Abstract
In recent work, Louis deRosset (Philosophical Studies 149:73–97, 2010) has argued that priority theorists, who hold that truths about macroscopic objects can be metaphysically explained without reference to such things, cannot meet an independently motivated constraint upon good explanation. By clarifying the nature of the priority theorist’s project, I argue that deRosset’s argument fails to establish its conclusion.
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Notes
I assume that the priority theorist defends a microphysicalist view of reality and thus will attempt to explain truths about macro objects in terms of truths about micro objects. Note that not all priority theorists will accept microphysical priority, but nothing will turn on this here.
In von Solodkoff and Woodward (MS.), two kinds of priority theorists are distinguished. The deflationist priority theorist claims that macro objects are not in the realm of being, they are not part of the world’s furniture. On this view, then, we are not ontologically committed to posterior objects (thus Cameron (2010) is explicit that macroscopic objects are not in our ontology). The inflationist, by contrast, holds that macro objects are included in the realm of being and that we are committed to macro objects (thus Schaffer (2009) is explicit that macroscopic objects are in our ontology). As the inflationist does not embrace (SPARSITY), she is not subject to deRosset’s criticisms (despite the fact that deRosset takes Schaffer as one of his targets). The response I will develop is therefore only intended to solve worries associated with the deflationist version of priority theory.
The priority theorist might well agree with the Quinean that macro objects are indispensable for our best science. But she will not take quantification over these objects as a reason for including these objects into her ontology.
You might wonder why the priority theorist should accept this form as the standard. But deRosset (2010, fn. 25) does not assume that any formula of the form \(\phi(a,i_1,\ldots,i_n)\) contains a. Given this syntactic assumption, it follows that the priority theorist’s explanatory proposals do have the standard form, even though the explanans don’t mention the macro objects introduced in the explananda.
As an anonymous referee pointed out to me, the priority theorist might use the bridge principles to identify what needs to be explained rather than using them to give explanations. So, e.g., the priority theorist might insist that what needs to be explained is why Tavi—that composite object composed of \(s_1,\ldots,s_n\)—is a table, and then cite the fact that \(s_1,\ldots,s_n\) are arranged tablewise as her explanation of this fact. Perhaps. But the role I envisage for the bridge principles will help us to illustrate a point that has wider significance in the debate: that whether or not the priority theorist can avoid talking about macroscopic objects in her explanans, there is no need to insist that she must.
References
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Acknowledgments
Many thanks to Elizabeth Barnes, Ross Cameron, Dominic Gregory, Eric Olson, Jason Turner, Robbie Williams, Richard Woodward, and an anonymous referee for this journal. I’d also like to take this opportunity to thank the Royal Institute of Philosophy for a Jacobsen Fellowship which supported me financially during the writing of this paper.
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von Solodkoff, T. Straightening priority out. Philos Stud 161, 391–401 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9745-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9745-y