Abstract
The phenomenon of akrasia, in which an actor makes a choice she regrets even while choosing it, appears problematic for theories of rational choice, which assume that an agent prefers any chosen course of action. The apparent possibility of akratic action presents a challenge to rational choice theorists, either to demonstrate that it is illusory or to show that akratic action does not violate the axioms of rational choice. The problematic status of akrasia is exhibited most sharply when set against the backdrop of praxeology. Therefore, this paper will explore whether the idea of akratic action can be reconciled with the fundamental principles of praxeology.
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Notes
Mises never suggested, as some of his critics have believed he did, that actors always choose the objectively optimal path to reaching their ends. He always acknowledged that there is “uncertainty inherent in every action.... one must never forget that every action is embedded in the flux of time and therefore involves a speculation. The capitalists, the landowners, and the laborers are by necessity speculators. So is the consumer in providing for anticipated future needs. There’s many a slip “twixt cup and lip.” (1996, p. 254)
Here it is important to recognize that Mises’s “rational actor” is quite different from the “rational utility maximizer” of neoclassical economics—for Mises, “rational” simply means “purposeful,” with no implication of perfect knowledge, absence of error, or purely selfish concerns.
Although this paper focuses on the problem akrasia presents to Misesian praxeologists, we should note that the difficulty is not uniquely theirs. The neoclassical theory of rational choice also seems to leave no room for akratic actions, since it assumes that an agent will always choose the course of action that will maximize her utility.
However, Aristotle probably would not accept Davidson’s argument that there is no inherent connection between akratic actions and moral concerns, since he writes, “incontinence is not merely to be avoided, but also blameworthy” (1999, p. 106).
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Callahan, G. The challenge of akrasia for the theory of rational choice. Rev Austrian Econ 22, 43–52 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-008-0050-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-008-0050-8