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A challenge for Humean externalism

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Abstract

Humean externalism is the view that moral motivation must be explained in terms of desires that are “external” to an agent’s motivationally-inert moral judgments. A standard argument in favor of Humean externalism appeals to the possibility of amoral or morally cynical agents—agents for whom moral considerations gain no motivational traction. The possibility of such agents seems to provide evidence for both the claim that moral judgments are themselves motivationally inert, and the claim that moral motivation has its source in desires external to those judgments. This essay makes the case that, rather than providing a compelling argument in favor of Humean externalism, the argument from amoralism can be recast to set up an important challenge to this view. On one hand, it appears that the central methodological considerations and types of evidence that undergird the externalist argument from amoralism are in tension with a central Humean commitment: namely, that desires can be sources of motivation. While it is possible for Humeans to escape this horn of the dilemma, the most plausible strategies for doing so can be co-opted by internalists to resist the argument’s externalist conclusion.

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Notes

  1. The characterizations of Humeanism, internalism, and externalism articulated here are drawn from Swartzer (2015).

  2. Sinhababu (2009, 465) refers to this as the “Desire out? Desire In!” principle.

  3. I take Smith’s (1994, Ch. 4) “direction of fit” argument, as an argument of this sort.

  4. Sinhababu (2009, 467–468), for instance, claims that Humeanism is a general psychological truth about all human agents, even if it is not true of all conceptually or metaphysically possible agents.

  5. For example: “[T]he motivation of all intentional action, including moral motivation, requires the existence of independent conative state or pro-attitudes. […] If I did not have this more ultimate desire or commitment, my moral belief would lead nowhere (or elsewhere)” (Brink 1997, 13–14); “moral judgments have no motivational efficacy in themselves, and that when they motivate us, the source of motivation lies outside the judgment in a separate desire” (Zangwill 2003, 134); and “to prompt action, [a] moral belief or judgment must be accompanied by a corresponding moral desire, […] one which is only contingently related to the moral belief” (Roskies 2003, 52).

  6. See, for instance, Shafer-Landau (2003, 143).

  7. See also Foot (1972), Stocker (1979), Brink (1986, 1997), and Roskies (2003).

  8. Hare (1964, 124–126) and McNaughton (1988, 139–140) defend a similar response. Bromwich (2016) updates this strategy by noting that internalists can offer a disjunctive explanation: that an apparent amoralist might fail to act morally either because she fails to make genuine moral judgments (say, because she lacks the relevant moral concepts) or because her motivation to comply with her judgments is overridden by competing considerations. Internalists needn’t offer a one-size-fits-all solution to the amoralist challenge.

  9. Zangwill articulates the (Proportional Determination Thesis) in terms of strength of desire, rather than strength of motivation. However, this presupposes the Humean’s general explanatory framework.

  10. See also Zangwill (2015, 52–53).

  11. See also Brink (1986, 1997) for similar concerns.

  12. See Stocker (1979) and Mele (1995, 1996). For responses, see van Roojen (2002), Cholbi (2011), and Swartzer (2015).

  13. In saying that Lucy seems rational, I only mean to insist that she does not suffer from any obvious defect in practical rationality. It may be that amoral motivation is practically irrational, even if it is not obviously so. See, for instance, van Roojen (2010).

  14. In Swartzer (2015), I critiqued a similar argument for Humean externalism that uses cases of severe depression. In what follows, I show how the argumentative strategy I deployed there can be extended to cover a broader range of externalist cases.

  15. See Audi (1973), Schroeder (2004), Strawson (2009, Ch. 9), and Sinhababu (2009).

  16. Barry (2010, 196) attributes a similar view to Humeans.

  17. This response is modelled on a similar error-theoretic explanation of our intuitions regarding what agents have no reason to do, developed by Schroeder (2007, 92–97).

  18. See also Schueler (1991, 279–280), Mele (1995, 394), and Schroeder (2004, 17–18), for further examples.

  19. Sinhababu (2009, 480) notes a similar phenomenon.

  20. For an explanation of why we shouldn’t fear ceteris-paribus laws, see Lange (2002).

  21. Here I draw on some insights from Shafer-Landau (2003, 129–131, 147–148, 157), although he understands the possibility of completely defeated moral motivation as incompatible with internalism, because he identifies internalism with (Modal Internalism).

  22. Mark Twain (1885).

  23. Some internalists might also be tempted by the following idea: the belief that one has no serious way to obtain some desired end is arguably a partly evaluative belief, and this is why this particular belief can serve as an undermining defeater. Perhaps. But we needn’t insist on this explanation. After all, the belief that something is beyond one’s control can also be a motivational defeater, and this belief is not evaluative. If some non-evaluative beliefs can play this role, others may so as well. But then can any belief play this role? If not, why can some beliefs play this role while others cannot? At some point, the internalist will need to provide a satisfactory answer to these questions. However, we are not in a position to answer them here.

  24. Zangwill (2008a, 104–105) frequently paints morally indifferent agents in similarly normative terms: “People, quite a few people—some people I know—utter sentences like ‘I don’t give a damn and I don’t see why I should’” [emphasis added]. [See also Zangwill (2015, 52).] Unless this is a non-sequitur, this suggests that if his friends did see why they should give a damn, they might very well be (more) morally motivated.

  25. See also Brink (1986, 30).

  26. While I lack space for such arguments here, I think that other externalist cases—such the morally perverse agent who is motivated to do things because he takes them to be immoral—can be accounted for in a similar way. It seems likely that such agents either believe that they have reasons to be immoral, or they strongly desire to be immoral. This is consistent with (Modest Explanatory Internalism) if these attitudes can serve as standing motivational defeaters.

  27. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for raising this concern.

  28. Svavarsdóttir (1999, 217–218), for instance, sees it as an advantage of her view that it explains moral cynicism by using the same theoretical resources that she uses to account for motivational variation, more generally. Sinhababu (2009) offers a more explicit appeal to theoretical economy.

  29. See, for instance, Nussbaum (2001), Tenenbaum (2007), Barry (2010), and Swartzer (2013).

  30. See Smith (1994, 117), Brink (1997, 13–14), and Svavarsdóttir (1999, 161).

  31. See, for instance, Nussbaum (2001) and Prinz (2004).

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Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to the many philosophers who have discussed these issues with me over the past several years or have given me feedback on earlier iterations of this paper. I would especially like to thank Kiran Bhardwaj, David Chavez, Mark Decker, Matt Dee, Janice Dowell, Aaron Elliot, Luke Elwonger, David Faraci, Allison Fritz, Leo Iacono, Clare LaFrance, John Lawless, Tim Loughrist, Barry Maguire, Joe Mendola, Sruthi Rothenfluch, David Sobel, Adam Thompson, Mark van Roojen, Preston Werner, and Vida Yao. I would also like to thank the anonymous referees for their valuable comments.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Parr Center for Ethics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 207-H Caldwell Hall CB#3125, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599-3125, USA

    Steven Swartzer

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Swartzer, S. A challenge for Humean externalism. Philos Stud 175, 23–44 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0854-0

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