Abstract
I argue that extended simples are possible. The argument given here parallels an argument given elsewhere for the claim that the shape properties of material objects are extrinsic, not intrinsic as is commonly supposed. In the final section of the paper, I show that if the shape properties of material objects are extrinsic, the most popular argument against extended simples fails.
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McDaniel, K. Extended simples. Philos Stud 133, 131–141 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9010-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9010-y