Abstract
An agent submaximizes with motivation when she aims at the best but chooses a less good option because of a countervailing consideration. An agent (radically) satisfices when she rejects the better for the good enough, and does so because the mere good enough gets her what she really wants. Motivated submaximization and satisficing, so construed, are different ways of choosing a suboptimal option, but this difference is easily missed. Putative proponents of satisficing tend to argue only that motivated submaximization can be appropriate while critics of satisficing tend to criticize satisficing, as I construe it. The existing literature, then, leaves (radical) satisficing in a very bad state: there are no good arguments for it and there are three unanswered objections to it. This paper (1) clarifies the distinction between motivated submaximization and satisficing and (2) refutes the three most prominent objections to the claim that satisficing can be appropriate.
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Notes
I tend to use the term appropriate and its cognates (rather than rational or morally permissible and their cognates), because nothing in this paper hinges on the difference between moral and rational evaluation.
With that said, in note 17, I explain why I don’t think the label satisficing should be extended to motivated submaximization.
Objection: the special connection with your family should be factored in when we evaluate options. Once it is factored in, A is better than B. Reply: the objection presupposes a particular axiology that isn’t always endorsed by those who think special connections matter (e.g., Vallentyne 2006: 30–42). Furthermore, we should avoid assuming that everything that makes a difference to the quality of a choice must also make a difference to the quality of our options (van Roojen 2004: 163–179, especially 163, 166–177).
Richardson (2004: 119–123 and nt 40 on pg 129) provides some helpful discussion concerning how ends, or aims, can be arranged in a hierarchy, with some ends being more final than others.
Those who deny that satisficing can be appropriate tend to use the language of global ends as opposed to purely final ends (see, e.g., Schmidtz 1995: 45–56; 2004: 44–55; Byron 1998: 76–80). I resist using the term ‘global’, because I tend to think of a global end as one that encompasses all my other ends. Schmidtz (1995: 46–50, 2004: 45–58) stresses that, as he uses the term global, one might have multiple global ends which compete with one another.
This corrects my earlier “considered opinion” that Slote and Swanton did defend satisficing (Tucker 2016: 134, nt. 7).
Although I won’t argue the point here, I think this argumentative strategy can be modified to support the appropriateness of satisficing.
Slote’s moderate agent has a standing reason to choose and aim for the highest degree of well-being that she can get (1989: 22). So, in the absence of countervailing considerations, the moderate agent chooses and aims for the best (22). But the moderate agent has a countervailing consideration, namely “non-need,” and thus may very well not aim for the best and may very well choose less than the best (1989: 39; cf. Swanton 1993: 40–51). Non-need countervails well-being, because its reason-giving force operates against and independently of the reason-giving force of well-being (1989:36; cf. 32–33 and Swanton 1993: 37–48). Since Slote holds that choosing and aiming for less than the best requires countervailing considerations, he holds that satisficing cannot be appropriate.
Actually, what’s popular among critics is even stronger than Necessity. Critics tend to claim that, if O1 is (all things considered) better than O2, then it’s impossible (not even countervailing considerations can help) to appropriately choose O2. Kagan (1989: 379–381) endorses Necessity rather explicity, but even he endorses the stronger claim too. Others who endorse the stronger claim include Henden (2007: 348) and Schmidtz (1995: 38–49; 2004: 38–49). Compare with Byron (1998: 79).
To be sure, I allow that something can pro tanto require without pro tanto justifying. I just prefer to think of such things as providing coherence constraints on which choices are appropriate rather than as providing a reason to make a choice. But nothing of consequence hinges on this preference.
Kagan’s term for a merely justifying reason is noninsistent reason.
Two objections to the possibility of merely justifying reasons are worth mentioning. First, if some sort of optimizing conception of appropriateness is true, then I think merely justifying reasons are impossible. Yet if we want an objection to merely justifying reasons to also pose an interesting objection to the possibility of appropriate satisficing, we can’t start by assuming optimizing theories of appropriateness. Satisficing theories of rationality/morality are being put forward as competitors to optimizing theories. Second, Tenenbaum (2007: 162–174) raises an interesting objection to Gert’s discussion of merely justifying reasons. I won’t discuss the objection here, except to remind Tenenbaum that there are coherence constraints on rationality (see my nt 14 above). Even if one could permissibly have been in either of two states (e.g., preferring suboptimal option A or preferring optimal option B), it can be irrational and incoherent to be in both states at once (cf. Goldman 2012: 36, sec 5). For a different reply, see Gert (2007b).
