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Provoking insurgency in a federal state: theory and application to India

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Abstract

This paper presents a model of provocation in a federation, wherein the state government triggers an insurgency with a view toward acquiring control of some economic assets with the help of the central government. Some econometric support for this model is found using data on the Naxalite conflict in eight states of India. The tests performed control for endogeneity of the state government’s police force interventions. They suggest that the latter are meant to trigger the violent activity of the insurgents, so as to lure the central government into intervening and helping clear the ground for mining purposes in the lands of tribal people.

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Notes

  1. Jaegar and Paserman (2009) analyze a case of strategic use of violence by Palestinians and Israel during the Second Intifada. Israel reacts to Palestinian suicide attacks by initiating targeted killings that have a short-term deterrent effect on Palestinian violence and lead to a reduction in subsequent Israeli fatalities. The authors believe that the purpose of Palestinian suicide bombings is to provoke the Israelis to attack thereby garnering support for violent extremism among Palestinians. Suicide attacks also derail the peace process by negatively affecting the views of the Israeli public.

  2. See research on Households in Conflict Network (hicn.org), MICROCON (microconflict.eu) and the CRISE network.

  3. For the link between macro-level political and economic conditions and risk of civil war, see Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Hegre (2002), Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2003).

  4. The Naxalites completely reject the parliamentary democratic system of Indian governance and aim to wage a ‘people’s war for a people’s government’.

  5. Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh noted this in his address to the 2nd meeting of the Standing Committee of Chief Ministers on Naxalism, 13th April 2006.

  6. The Communist Party of India (Maoist), born in 2004 after the People’s War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre united, lead the Maoist movement in India.

  7. See “Green Hunt: The anatomy of an operation”, The Hindu, February 6, 2010.

  8. Off-shore regions contributed 29% to the value of India’s minerals production in 2009–2010.

  9. The price of iron ore rose from $13 per metric ton in January 2002 to $179 per metric ton in January 2011; the price of aluminium rose from $1371 per metric to $2440 per metric ton over the same period.

  10. The Chotanagpur Tenancy Act (1908), the Santal Pargana Tenancy Act (1949), the Bombay Province Land Revenue Code (1879), Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property Regulation (1956), the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulations (1969), the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (1955), the MPLP Code of Madhya Pradesh (1959), the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation (1959), the Tripura Land Revenue Regulation Act (1960), the Assam Land and Revenue Act (1970) and the Kerala Scheduled Tribes (Restriction of Transfer of Lands and Restoration of Alienated Lands) Act (1975).

  11. The current Environment Minister, Prakash Javadekar, has been trying to ease rules for industries under the FRA but has faced opposition from the Tribal Affairs Ministry. See “Law ministry tells Prakash Javadekar only tribal ministry can tweak forest act rules”, The Economic Times, July 2, 2015.

  12. We highlight here some examples of protest in the last decade (Source: News reports). In Jagatsinghpur district of Orissa, POSCO faces major protests against its proposed steel plant. On January 2, 2006, 14 tribal men and women were killed while opposing the building of a boundary wall on the land allotted to Tata Steel in Orissa. In Kashipurblock of Raygada district, Orissa people are fighting against proposed bauxite mining, arguing that this will destroy their agricultural lands and perennial water streams. In Jharkhand, Arcelor Mittal faces stiff resistance from tribals to two proposed steel plants. In Singur, West Bengal, Tata Motors had to withdraw their small car project after massive protests from farmers.

  13. ‘Cannot deny links between forest depts. & mining lobbies’ Hindustan Times, 15th May, 2010. Of late, India has been affected by many mining scams wherein state governments are also complicit. Chief among them are the coal allocation scam or “Coalgate”, illegal iron ore mining in Karnataka, bauxite mining in Orissa and illegal mining in Goa, Uttarakhand and Madhya Pradesh.

  14. WP Criminal 119 of 2007.

  15. A handout that spells out all the steps in the calculations is available from the authors upon request.

  16. Based on Cameron and Trivedi (2009, p. 561), we perform a test of over-dispersion for our dependent variable ‘rebellion’. The outcome indicates the presence of significant over-dispersion. Many of the observations on the dependent variable (47.64% of them) are zeros. To see which model best fits the data, we compare Poisson, Negative Binomial (NB) and Zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) models. The predicted probabilities from all three models are close to actual frequencies with NB doing better than Poisson and ZINB. We also compare three commonly used model-comparison statistics: log likelihood, Akaike and Bayes information criteria (AIC and BIC). All three criteria suggest that, compared to Pthe oisson model, the NB model provides the best fit and the most parsimonious specification. When we compare NB to ZINB, the BIC criterion favors the NB model while the AIC favors the ZINB. Based on these results, we decide to use the NB model.

  17. All other Indian states witnessed less than five Maoist-related fatalities during our sample period.

  18. www.satp.org.

