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Questions, topics and restricted closure

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Abstract

Single-premise epistemic closure is the principle that: if one is in an evidential position to know that \(\varphi\) where \(\varphi\) entails \(\psi\), then one is in an evidential position to know that \(\psi\). In this paper, I defend the viability of opposition to closure. A key task for such an opponent is to precisely formulate a restricted closure principle that remains true to the motivations for abandoning unrestricted closure but does not endorse particularly egregious instances of closure violation. I focus on two brands of epistemic theory (each the object of sustained recent interest in the literature) that naturally incorporate closure restrictions. The first type holds that the truth value of a knowledge ascription is relative to a relevant question. The second holds that the truth value of a knowledge ascription is relative to a relevant topic. For each approach, I offer a formalization of a leading theory from the literature (respectively, that of Jonathan Schaffer and that of Stephen Yablo) and use this formalization to evaluate the theory’s adequacy in terms of a precise set of desiderata. I conclude that neither theory succeeds in meeting these desiderata, casting doubt on the viability of the underlying approaches. Finally, I offer a novel variant of the topic-sensitive approach that fares better.

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Notes

  1. The current debate traces back to Dretske (1970), Goldman (1976) and Stine (1976).

  2. Though not the only one: other epistemic paradoxes that crucially involve an appeal to unrestricted epistemic closure include Saul Kripke’s dogmatism paradox and Stewart Cohen’s easy knowledge paradox. See Yablo (2014, Ch. 7) for a survey of relevant paradoxes. The discussion in this paper can easily be adapted to these other cases.

  3. One can admit some exceptions to deduction’s capacity to extend knowledge without betraying the title of “closure advocate”. For instance, if a conclusion is reached by competent deduction from known premises, but was already known, then the deduction did not succeed in extending knowledge.

  4. Richard Feldman: “To my mind, the idea that no version of the closure principle is true—that we can fail to know things that we knowingly deduce from other facts we know—is among the least plausible ideas to gain currency in epistemology in recent years” (Feldman 1999, p. 95). John Hawthorne: “[Overstatement aside], I am inclined to side with Feldman. The intuitive consequences of denying Single-Premise Closure seem to be extremely high” (Hawthorne 2004, Sect. 1.5). Saul Kripke: “...I am sympathetic to those philosophers who regard this idea [i.e. closure rejection] as intrinsically implausible or even preposterous” (Kripke 2011, p. 163) (I emphasize, however, that Hawthorne and Kripke take closure rejection seriously enough to construct a careful refutation). Timothy Williamson: “We should in any case be very reluctant to reject intuitive closure, for it is intuitive. If we reject it, in what circumstances can we gain knowledge by deduction?” (Williamson 2000, p. 118).

  5. Dretske (1970) and Nozick (1981) are the most well-known closure deniers. More recent authors that embrace restricted closure in lieu of unrestricted closure include Black (2008), Lawlor (2013) and Holliday (2013).

  6. See Lawlor (2013, sect. 4.7) for further discussion of restricted versus unrestricted closure.

  7. Schaffer (2005, sect. 5) notes this objection succinctly (in the voice of the closure advocate): “Surely deduction transmits knowledge. … How could it not, given that mathematical proof is deductive and mathematical proof yields knowledge?” Though preserving mathematical inquiry is a serious challenge for closure deniers, the challenger must resist overstating their case by mistaking closure denial for a bolder thesis: that deduction (and so mathematical proof) is always epistemically inert. The challenge, rather, is to show how it is possible to account for the epistemic power of mathematical proof while denying closure in full generality.

  8. This, of course, is too quick a dismissal of the moorean approach, especially given the sophisticated versions on the market. Again, my purpose is not to conclusively refute every rival to closure denial.

  9. Schaffer, in particular, distances his views from what he calls relevantism (Schaffer 2005, p. 267). His opposition is grounded in (1) understanding relevantism as endorsing a binary conception of knowledge-itself and (2) closely associating ‘relevance’ with David Lewis’ particular elaboration. Neither assumption is built into my statement of relevant alternatives semantics.

  10. Lewis uses the term possibility, instead of proposition, somewhat ambiguous between talk of possible worlds and propositions. The difference does not matter for our discussion of Lewis.

  11. Yablo (2014) in fact offers two accounts of subject matter—what he calls the recursive account and the reductive account. He is hesitant to fully commit to one model at the exclusion of the other (Yablo 2014, sect. 4.11). Either can be integrated into an RA semantics for knowability attributions. We focus here on the reductive account. The recursive account produces an RA theory that shares important similarities with compositional S-theory (see Sect. 5.1).