Although nothing hangs on how generous we are in using the labels “satisficing” or “satisficing theory” (recall the introduction), here is a brief explanation of why Asymmetry should count as satisficing theory and, insofar as a theory allows for appropriate motivated submaximization, it probably should not count as a satisficing theory. It is generally agreed that, to count as “satisficing theory,” a theory must make sense of this idea: choosing a suboptimal option can be appropriate because the option is good enough (cf. Henden 2007: 347; van Roojen 2004: 169–170; Weber 2004: 98). Asymmetry makes sense of this idea. The good pro tanto demands that we pursue the good up to a certain point, and this point sets the threshold for the good enough. When I choose an option that meets or surpasses this threshold, the good pro tanto justifies my choice and does not pro tanto require that I choose an alternative option. In the absence of countervailing considerations, my choice is appropriate. Had the option failed to be good enough, the good would have pro tanto required that I choose an alternative. In the absence of countervailing considerations, my choice would have been inappropriate. Hence, Asymmetry makes sense of the relevant idea, namely that choosing a suboptimal option can be appropriate because the option is good enough.
van Roojen (2004) and Weber (2004) argue that their defenses of motivated submaxization deserve the label “satisficing theory,” precisely because appropriate motivated submaximization can make sense of the relevant idea. For example, van Roojen (2004: 170) holds that the constraint against torture justifies enduring some loss of the good but not a “calamity”. He infers that his view makes sense of the relevant idea. I’m skeptical of this inference. What he makes sense of is the idea that one can choose a suboptimal option because the countervailing consideration is strong enough. Suppose that there are potential countervailing considerations of various strengths. The constraint against lying, say, justifies a loss of up to 10 units whereas the constraint against torture justifies a loss of up to 100 units. One can say, of course, that giving up 50 units of the good for the sake of telling the truth involves choosing an option that is not “good enough,” whereas giving up 50 units to avoid torture involves choosing an option that is “good enough”. But here what counts as being good enough is determined by the strength of the relevant countervailing consideration: the constraint against torture is strong enough to justify that loss, but the constraint against lying isn’t strong enough. Hence, in appropriate motivated submaximization it’s not clear that being good enough plays a genuine, non-redundant explanatory role in making the choice appropriate.
In sum, the contrast is as follows. Insofar as a choice is appropriate satisficing, it is appropriate because the chosen option is good enough. Insofar as a choice is appropriate motivated submaximization, it is appropriate because the relevant countervailing consideration is strong enough.
Vallentyne (2006: 24) and Russel (2013) endorse something like this response. I think Gert may be committed to something like Asymmetry, but he doesn’t explicitly endorse it. Vallentyne cites Kamm (1996, ch 8) as endorsing his version. While Kamm (230–241) mentions Kagan’s discussion of something like Asymmetry, she doesn’t seem to endorse it. What she endorses is the idea that our autonomy can generate a personal prerogative—a merely justifying reason to prefer one’s own projects—that countervails considerations of well-being. As mentioned previously, such a view endorses the existence of merely justifying reasons without thereby endorsing the appropriateness of satisficing.
If you think that a consideration can justify without being a reason, then what really matters is that we have a consideration that justifies not choosing the best. If that consideration fails to count as a reason, then we don’t need a reason to reject the best.
I inherit these terms from Slote’s (1989, esp ch 2) discussion of the moderate agent, but I develop them in my own way.
Slote sometimes expresses sympathy with satisficing in Byron’s sense (e.g., 1989: 151).
In my 2016, I show that this distinction has significant implications for the philosophy of religion.
This paper was improved thanks to the feedback of Chris Freiman, Josh Gert, Lanny Goldman, Jonah Goldwater, Aaron Griffith, Matt Haug, Noah Lemos, Tucker McKinney, and the audience at Fordham University, not to mention the hard work of anonymous referees. Especial thanks goes to Hamish Russell. Many of the early ideas for this paper were developed while directing his excellent BA Honours dissertation on satisficing. The College of William and Mary also has my gratitude for supporting this paper with a Faculty Summer Research Grant. I’m lucky to have an institution and colleagues that are so supportive.
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Tucker, C. How to think about satisficing. Philos Stud 174, 1365–1384 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0763-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0763-7