_{3} AGE_{i} + \beta_{4} LOT_{i} + \beta_{5} BED_{i} \\ & \quad + \beta_{6} FULL_{i} + \beta_{7} HALF_{i} + \beta_{8} POOL_{i} + \beta_{9} FC_{i} + \beta_{10} ASIS_{i} + \beta_{11} DEFECT_{i} \\ & \quad + \beta_{12} REPAIR_{i} + \beta_{13} TIME_{i} + \beta_{14} NEW_{i} + \beta_{15} NEW1_{i} + \beta_{16} LISTRES_{i} \\ & \quad + \beta_{17} SUMMER_{i} + \beta_{18} LLRESID_{i} + \varepsilon_{i} \\ \end{aligned}$$
(9)

And, Eq. (4) becomes

$$\begin{aligned} SOVERL_{i} & = \alpha_{i} + \beta_{1} LLISTINGS_{i} + \beta_{2} FT_{i} + \beta_{3} AGE_{i} + \beta_{4} LOT_{i} + \beta_{5} BED_{i} \\ & \quad + \beta_{6} FULL_{i} + \beta_{7} HALF_{i} + \beta_{8} POOL_{i} + \beta_{9} FC_{i} + \beta_{10} ASIS_{i} + \beta_{11} DEFECT_{i} \\ & \quad + \beta_{12} REPAIR_{i} + \beta_{13} TIME_{i} + \beta_{14} NEW_{i} + \beta_{15} NEW1_{i} + \beta_{16} SUMMER_{i} \\ & \quad + \beta_{17} LLRESID_{i} + \varepsilon_{i} \\ \end{aligned}$$
(10)

A coefficient on LLRESID that is significantly different from zero in a given regression indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis of exogeneity between LLISTINGS and the dependent variable in question. Tables 9, 10, and 11 present the results of the Durban–Wu–Haussman Test for LLISTINGS and LIST, SALE, and SOVERL, respectively. Note the insignificant coefficients on LLRESID in each of these regressions indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity between LLISTINGS and any of the dependent variables. Consequently, ordinary least squares regression yields consistent estimates is an appropriate methodology.

Table 8 OLS regression of LLISTINGS, the natural logarithm of the number of properties listed by an individual brokers
Table 9 OLS regression of LIST, the property’s list price, on the variables specified in Eq. (1) with the addition of LLRESID
Table 10 OLS regression of SALE, the property’s transaction price, on the variables specified in Eq. (3) with the addition of LLRESID
Table 11 OLS regression of SOVER, the ratio of the property’s transaction price to its list price, on the variables specified in Eq. (4) with the addition of LLRESID

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Palmon, O., Sopranzetti, B.J. On the relationship between the number of a broker’s real estate listings and transaction outcomes. Rev Quant Finan Acc 49, 65–89 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-016-0583-z

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