  12. Also see Yablo (2012), available on Yablo’s website at http://www.mit.edu/~yablo/home/Papers.html.

  13. This ignores a subtle feature that Yablo incorporates into his picture: namely, that the agent not only be in a position to discard the falsemakers of \(\varphi\), but also have a suitable grip on the minimal truthmaker that is in fact responsible for the truth of \(\varphi\): one might be “right to regard Q as true, but, if you are sufficiently confused about how it is true—about how things stand with respect to its subject matter—then you don’t know that Q” (Yablo 2014, p. 119). I here put aside this extension for two reasons: (1) Yablo does not elaborate on his proposal and (2) it seems to me that however the details are worked out, the critical results of Proposition 4 will hold (since the pertinent counter-examples depend only on falsemaker structure).

  14. I owe the terminology of “egregious violation” and “egregious non-violation” to Yablo (2014).

  15. Is there room to sensibly resist the validity of conjunctive distribution, supposing one has already embraced closure denial (on the basis of skeptical paradoxes)? Consider the following instance (pointed out by an anonymous reviewer): \(K (h \wedge (h \vee \lnot b)) \rightarrow K(h \vee \lnot b)\), where, as usual, h is mundane and b is a skeptical hypothesis (note that expressions of this form are particularly pertinent to our evaluation of Yablo’s theory: see the proof of Proposition 4). Note the following: \(h \wedge (h \vee \lnot b)\) is logically equivalent to h and so expresses a mundane, “lightweight” proposition. On the other hand, \(h \vee \lnot b\) is logically equivalent to \(\lnot b\) and so expresses an explicitly anti-skeptical, “heavyweight” proposition. A closure denier may be tempted, for these reasons, to propose that \(h \wedge (h \vee \lnot b)\) is knowable, while \(h \vee \lnot b\) is not. To stifle this temptation, consider first an example where our intuitions are clearer: \(K (h \wedge \lnot (\lnot h \wedge b)) \rightarrow K\lnot (\lnot h \wedge b)\). This is the claim that if it is knowable that one has hands and is not a handless brain-in-vat, then one is in a position to know that one is not a handless brain-in-vat. Note that \(h \wedge \lnot (\lnot h \wedge b)\) is equivalent to the mundane h and \(\lnot (\lnot h \wedge b)\) is equivalent to the heavyweight \(\lnot b\). Should we therefore conclude, as closure deniers, that while \((h \wedge \lnot (\lnot h \wedge b))\) is knowable, \(\lnot (\lnot h \wedge b)\) is not? No. Rather, we should not accept \(K(h \wedge \lnot (\lnot h \wedge b))\). For consider the paradox (cf. the motivating paradoxes for criterion 2): I know I have hands; I do not know both that I have hands and am not a handless brain-in-vat; having hands entails having hands and not being a handless brain-in-vat. This is on a par with the standard skeptical paradox, so the closure denier ought to treat like as like, and therefore accept \(\lnot K(h \wedge \lnot (\lnot h \wedge b))\). Now, return to the proposed counter-example to conjunctive distribution that we started with. On the uncontroversial supposition that knowability claims are closed under applications of De Morgan’s law, it follows that \(h \wedge (h \vee \lnot b)\) and \(h \wedge \lnot (\lnot h \wedge b)\) are equivalent with respect to knowability. Thus, the closure denier should conclude that the former is not knowable after all. Incidentally, I see no motivation for a closure denier to reject closure under applications of De Morgan’s laws: for what skeptical paradox can be generated merely through such applications?

  16. For a second opinion on the status of this principle, consult Roush (2010).

  17. This restriction need not match up with the most promising restrictions for satisfying criterion 4.3 i.e. it need not be that \({\mathtt {Restr}}(\varphi , \psi )\) holds just in case \(\square \varphi\) holds. Indeed, the left to right direction is undesirable, since \({\mathtt {Restr}}(\varphi , \psi )\) is intended to maintain deductive reasoning as a resource for extending knowledge of contingencies. At any rate, I see no difficulty in positing multiple restricted closure principles, so long as each is robust enough to unify knowledge by deduction in some significant domain.

  18. The validity of the above two principles is no surprise if \(\square \varphi \rightarrow (K(\varphi ) \wedge K(\square \varphi ))\) is valid, as it is in the theories that we next discuss. This last validity deserves two comments. First, those influenced by Kripkean examples to reject modal rationalism will balk at this validity if the necessity at issue is, say, metaphysical necessity. For they will think: though Hesperus is necessarily identical to Phosphorus, it does not follow that it is always knowable that Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus. Fortunately, then, the necessity at issue in this paper is more naturally read as epistemic necessity or logical necessity. Second, this validity points to an interesting divergence in how logical omniscience is regarded in a logic of knowability, rather than knowledge. For: the validity in question may be regarded as capturing a type of logical omniscience and is therefore undesirable in a logic of knowledge. For a logic of knowability, on the other hand, this validity is a natural desideratum (unless, of course, one is prepared to deny that logical or epistemic necessities are always knowable in principle, no matter the empirical information).

