“Politically, it [i.e., the parliamentary situation] is rather impossible.”
Poul Hartling, Danish Prime Minister,
in his diary, following the 1975 election
Abstract
All democratic systems are theoretically open to so-called election inversions, i.e., instances wherein a majority of the decision makers prefer one alternative but where the actual outcome is another. The paper examines the complex 1975 Danish government formation process, which involved five rounds of negotiations and at least five competing alternatives. We demonstrate that in terms of party preferences the final outcome was not the Condorcet winner but rather one that could have been beaten by at least three other government alternatives in head-to-head comparisons. The Danish procedural system of “negative” parliamentarism combined with simple plurality rule to produce the electoral inversion.
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Notes
Another lengthy and complex government formation was that of 1957, in which a majority of the seats went to the non-socialist parties, but the end result was a coalition government headed by the Social Democrats in partnership with the Radicals and the “Georgist” single-tax Justice Party. See Kaarsted ([1964] 1969, 1988).
The specific ordering made here—Progress Party/Conservative People’s Party/Liberal Party/Christian People’s Party/Center-Democrats/Radicals/Social Democrats/Socialist People’s Party/Danish Communist Party/Left-Socialists—is based in the legislative voting behavior of the parties in the 1975–1977 sessions using the so-called Distance Index (cf. Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 2008: 196f).
For a more detailed treatment, see Kaarsted (1988: 69–71). Of the four North-Atlantic MPs one was absent, one voted against, and two in favor, i.e., with the three aligning themselves with parties with whom they caucused.
For a more detailed treatment of the first round of government formation, see Kaarsted (1988: 78–88).
On the second round of government formation, see Kaarsted (1988: 89–95).
On the third round of government formation, see Kaarsted (1988: 96–108).
On the fourth and final round of government formation, see Kaarsted (1988: 109–112).
This was not suggested specifically but is largely identical to what the Progress Party is known to have wanted and what the party recommended at the fourth round (cf. Table 2): A so-called “magistrate government”, wherein all parties would take part and be assigned a number of cabinet posts corresponding to their parliamentary strength. For the present purposes we will view this as essentially identical to the alternative R, since it would have given the Progress Party cabinet level influence and some form of veto.
This alternative was not suggested specifically by any party but may be seen as “the elephant in the living room”, since it was the status quo and a latent possibility. It is also plausible to see it as the alternative most preferred by Hartling and the Liberal Party, albeit one disregarded for tactical reasons in favor of a four party coalition government (C).
A specific “grand coalition” including the Social Democrats and at least one non-socialist party other than the Radicals was a constant focal point of several parties but a specific coalition was never proposed formally. Among the informal suggestions were, e.g., a Social Democratic-Liberal coalition (Kaarsted 1988: 70 & 80) or a Social Democratic-Liberal-Radical coalition (Kaarsted 1988: 68 & 81). The former would have had 95 seats (a majority), while the latter would have had 108 and been larger than a minimal-winning-coalition (cf. Riker 1962). Other suggestions included a Social Democratic-Radical-Conservative coalition (Kaarsted 1988: 84 & 96), which would have required at least one more party (and most likely two) in order to have a working majority, and even a “national government of unity” encompassing more or less all parties except the Progress Party and the three parties to the left of the Social Democrats, cf. Kaarsted 1988: 80f.
There are exceptions. The Center-Democrats with only four MPs generally made it clear that they did not seek a place in government; however, at the third round of government formation they actually agreed to be part of a four-party coalition. The Radicals made it clear that they only wanted a place in government if it was a broad majority coalition.
Cf. Wright and Riker (1989) on the possible relationship between given rules (plurality versus runoff) and the number of alternatives coming forth.
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Lars Bille, Flemming Juul Christiansen, Jørgen Elklit, Jacob Hariri, Michael Munger, Mogens N. Pedersen, and especially Bill Shughart for discussions, suggestions and helpful comments related to this paper. The paper was written as an Academic Visitor at Nuffield College, Oxford, 2012.
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Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. Picking a loser? A social choice perspective on the Danish government formation of 1975. Public Choice 158, 483–497 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0120-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0120-8