Abstract
Among the many topics covered in Sven Bernecker’s impressive study of memory is the relation between memory and personal identity. Bernecker uses his grammatical taxonomy of memory and causal account to defend the claim that memory does not logically presuppose personal identity and hence that circularity objections to memory-based accounts of personal identity are misplaced. In my comment I investigate these claims, suggesting that the relation between personal identity and memory is more complicated than Bernecker’s analysis suggests. In particular, I argue (1) that while he shows that some memories do not presuppose personal identity he fails to show that those that are appealed to in memory-based accounts of personal identity do not, and (2) that the features of his view that allow him to define memory without reference to personal identity also obscure important features of memory that must be part of a complete account.
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Notes
The reason “p” becomes “p*” is that Bernecker allows the representation in the memory to be slightly different in content from the original representation (see 2010, pp. 39–40). This is a complication we can ignore for our purposes.
Parfit (1984, pp. 207–209) makes a similar point but I do not go quite as far as he does.
This is not to say that the two features are completely independent. Having vivid images and experiencing a representation of the past as if from the inside may well be what causes us to conclude (implicitly or explicitly) that it is a representation of something experienced firsthand.
References
Bernecker, S. (2010). Memory: A philosophical study. New York: Oxford University Press.
Casey, E. S. (1987). Remembering: A phenomenological study. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schechtman, M. (1996). The constitution of selves. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Wolheim, R. (1979). Memory, experiential memory, and personal identity. In G. F. MacDonald (Ed.), Perception and identity: Essays presented to A J. Ayre with his replies to them (pp. 186–234). London: MacMillian.
Wolheim, R. (1984). The thread of life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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Schechtman, M. Memory and identity. Philos Stud 153, 65–79 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9645-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9645-6