Abstract
Schopenhauer’s bifurcation between optimistic and pessimistic religions is made, so I argue here, by means of five criteria: to perceive of existence as punishment, to believe that salvation is not attained through ‘works’, to preach compassion so as to lead towards ascetics, to manifest an aura of mystery around religious doctrines and to, at some deep level, admit to the allegorical nature of religious creeds. By clearly showing what makes up the ‘pessimism’ of a ‘pessimistic religion’, Schopenhauer’s own philosophical pessimism can be clarified since he posits a strict correlation between the truth of (proper) philosophy and (pessimistic) religion. Accordingly, Schopenhauer’s pessimism is by means of this process clarified as non-radical and providing a genuine ‘highest good’ that is more than absolute denial.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
I use the following abbreviations to refer to Schopenhauer’s works: WWV1/2 (The World as Will and Representation: volume 1 and 2), BGE (The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics), PP2 (Parerga and Paralipomena: volume 2). Pagenumbers refer to the pages of the Hübscher Sämtliche Werke-edition, except in the case of Parerga and Paralipoma (where they refer to the pages of the translation).
For an overview of Kant’s philosophy of religion: Byrne (2007), DiCenso (2011), Palmquist (2000), Firestone and Jacobs (2008), Vanden Auweele (2014a) The similarities between Kant and Schopenhauer’s philosophy of religion are uncanny even though Schopenhauer never overtly refers to Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Obviously, Kant develops his views of religion elsewhere as well. Nevertheless, two of the most prominent biographies of Schopenhauer did not find a single mention of Kant’s Religionschrift throughout the entirety of Schopenhauer’s life: Safranksi (1990), Cartwright (2010). For a sustained argument departing from Schopenhauer’s ontology on these similarities: Vanden Auweele (2013).
For this complaint from a variety of angles: Janaeay (1999, pp. 333–343), Birnbacher (2009), Cartwright (1988, pp. 51–66), Hamlyn (1980, p. 143), Magee (1983, pp. 13–14). Even Friedrich Nietzsche seriously doubted the intellectual sincerity of Schopenhauer’s pessimism: “Schopenhauer, pessimism notwithstanding, actually—played the flute ... every day, after dinner. You can read it in his biography. And just out of curiosity: a pessimist who negates both God and world but stops before morality,—who affirms morality and plays his flute, affirms laede neminem morality: excuse me? Is this really—a pessimist?” (Nietzsche 2002, p. 76 (§186)).
Few have queried what the criteria for a pessimistic religion are. For instance, Janaway points solely to the influence of theism in rendering a religion optimistic (Janaway 1999, pp. 319–323). Jörg Salaquarda points out the following elements: the omnipresence of suffering, the inability of a positive state of happiness, the opposition to egoism, compassion as the prime virtue and asceticism (Salaquarda 2007b, p. 136). Robert Wicks mainly enumerates how Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism advocate a mystical flight from this word, whereas Judaism, Islam and Paganism believe there to be purpose in this world (Wicks 2008, pp. 82–91).
Cf. Magee (1983, pp. 53–54), Salaquarda (2007a, p. 84 ff). Jörg Salaquarda famously stated that “Schopenhauer has not written a philosophy of religion” (Ibid., 83; my translation). Salaquarda is here following Schopenhauer’s own definition of Religionsphilosophie and does not deny that Schopenhauer has philosophically reflected on the subject of religion. For an overview of the Continental reception of Schopenhauer’s views of religion: Mannion (2003, pp. 41–52).
In an unpublished note of January 1820, Schopenhauer recognizes the identification of natural religion with philosophy of religion: “Natural religion, or as present-day custom calls it, philosophy of religion means a philosophical system which in its results harmonizes with some positive religion, so that in the eyes of those who confess one of them, both in precisely this way are proved to be true” (Schopenhauer 1985, p. 16).
This not to exclude that Schopenhauer was already interested in philosophy of religion, only that he did not consistently investigate in what way his philosophy could make use of religion.
One could object that a similarly important function of religion is to provide rituals and practices that reinforce ethical behavior, not simply to convey metaphysical knowledge. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer similarly believes that ethical behavior derives from the indeterminate awareness of the metaphysical unity of reality. Accordingly, if religious rituals and such instigate human agents to act ethically, they can only do so by awakening or cultivating this form of ethical knowledge.
For numerous enlightening notes on the historical and personal context of Schopenhauer’s attitude towards religion: Cartwright (2010, pp. 79 and 175–176).
One possible complaint is that Schopenhauer’s view of philosophical ascetics, which he finds resonating in Christian mysticism, Hinduism and Buddhism, is far more extreme than the ascetics in these religions. Generally, mystics are not opposed to all desires, rather to those that attach the human agent to material things: “The concept of the denial of the will-to-live touches a degree of metaphysical dualism and extreme asceticism combined with a pessimistic dismissal of samsara that Vedanta and Buddhism do not advocate” (Singh 2007, p. 58; Cf. Wicks 2008, p. 85 ff.).