  19. We include civilian casualties in the variable ‘rebellion’ because most of the civilian attacks (67%) are against individuals considered to be state collaborators by the Maoists. Since the rebel group considers them as part of the state, we include them in our dataset. Appendix 2 supplies details on our coding methodology for the three conflict variables.

  20. This kind of bias is common to studies based on analyses of news reports. To the best of our knowledge, a more comprehensive open source database for Maoist insurgency is not available. To control for most plausible factors impacting under-reporting, we check our results by adding state fixed-effects dummies to the model. Most results hold up.

  21. In 67% of the instances of civilian killings by Maoists, the SATP website provides the motive for the attack. The Maoists in most cases of civilian killings leave a note stating their motive. We have included unspecified civilian casualties in our data and hence we may be slightly overestimating violence by the Maoists.

  22. In July 2012, the chief minister of Chhattisgarh refused to apologize for the killing of 13 innocent civilians during an encounter in the Dantewada district. The 13 civilians were initially branded as Maoists but an inquiry into the matter proved otherwise. See ‘No alternative to strong anti-naxal response: Raman’ Indian Express, July 10, 2012.

  23. The Ministry of Home Affairs data is not disaggregated at the district level and cannot be used to separately identify state and central governmental interventions.

  24. We leave out bauxite as it is highly correlated with forest cover.

  25. See Table 6, columns 2 and 3. We also check by adding the instruments to a simple reduced form equation explaining rebellion. None of them are significant.

  26. The data on mineral deposits are from the 2009 Annual Report published by the Ministry of Mines, Government of India.

  27. The Indian Census defines literate as a person who can read and write with some understanding in any language. Here, we take a subset of literates who never have been to school, college or attended any technical course.

  28. The authors use National Sample Survey (NSS) Consumption data from the 1999–2000 round to calculate this variable.

  29. Our predictors might be collinear which might affect the coefficient estimates. We calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each predictor to estimate how much the variance of a coefficient is “inflated” because of linear dependence with other predictors. All the predictors have a VIF less than 1.5 except state_forces and residual1 which have VIFs of 3.7 and 3.13, respectively. The last two variables are likely to be highly correlated since the residuals are the unobserved factors affecting state violence. A VIF greater than 2.50 corresponds to an R 2 of 0.60 with the other variables.

  30. Results not shown, but available upon request. They are robust to including variables controlling for economic wealth and human development in the district such as the share of the land area sown and the female literacy rate. They are also robust to adding state fixed effects which capture unobserved state level factors like state capacity, policy, and terrain.

  31. Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra had coalition governments with INC, Chhattisgarh remained a BJP-ruled state, Orissa had a coalition government with BJP. Karnataka, Jharkhand and Bihar had coalition governments with both INC and BJP at different times; West Bengal was ruled by the Communist party (Marxist) until May 2011 after which a coalition government with INC support came to power.

  32. We may have an endogeneity problem because unobserved variables can simultaneously affect both INC_days and rebellion. For example, if a mining firm desperately wants some piece of land, it can give campaign contributions that will affect INC_days and it can start building its plant or field more experts, which will anger the rebels. To control for endogeneity, we use the two-stage estimation technique outlined earlier.

  33. Results available upon request.

  34. Police forces fall under state command. The Central government supplements state’s efforts in the Naxalite-affected districts by providing Special Forces such as Central paramilitary forces (CPMFs), Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (CoBRA) and India Reserve (IR) battalions.

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Acknowledgements

This paper has been presented at the Workshop in honor of Robert Townsend in Toulouse, EUDN Scientific Meeting in Paris, the European Public Choice Society conference in Zurich, Uppsala University, HEC Lausanne, the MENA Chief Economist Workshop at the World Bank, at the Catholic University of Milan and at the Workshop on India’s Maoist Insurgency at Princeton University. Comments by Emmanuelle Auriol, Jean-Marie Baland, Clive Bell, Roland Benabou, Olivier Cadot, Raul Caruso, Kanchan Chandra, Denis Cogneau, Kishore Gawande, Paul Gertler, Guy Grossman, Erich Gundlach, James Hammitt, Anat Hermann, Devesh Kapur, Eliana La Ferrara, Mariapia Mendola, Anirban Mitra, Shivaji Mukherjee, Ola Olsson, Sarmistha Pal, Jean-Philippe Platteau, Cyrus Samii, Shankar Satyanath, Paul Seabright, Jacob Shapiro, Yu Shu, Stéphane Straub, Mathias Thoenig, Rob Townsend, Oliver Vanden Eynde, Andrea Vindigni and Steven Wilkinson, as well as by five anonymous referees and the Editor, William F. Shugart II, are gratefully acknowledged without implicating.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

1.1 Proof of Proposition 1

A glance at (6) shows that the potential rebels minimize their loss by choosing \( R^{*} = 0 \) if \( A = 0 \), because the constitutional constraint deters the central government from intervening in this case, yielding \( L_{T} ^{*} = 0 \). Looking again at (6) shows that setting \( R = 0 \) when \( A > 0 \) would not minimize the potential rebels’ loss as this would make \( L_{T} \to \infty \).

