Philosophical Studies

, Volume 170, Issue 2, pp 175–198

Affect: representationalists’ headache

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-013-0206-7

Cite this article as:
Aydede, M. & Fulkerson, M. Philos Stud (2014) 170: 175. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0206-7

Abstract

Representationalism is the view that the phenomenal character of experiences is identical to their representational content of a certain sort. This view requires a strong transparency condition on phenomenally conscious experiences. We argue that affective qualities such as experienced pleasantness or unpleasantness are counter-examples to the transparency thesis and thus to the sort of representationalism that implies it.

Keywords

Representationalism Affect Affective qualities Transparency Introspection Phenomenal content Pain Pleasure 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of British ColumbiaVancouverCanada
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of California, San DiegoLa JollaUSA

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