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Merger Review by the Federal Communications Commission: Comcast–NBC Universal

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Abstract

The Communications Act of 1934 created a dual review process in which mergers in the communications industry are reviewed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as well as the antitrust authorities. Commentators have criticized dual review not only as costly and redundant, but also as subject to substantive and procedural abuse. The process of clearing the 2011 Comcast–NBC Universal merger provides a useful case study to examine whether such concerns are justified. A review of the empirical context reveals that the FCC intervened even though the relevant markets were not structured in a way that would ordinarily raise anticompetitive concerns. In addition, the FCC was able to use differences between its review process and that used by the Justice Department to extract concessions from the merging parties that had nothing to do with the merger and which were more properly addressed through general rulemaking. Moreover, the use of voluntary commitments also allowed the FCC to avoid subjecting certain aspects of its decision to public comment and immunized it from having to offer a reasoned explanation or subjecting its decision to judicial review. The aftermath of the merger provides an opportunity to assess whether the FCC’s intervention yielded consumer benefits.

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Notes

  1. The 1934 Act initially gave the FCC authority to exempt telecommunications mergers from antitrust scrutiny, which made the FCC the sole merger review authority. This authority was repealed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which made dual review the norm.

  2. For FCC Commissioners’ criticisms of FCC merger review processes, see, e.g., FCC (2005b) (separate statement of Abernathy, Commissioner); FCC (2001b) (Powell, Commissioner, concurring in part and dissenting in part); FCC (1999) (Furchtgott-Roth, Commissioner, concurring in part and dissenting in part). For scholarly critiques, see Barkow and Huber (2000), Tramont (2000), Kolasky (2001), Kovacic (2001), Troy (2001), Curran (2002), Russell and Wolfson (2002), Weiser (2008), Spulber and Yoo (2009), Rinner (2009), Koutsky and Spiwak (2010), Kaplan (2012). Although most commentators favor eliminating the FCC’s merger review authority or reforming it to make it more like that of the antitrust authorities, some call for giving the FCC primary authority or for making general antitrust merger review more like the FCC’s; see Weiss and Stern (1998) and Frankel (2008).

  3. Comcast also had a relatively small presence in the New York DMA, in which it serves less than 10 % of the area.

  4. There is one exception where tastes are sufficiently heterogeneous and localized to make the relevant market less than national: live sports (Yoo 2014).

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Correspondence to Christopher S. Yoo.

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This article is based in part on the author’s testimony at the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation’s hearing on “Consumers, Competition, and the Consolidation in the Video and Broadband Market” on March 11, 2010. The author would like to thank the Milton and Miriam Handler Foundation for its financial support for this project.

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Yoo, C.S. Merger Review by the Federal Communications Commission: Comcast–NBC Universal. Rev Ind Organ 45, 295–321 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-014-9437-9

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