The locus classicus of the Vedantic myth of reincarnation is the Mukhya Upanishad or Katha Upanishad (c. fifth century b. C.). Here, a young philosopher Naciketes is tutored by Yama (death) about the secrets of life and death. While this text was highly influential in Western culture (e.g. Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman), the first translations of it reached Europe near the end of the nineteenth century. So while Schopenhauer might have known of the individual concepts and the general story of the text, the particular text itself was more than likely unknown to him.
For an overview of Schopenhauer’s assessment of Islam: Berger (2004, pp. 135–145).
See in particular Pelagius’ letters ‘Epistula ad Adolescentem’ and ‘Epistula de possibilitate non peccandi’ (Rees 1991, pp. 157–163, 164–170).
Martha Nussbaum opined that Schopenhauer’s pessimism is underlined by a theological sense of original sin. While this assertion is accurate and insightful, she mistakenly argues for the “Catholic origin of Schopenhauer’s loathing of the will” (Nussbaum 1999, p. 356). Schopenhauer’s sense of depravity is of more of a Lutheran bend, calling for a full-out sense of radical depravity. The Catholic sense of ‘fallenness’ retains the hope, in natural existence, for some kind of redolence to goodness and remembrance of divine transcendence. I have argued for this point of view more extensively elsewhere: Vanden Auweele (2013).
Schopenhauer expresses serious reservations whether Kant’s sense of personal conscience would ever be sufficiently persuasive to induce agents to act ethically (BGE 132–155). Kant himself realized this difficulty and augmented his ethical theory with a practical theology (Dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason) and a philosophy of religion (Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason). As Kant argued in §87 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, atheism carries the danger of impairing moral agency. Similarly, Schopenhauer believes that the main strength of any religious doctrine is “wholly and exclusively its ethical aspect” (WWV1 427n) to such a point where “atheism, or godlessness has become a synonym for an absence of all morality” (ibid.). Obviously, Schopenhauer never goes as far as to say that atheism is an immoral position (he even emphasizes time and again that a lot of immorality is committed under the guise of religion), but he does warn that a complete absence of all religion might seriously impair moral agency for those that are not philosophically enlightened (cf. §174 of PP2).
In how far Schopenhauer’s assessment of the ground of morality is cogent and consistent is something that I must leave open here. Johann Becker early on pointed out that Schopenhauer really formats a higher form of egoism as the ground for morality, since the moral agent can only act upon the suffering of another after appropriating it for himself. This objection has been reiterated in different form by numerous authors:Gardiner (1963, p. 276 ff.), Young (2005, pp. 182–183), Hamlyn (1980, p. 45). For a, in my view, cogent solution to this problem by specifying the illusory nature of egoist desires: (Cartwright 2009, p. 144), Reginster (2012, pp. 421–423).
Schopenhauer admired Buddhism even more than Christianity and Hinduism: “If I wished to take the results of my philosophy as the measure of truth, I would have to grant Buddhism priority over the others” (WWV2 192). David Cartwright points out that Schopenhauer’s preference of Buddhism over Hinduism likely derives from Buddhism’s atheism, its rejection of Vedantic metaphysics and the rejection of a creator God (Cartwright 2010, p. 272).
Cf. Also: “The moral virtues are precisely not the ultimate purpose, but only a step toward it” (WWV2 696) and: “Virtuous action is a momentary passage through the point to which permanent return is denial of the will to life” (WWV2 698).
See also: “For in spite of all Protestant-rationalistic distortions and misrepresentations, the ascetic spirit is assuredly and quite properly the soul of the New Testament” (PP2 314).
Schopenhauer takes from this that the purpose of existence is not to be happy, and finds this viewpoint resonating with Christianity and Hinduism: “For the true spirit and core of Christianity, just as of Brahmanism and Buddhism, is cognizance of the nullity of all earthly happiness, complete contempt for it, and turning towards an entirely different, indeed opposite, kind [...] For precisely this reason, atheistic Buddhism is much more closely related to Christianity than are optimistic Judaism and its variation, Islam” (WWV2 505).
Recognizing the non-radical or non-absolutist nature of Schopenhauer’s pessimism might go a long way in recovering credibility of it. For a sustained argument on the nature of Schopenhauer’s pessimism along the lines I have developed here: Mannion (2003, pp. 11–38).
“The thought of suicide is a strong means of comfort: it helps get us through many an evil night” (Nietzsche 2002, 70 §157).
References
Berger, D. (2004). The poorest form of theism: schopenhauer, islam and the perils of comparative hermeneutics. Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 15, 135–145.
Birnbacher, D. (2009). Schopenhauer. Stuttgart: Verlag Reclam.
Brecht, M. (Ed.). (1993). Der Pietismus vom siebzehnten bis zum frühen achtzehnten Jahrhundert. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Brecht, M. (Ed.). (1995). Der Pietismus in achtzehnten Jahrhundert. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Byrne, P. (2007). Kant on god. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Cartwright, D. (1988). Schopenhauer on suffering, seath, guilt, and the consolation of metaphysics. In E. von der Luft (Ed.), Schopenhauer: New essays in honor of his 200th birthday (pp. 51–66). Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.
