Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of economic changes in the 1990s and 2000s on the welfare of married households, taking into account the relative earnings structure of husband and wife. Modeling the household members’ joint labor supply, we find that families in which the wife is the higher wage earner experienced as much welfare gain in the 1990s and significantly higher welfare gains in the 2000s as families in which the husband is the higher wage earner.
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Notes
An alternative theoretical treatment of mutually determined marital and labor market outcomes can be found in Grossbard-Shechtman (1984).
Additionally, Bonke (2015, p. 90) finds that the, “great majority of households [in the Danish Household Survey] pool their incomes,” although this doesn’t necessarily preclude an absence of bargaining behavior.
Net of taxes, wages and non-labor income are computed using a publicly available tax calculator developed by the National Bureau of Economic Analysis called TAXSIM (http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/).
Apps and Rees (2009) are highly critical of family utility models that do not include measures of household production, but even they acknowledge that not much can be done without the availability of richer data (p. 108). Since the focus of the analysis in this paper is utility at the household level, the absence of home production activities is not crucial. It has been suggested that the BLS Time Use Survey would be useful here, but that survey has one respondent per household so data necessary for modeling joint decisions is not available in that survey.
Note that marriage formation and dissolution are exogenous to the optimization problem here. It is a static model. Clearly, marriage formation decisions occurred prior to observing these couples in the data, and it is unknown and not relevant (to the question at hand) whether dissolution of these marriages occurs after the optimization problem investigated here.
Many of the caveats, warnings, solutions, and implications related to this specific model were first detailed in Hotchkiss et al. (2012).
Z 1 and Z 2 are re-parameterized to account for individual and family characteristics, such as age, race, education, and number of children. Further details are found in Appendix 1.
Expressions for Ω i (i=1–5) are given in Appendix 1.
For purposes of identification, the Heckman selection equation uses non-labor income, number of children in the household, and spouse education as exclusion restriction variables.
This assumption of strictly convex preferences can be tested by analyzing the second order conditions of the maximization problem, which are akin to the internal consistency conditions established by Amemiya (1974, p. 1006). Using the nomenclature presented in Eqs. 6 and 7, the conditions imply that Ω1<0; Ω4<0 and Ω1Ω4>Ω2*Ω2, which are found to be true for all the models estimated here.
Given the nature of self-employed activities, in a short period of time, reported earnings can be negative, even if, in the long term, the market value of a self-employed worker’s time would be positive. The welfare gains of the self-employed are left for future work.
In addition to the detailed income source information from the CPS data, we also include information on property tax, CPS imputed capital gains and capital losses. All households are classified as if they were declaring taxes jointly and the main earner is identified as that with the highest total earned income. The tax simulation was implemented using the Stata taxsim interface. Data was prepared based on the recommendations found at http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/to-taxsim/cps/.
Using wage differentials between husband and wife of 0.15 and 0.25 log points produced similar results and the same conclusions.
See Hotchkiss and Rios-Avila (2013) for an analysis of the decline in labor force participation over this time period.
These earlier analyses only included families in which both spouses were working, whereas here we allow for non-participation of both members, and the focus of the earlier work was on the role of the shrinking male/female wage gap and on documenting welfare gains across the income distribution.
Similar to Ransom (1987), while the uncompensated wage elasticity can be negative, the corresponding compensated own wage elasticity for husbands is always positive.
Also see Killingsworth (1983, p. 107).
We present results for the average family in each relative wage classification as opposed to the average welfare change within each classification because it is at the average values of the variables used to generate the parameter coefficients that we can be sure the first order conditions for the utility maximization problem are satisfied.
Another potential source, of course, is a change in preferences, which would be reflected through differences in estimated utility function parameters found in Appendix 2.
The analysis by Hotchkiss et al. (1997) differed from the one in this paper primarily by using a sample of dual earner families only, not allowing for non-workers.
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The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or of the Federal Reserve System. Comments from Anne E. Winkler, Phanindra Wunnava, and participants of the Federal Reserve System Applied Micro meeting and the Southern Economic Association meeting are greatly appreciated.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
1.1 This appendix presents the first order conditions of families' utility maximization problem, derivation of the labor supply equations, and the liklihood function estimated
The quadratic functional form as presented in Eq. (5) in the text can also be written in the following form:
where \({L_1} = T - {h_1};{L_2} = T - {h_2};\;{\rm{and}}\;C = {w_1}{h_1} + {w_2}{h_2} + Y\)
This becomes an unconstrained utility maximization problem which depends on the working hours h 1 and h 2, assuming that Y (non-labor income) is exogenous. The corresponding first order conditions become:
There is no need to specify a time endowment (T) in order to estimate the labor supply functions because \(a_1^*\), \(a_2^*\), and \(a_3^*\) are re-parameterized functions of T and Y. This re-parameterization is necessary for identification of the labor supply equations. It is through these starred parameters that differences in tastes across families are allowed to enter. Specifically,
where X 1 and X 2 are vectors of individual and family characteristics and Γ1 and Γ2 are parameters to be estimated. Individual characteristics included in X are age, age squared, race, and education. Family characteristics include number of children. Non-labor family income enters separately.
Using Eqs. (14) and (15), we can solve the system obtaining the values of h 1 and h 2 that maximize the utility function, in the following way:
where:
From Eqs. (16) and (17), the solutions for \(h_1^*\) and \(h_2^*\) become:
These derivatives are obtained with the help of Mathematica® (Wolfram Research, Inc. 2010). We calculate expected hours conditional on being positive according to (Muthen 1990).
Appendix 2
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Hotchkiss, J.L., Moore, R.E., Rios-Avila, F. et al. A tale of two decades: Relative intra-family earning capacity and changes in family welfare over time. Rev Econ Household 15, 707–737 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-016-9354-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-016-9354-9