Now, in order to prove that \( R^{*} \) is an increasing function of \( A{\text{ and }}\mu \) as soon as A is strictly positive, we can compute the first-order condition for problem (6), taking due account of (5), which yields:

$$ \gamma \,R^{2 + \xi } - (1 + \xi \,)Bh\,\left( {\mu ,\,A} \right) - \xi R\,(A^{\xi } + \alpha B) = 0 $$
(12)

where \( B \equiv \delta [(A + M^{*} )^{\xi } - A^{\zeta } ] > 0 \) For the sake of saving notation, define:

$$ \begin{aligned} E \equiv \delta [(A + M^{*} )^{\xi - 1} - A^{\xi - 1} ]\, > 0, \hfill \\ D \equiv \,A^{\xi - 1} > 0. \hfill \\ \end{aligned} $$

Then, taking the total differential of (12) and rearranging the terms yields:

$$ \frac{d\,R^{*}}{d\,A} = \frac{{\xi (1 + \xi )h(\mu ,A)E + \delta \xi (A + M^{*} )^{\xi - 1} [(1 + \xi )h(\mu ,A) + \xi \alpha R]\partial M/\partial A + B\left( {1 + \xi } \right)\,\partial h/\partial A + \xi^{2} R(D + \alpha E)}}{{\left( {1 + \xi } \right)\,[\gamma \,R^{1 + \xi } + {{B\,h\,\left( {\mu ,\;A} \right)} \mathord{\left/ {\vphantom {{B\,h\,\left( {\mu ,\;A} \right)} {R]}}} \right. \kern-0pt} {R]}}}} $$
(13)

and

$$ \frac{d\,R^{*}}{d\,\mu } = \frac{{B\,{{\left( {1 + \xi } \right)\,\partial \,h\,} \mathord{\left/ {\vphantom {{\left( {1 + \xi } \right)\,\partial \,h\,} {\partial \,\mu }}} \right. \kern-0pt} {\partial \,\mu }} + \xi \,\delta (A + M^{*} )^{\xi - 1} [(1 + \xi )\,h(\mu ,A) + \xi \alpha R]{{\,\partial M} \mathord{\left/ {\vphantom {{\partial M} {\partial \mu }}} \right. \kern-0pt} {\partial \mu}}}}{{\left( {1 + \xi } \right)\,[\gamma \,R^{1 + \xi } + {{B\,h\,\left( {\mu ,\;A} \right)} \mathord{\left/ {\vphantom {{B\,h\,\left( {\mu ,\;A} \right)} {R]}}} \right. \kern-0pt} {R]}}}}. $$
(14)

It is easily checked that these two derivatives are positive.

1.2 Proof of Proposition 2

If \( R = 0 \), the state government’s objective function reduces to \( \lambda \,A - x\,\left( A \right) \), which is strictly increasing in the neighbourhood of A = 0 if \( \lambda > \theta \). It takes some simple calculations to show that conditions (8) and (9) ensure that \( p\,\left( {\mu ,\;A,\;R} \right)\,\,M\,\left( {\mu ,\;A} \right) \) is strictly concave in A for large enough values of μ. This property is used in the graphical analysis of Fig. 3.

Appendix 2: construction of the conflict variables from SATP

The data on killings by rebels, state forces and central forces were constructed by the authors from the SATP website. Below are 5 examples of daily summaries from the SATP website.

Case 1

The CPI-Maoist cadres killed a civilian, identified as Sodhi Darra, in the Chintalnar Police station area of Dantewada District. A pamphlet recovered from the incident site allegedly branded the victim as a Police informer.

Case 2

CPI-Maoist cadres killed two special Police officers in the Narayanpur District.

Case 3

Two women cadres of the CPI-Maoist were killed and another was arrested by the Police during an encounter at Badgai village in the Bastar District. Police also recovered an unspecified number of arms and ammunition from the encounter site.

Case 4

Three CPI-Maoist cadres were killed in separate encounters with Security Forces in the Bastar region.

Case 5

Two women of the CPI-Maoist were killed in an encounter when a joint party of the CRPF and the Police neutralized a Maoist hideout during a search operation in the Narayanpur District. An unspecified number of arms and ammunition were also recovered from the hideout.

Coding killings by rebels is simple. Both Cases 1 and 2 are coded as violence by Maoists. Police intervention is coded as state violence and fatal attacks by central Special Forces are coded as central violence.Footnote 34 In Case 3, the 2 Maoist deaths are coded as state violence. In Case 4, the 3 killings are attributed to central government. Case 5 is an example of joint operation between the police and central security forces. Here, we divide the number of Maoist killed equally between the state and central forces (if nothing has been specified).

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Azam, JP., Bhatia, K. Provoking insurgency in a federal state: theory and application to India. Public Choice 170, 183–210 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0389-5

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