Cartwright, D. (2009). Compassion and solidarity with sufferers: The metaphysics of mitleid. In A. Neill & C. Janaway (Eds.), Better consciousness. Schopenhauer’s philosophy of value (pp. 138–156). Oxford: Wiley.
Cartwright, D. (2010). Schopenhauer. A biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Copleston, F. (1947). Arthur schopenhauer: Philosopher of pessimism. London: Oates and Washbourne.
DiCenso, J. (2011). Kant, religion, and politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fernández, J. (2006). Schopenhauer’s pessimism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73, 646–664.
Firestone, C., & Jacobs, N. (2008). In defense of Kant’s eeligion. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Gardiner, P. (1963). Schopenhauer. Harmondsworth: Penguin Publishing.
Gawthrop, R. (1993). Pietism and the making of eighteenth century prussia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hamlyn, D. (1980). Schopenhauer. London: Routledge.
Hannan, B. (2009). The riddle of the world. A reconsideration of schopenhauer’s philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jacquette, D. (2000). Schopenhauer on the ethics of suicide. Continental Philosophy Review, 33, 43–58.
Janaway, C. (1999). Schopenhauer’s pessimism. In C. Janaway (Ed.), The cambridge companion to schopenhauer (pp. 318–343). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Magee, B. (1983). The philosophy of arthur schopenhauer. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mannion, G. (2003). Schopenhauer, religion and morality. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
Migotti, M. (1995). Schopenhauer’s pessimism and the unconditioned good. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 33, 643–660.
Neidert, R. (2012). Der Weltoffene Atheist Schopenhauer - offen auch für Religion, Christentum, gar Luther? Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch, 93, 441–462.
Nietzsche, F. (2002). Beyond good and evil (edited and trans: Horstmann, R.-P. & Norman, J.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nussbaum, M. (1999). Nietzsche, schopenhauer, and dionysus. In C. Janaway (Ed.), The cambridge companion to schopenhauer (pp. 344–374). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Palmquist, S. (2000). Kant’s critical religion. Volume two of Kant’s system of perspectives. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Rees, B. (Ed.). (1991). The letters of pelagius and his followers. Suffolk: The Boydell Press.
Reginster, B. (2012). Autonomy and the self as the basis for morality. In A. Wood & S. Hahn (Eds.), The Cambridge history of philosophy in the nineteenth century (1790–1870) (pp. 387–433). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Safranksi, R. (1990). Schopenhauer and the wild years of philosophy (trans: Osers, E.). Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
Salaquarda, J. (2007a). Schopenhauer und die Religion. In Broese, K., Kossler, M., & Salaquarda, B. (Eds.) Die Deutung der Welt (pp. 83–96), Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
Salaquarda, J. (2007b). Schopenhauers Hermeneutik der Religion(en). In Broese, K., Kossler, M., & Salaquarda, B. (Eds.) Die Deutung der Welt (pp. 119–140). Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
Schopenhauer, A. (1974). Parerga and paralipomena (edited and trans: Payne, E. F. J.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Schopenhauer, A. (1985). Manuscript remains, Vol. III. (Edited: Arthur Hübscher, trans: Payne, E. F. J.). New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Schopenhauer, A. (2009). The two fundamental problems of ethics (edited and transl: Janaway, C.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schopenhauer, A. (2010). The world as will and representation Vol. 1 (edited and trans: Janaway, C., Norman, J., & Welchman, A.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schopenhauer, A. (2011). The world as will and representation (sic.), Vol. 2 (edited and trans: Carus, D. & Aquila, R.). Upper Saddle River: Pearson.
Scruton, R. (2010). The uses of pessimism. And the danger of false hope. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Singh, R. (2007). Death, contemplation and schopenhauer. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
Škof, L. (2006). Metaphysical ethics reconsidered: Schopenhauer, compassion and world religions. Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch, 87, 101–119.
Vanden Auweele, D. (2013). New perspective on schopenhauer’s ontology of will. Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch, 94, 31–52.
Vanden Auweele, D. (2014a). For the love of god: Kant on grace. International Philosophical Quarterly, 54(2014), 175–190.
Vanden Auweele, D. (2014b). Schopenhauer, pessmisme en zelfmoord. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 76(2014), 307–330.
Wicks, R. (2008). Arthur Schopenhauer. In G. Oppy & N. N. Trakakis (Eds.), Nineteenth-century philosophy of religion (pp. 81–93). Durham: Acumen Publishing.
Young, J. (1987). Willing and unwilling: A study in the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Young, J. (2005). Schopenhauer. London: Routledge Publishing.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Vanden Auweele, D. Schopenhauer on religious pessimism. Int J Philos Relig 78, 53–71 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9479-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9479-9