  19. What is the effect of replacing comprehensive ruling out with counterfactual ruling out (as introduced in Sect. 5.2) in the question-sensitive setting? I note here only that, though the details deserve proper scrutiny, I do not think that this move produces a theory that escapes objection. For instance, it can be shown that compositional S-theory with counterfactual ruling out does not validate \(K(p \wedge q) \rightarrow K(p \vee q)\).

  20. This departs from Yablo’s own treatment [at least as developed in Yablo (2012), in contrast to a non-committal stance in chapter 7, footnote 6 of Yablo (2014)], which is similarly subjunctivist, but rather requires that the truth of P be tracked by the agent’s belief, according to a Nozickian sensitivity condition. Our own treatment is inspired by the notion of a conclusive reason due to Dretske (1971), and better fits discussion of knowability on the evidence. The technical results for Yablo’s theory can be maintained if we switch to a belief-tracking notion of ruling out.

  21. For those unsatisfied with a direct appeal to our intuitions concerning disjunctions, consider the following argument based on three unremarkable assumptions. First, p and \(\lnot p\) have the same subject matter, as do q and \(\lnot q\), on the assumption that negations preserve subject matter. Thus, \(p \wedge q\) and \(\lnot p \wedge \lnot q\) have the same subject matter, on the assumption that conjunctions combine the subject matter of their conjuncts in a uniform manner. Thus, \(p \wedge q\) and \(\lnot (\lnot p \wedge \lnot q)\) have the same subject matter. Thus, \(p \wedge q\) and \(p \vee q\) have the same subject matter, on the assumption that disjunction can be defined in terms of negation and conjunction, in the standard manner: \(\varphi \vee \psi \, {{:}{:{=}}} \lnot (\lnot \varphi \wedge \lnot \psi )\) (that is, the meaning of a disjunctive expression is exhausted by a disjunction-free expression containing only conjunctions and negations).

  22. According to Yablo’s account of inclusion (Yablo 2014, p. 46), the latter’s subject matter is not even included in that of the former, for it is not the case that the minimal falsemaker for the latter (i.e. \(\lnot p \wedge \lnot q\)) is implied by a minimal falsemaker for the former (neither \(\lnot p\) nor \(\lnot q\)).

  23. Yablo’s account may not be alone in this regard. For instance, for Lewis (1988), a subject matter is a partition of logical space (or, at least, a member of a special class of partitions), and a proposition P is about a subject matter just in case the truth value of P supervenes on that subject matter i.e. the subject matter in question is a refinement of the partition comprised of P and the complement of P. It follows that the propositions expressed by “Mary is a lawyer and Fido is a dog” and “Mary is a lawyer or Fido is a dog” concern different subject matters (at least on the assumption, say, that the former and its complement make up a subject matter, for then the former proposition is trivially about this subject matter, while that expressed by “Mary is a lawyer or Fido is a dog” is not).

  24. In some cases, this change may be an unobjectionable enrichment: for example, I might say “Mary is a lawyer” and you add “Mary is a successful lawyer”.

  25. Some utterances are correctly described as partially off-topic: if we are discussing Mary’s profession and you utter “Mary is a successful lawyer”, then it is natural to say that your statement is on-topic to the extent that it speaks to the matter of Mary’s profession, and off-topic to the extent that it speaks to the matter of Mary’s success (though if your refinement of the topic of conversation is welcome, we are more inclined to describe your utterance as enriching the topic, rather than departing from it). Another example: suppose that the topic is Mary’s success as a professional, and you utter “Mary is a married lawyer”. Here, the subject matter of your utterance seems to be an enriching of the sub-topic of Mary’s profession to the extent that it speaks to both the matter of her profession and her marital status, and an ejection of the sub-topic of Mary’s success.

  26. It need not rattle the resolution theorist that, in an ordinary context, she must conclude that \(Kh,\,K(h \,\Rightarrow\, \lnot b)\) and \(\lnot K(h \wedge (h \,\Rightarrow\, \lnot b))\) all hold (where h is, once again, an ordinary empirical claim and b is a skeptical hypothesis). In fact, this represents a subtle result that the resolution theorist should offer as illuminating: though both h and \(h \,\Rightarrow\, \lnot b\) are knowable on the evidence—the latter a priori knowable—it does not follow that these potential pieces of knowledge can be integrated and so potentially known at once. For the introduction of the subject matter of b focuses on distinctions that the agent’s evidence cannot track.

