Continental Philosophy Review

, Volume 45, Issue 3, pp 447–459

Empathy and second-person methodology

Authors

    • Research Center for Applied Epistemology (Paris)University of Rouen (E.R.I.A.C.) Husserl-Archives (ENS, Paris)
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11007-012-9223-z

Cite this article as:
Depraz, N. Cont Philos Rev (2012) 45: 447. doi:10.1007/s11007-012-9223-z

Abstract

How the phenomenology of empathy in Husserl and beyond and the second-person approach of cognition are able to mutually enrich and constrain each other? Whereas the intersubjective empathy is limited to face-to-face inter-individual relational experiences or, when socially embedded, results a non-individualized understanding of others in general, the second person approach of cognition opens the way for a plural relational yet individualized understanding of the other. I would like to show in this paper how the integration of both phenomenological and cognitive fields paves the way for the more encompassing description of intersubjective experience as a “relational multiplicity,” which I will ultimately describe through the empirical practice of an emergency psychiatric unit.

Keywords

Phenomenology Husserl Empathy The other Intersubjectivity

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012