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Brentano on the dual relation of the mental

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Abstract

Brentano held that every mental phenomenon has an object and is conscious (the dual relation thesis). The dual relation thesis faces a number of well-known problems. The paper explores how Brentano tried to overcome these problems. In considering Brentano's responses, the paper sheds light on Brentano's theory of judgement that underpins his philosophy of mind.

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Notes

  1. Many of Brentano’s students would later follow him in accepting and defending the dual relation of the mental. See, for instance, Marty (2011, pp. 9 and 11).

  2. This is Brentano’s translation. Barnes translates ‘en parergo’ as ‘by the way’.

  3. On Brentano’s theory of judgement in general, see Brandl (2010).

  4. Brentano himself discusses von Hartmann (1869).

  5. On Brentano’s reform of logic, see Simons (2004).

  6. The translation is mine. The original translation spoils Brentano’s main points.

  7. See, for example, Bergmann (1908, p. 5). Kuroda (1975) provides linguistic evidence from Japanese that there are thetic judgements.

  8. See Brandl (2011, p. 51ff) who argues that Brentano changed his view on this point in later work.

  9. On Descartes and Leibniz, see Simmons (2001) and for Reid, see Reid (1785, p. 191).

  10. See also Hossack (2002, p. 174).

  11. Brentano’s change to a reistic ontology is discussed (Chrudzimski and Smith 2004, see especially p. 215f).

  12. See Kriegel (2009, chapter 6.3) for a contemporary account of self-representation in mereological terms according to which mental states are complexes represented by their parts.

  13. I am grateful to Guillaume Frechette, Nick Jones, Uriah Kriegel, Guy Longworth, Jessica Leech and Hamid Taieb for comments and criticism.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, King’s College London, 160 Strand, London, WC2R 2LS, UK

    Mark Textor

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Textor, M. Brentano on the dual relation of the mental. Phenom Cogn Sci 12, 465–483 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9281-z

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