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Acknowledgments

This paper was improved considerably by the comments of two anonymous referees. Further, I thank the following philosophers for invaluable observations and criticisms made over the course of the development of this paper (in alphabetical order): Johan van Benthem, Michael Bratman, Blake Francis, David Hills, Wesley Holliday, Ethan Jerzak, Krista Lawlor, Meica Magnani, Anna-Sara Malmgren, Katy Meadows and Shane Steinert-Threlkeld. Of course, I am solely responsible for the errors or other infelicities that have survived in the paper. Early versions of some the ideas in this paper were presented at the ESSLLI 2014 student session. This paper was largely written while I was a recipient of a 2015–2016 Mellon Foundation Dissertation Fellowship. I am extremely grateful for the support of the Mellon Foundation.

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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1

Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1

The first part is trivial. We prove the second by contraposition: assume that \(atoms(\psi ) \nsubseteq atoms(\varphi )\). We construct resolution model \({\mathscr {M}}\) such that \({\mathscr {M}}, w\,\vDash\,K\varphi \wedge \lnot K\psi\). Let \(\lambda ^+ = \lambda ^+_\varphi \wedge \lambda ^+_\psi \wedge \lambda ^+_{\varphi , \psi }\) be some conjunction of literals that contains all and only the atoms that occur in one or both of \(\varphi\) and \(\psi\), and such that \(\lambda ^+\) tautologically entails \(\varphi\) (and so also entails \(\psi\)). In particular, let \(\lambda ^+_\varphi\) contain all and only the atoms that occur in only \(\varphi\); let \(\lambda ^+_\psi\) contain all and only the atoms that occur in only \(\psi\); let \(\lambda ^+_{\varphi , \psi }\) contain all and only the atoms that occur in both \(\varphi\) and \(\psi\). Further, let \(\lambda ^- = \lambda ^-_\varphi \wedge \lambda ^-_\psi \wedge \lambda ^-_{\varphi , \psi }\) be some conjunction of literals that contains all and only the atoms that occur in one or both of \(\varphi\) and \(\psi\), and such that \(\lambda ^-\) tautologically entails \(\lnot \psi\) (and so also entails \(\lnot \varphi\)). In particular, let \(\lambda ^-_\varphi\) contain all and only the atoms that occur in only \(\varphi\); let \(\lambda ^-_\psi\) contain all and only the atoms that occur in only \(\psi\); let \(\lambda ^-_{\varphi , \psi }\) contain all and only the atoms that occur in both \(\varphi\) and \(\psi\). Now, let \(W = \{w_1, w_2, w_3\}\). Set valuation \({\mathfrak {v}}\) so that \(\lambda ^+\) holds at \(w_1\) (and so \(\varphi\) holds at \(w_1\)); \(\lambda ^-\) holds at \(w_2\) (and so both \(\lnot \psi\) and \(\lnot \varphi\) hold at \(w_2\)); and \(\lambda ^-_\varphi \wedge \lnot \lambda ^-_\psi \wedge \lambda ^-_{\varphi , \psi }\) holds at \(w_3\). Note that since \(\lambda ^-\) tautologically entails \(\lnot \varphi\) and \(\lambda ^-_\psi\) contains no atoms from \(\varphi\), it must be that \(\lambda ^-_\varphi \wedge \lambda ^-_{\varphi , \psi }\) entails \(\lnot \varphi\), and so \(\lnot \varphi\) holds at \(w_3\). Note then that \(\{w_2, w_3\}\) is a (and the only) relevant alternative proposition to \(\varphi\) in this model (since it is the proposition expressed by \(\lambda ^-_\varphi \wedge \lambda ^-_{\varphi , \psi }\)) but \(\{w_2\}\) is not. Note further that \(\{w_2\}\) is a relevant alternative to \(\psi\) (expressed by \(\lambda ^-_\psi \wedge \lambda ^-_{\varphi , \psi }\)). Finally, set \(E_{w_1} = \{w_1, w_2\}\) and set \(\preceq _{w_1}\) so that \(w_3 \preceq _{w_1} w_2\). Thus, the nearest \(\lambda ^-_\psi \wedge \lambda ^-_{\varphi , \psi }\) world is compatible with the evidence at \(w_1\), while the nearest \(\lambda ^-_\varphi \wedge \lambda ^-_{\varphi , \psi }\) is not. In total: \({\mathscr {M}}, w_1\,\vDash\,K\varphi \wedge \lnot K\psi\).

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Hawke, P. Questions, topics and restricted closure. Philos Stud 173, 2759–2784 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0632-4

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