Abstract
This article presents a dynamic Generalized Nash–Cournot model to describe the evolution of the natural gas markets. The major players along the gas chain are depicted including: producers, consumers, storage and pipeline operators, as well as intermediate local traders. Our economic structure description takes into account market power and the demand representation tries to capture the possible fuel substitution that can be made between the consumption of oil, coal, and natural gas in the overall fossil energy consumption. We also take into account long-term contracts in an endogenous way, which makes the model a Generalized Nash Equilibrium problem. We discuss some means to solve such problems. Our model has been applied to represent the European natural gas market and forecast, until 2030, after a calibration process, consumption, prices, production, and natural gas dependence. A comparison between our model, a more standard one that does not take into account energy substitution, and the European Commission natural gas forecasts is carried out to analyze our results. Finally, in order to illustrate the possible use of fuel substitution, we studied the evolution of the natural gas price as compared to the coal and oil prices.
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Notes
GDF-SUEZ produces 4.4% of its natural gas supplies (GDF-SUEZ 2009).
We will call burner a technology that can use either coal, oil or natural gas. Note that our approach concerns the primary natural gas consumption (not only the electricity generation demand).
There are no storage losses in the model. They can easily be taken into account by increasing the transportation losses of the arcs that start at the storage nodes.
The Norwegian sales are not taken into account in the foreign supplies for security of supply reasons.
Shale gas production is expected to be negligeable in Europe due to environmental concerns, for instance. As of now, few credible assumptions exist concerning the development of European domestic shale reserves (Stevens 2010).
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Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Pierre-André Jouvet for his helpful comments and advice. All errors present in the article are those of the authors. The views expressed herein are strictly those of the authors and are not to be construed as representing those of EDF, University of Maryland, Université Paris 10 or the IFP Energies nouvelles.
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Appendix A
Appendix A
This appendix presents the KKT conditions derived from our model. Once the KKT conditions are written, we get the Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) given below.
The producers KKT conditions
The independent traders’ KKT conditions
The pipeline operator KKT conditions
The storage operator KKT conditions
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Abada, I., Gabriel, S., Briat, V. et al. A Generalized Nash–Cournot Model for the Northwestern European Natural Gas Markets with a Fuel Substitution Demand Function: The GaMMES Model. Netw Spat Econ 13, 1–42 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11067-012-9171-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11067-012-9171-5