Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Luck’s Extended Reach

  • Published:
The Journal of Ethics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Something is a matter of luck if it is beyond our control. In this paper, I argue for the primary thesis that luck can undermine varieties of obligation, such as moral and prudential obligation, as well as judgments that are best from an agent’s own point of view. Among the considerations invoked to defend this thesis is a prevalent form of libertarianism, event-causal libertarianism. Arguments for the primary thesis that call on event-causal libertarianism raise concerns with this variety of libertarianism.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Henceforth, I will frequently omit inclusion of the twin temporal indices in obligation statements. Understand the temporal indices in such statements to follow in which these indices are not explicit to be suppressed.

  2. See Haji (2016) for arguments for the conclusion that permissibility requires alternatives.

  3. Take determinism to be the thesis that, for any given time, a complete statement of the nonrelational facts about that time, together with a complete statement of the laws of nature, entails all truths.

  4. See, e.g., Haji (2004, 2009, 2012: Chap. 9, 2016: Chap. 7).

  5. Such accounts have been defended or discussed, for e.g., by Dennett (1978), Fischer (1995, 2011, 2014), Mele (1995), Kane (1996, 1999a, b), Clarke (2000, 2003, 2011), Franklin (2011, 2014).

  6. See Davidson (1963).

  7. A defense of this sort of view is to be found in Kane (1996). Frequently, modest libertarians contend that the events that are directly free and indeterministically caused are the making of decisions. (see, e.g., Clarke 2000: 23).

  8. Mele (2006: 66).

  9. Hereafter, I will for easy readability frequently suppress the second temporal index in constructions such as ‘at t Peg decides to A at t*.’

  10. Ignore relevant Frankfurt-type scenarios (Frankfurt 1969) here.

  11. See, e.g., Watson (1975) and Mele (1995: Chap. 2).

  12. See, e.g., Haji (2013). I have also argued that other accounts of akratic action fare no better when it comes to explaining why Peg decides to do B in W* (see, e.g., Haji 2012).

  13. See, e.g., Kane (1996: 114, 2013: 61).

  14. On breakdowns of agency, see Mele (2006: 60–61, 125–129, 2008: 268–271).

  15. Perhaps other libertarians might object that akratic misalignment does not pre-exist the pertinent choice but is created by the akratic agents themselves when they choose. (Kane 1999a: 114, note 17) Again, I have addressed this concern elsewhere (see, e.g., Haji 2012).

  16. I have reservations about a solution; Mele is much more optimistic (Mele 2006: 105–136). Also see Franklin (2014) and Lemos (2011) for proposed solutions.

  17. References to (Franklin n.d.) are from a prepublication manuscript, with permission from the author.

  18. See, e.g., Clarke (2003: 96), Pereboom (2014: 31–39).

  19. See, also, Mele (2013) in which he formulates the problem of present luck independently of appealing to any concerns of explanation.

  20. Mele (2013: 244).

  21. Mele states (Mele 2006: 73) that no contentious claim about contrastive explanation “needs to be made for the purposes of posing the problem of present luck.”

  22. See, e.g., Haji (2012, 2013, 2016).

  23. The assumed relevant principle is Prerequisites, roughly, the principle that if one ought to do one thing, A, but one cannot do A without doing B because B is a necessary prerequisite to doing A, then one ought to do B.

  24. References to this work are from a pre-published manuscript, and with permission from the author.

  25. Strictly, (iii) is redundant since a contrast world just is a world with the same pre-t past and laws as the actual world.

  26. There is an excellent collection of papers on Frankfurt examples in Widerker and McKenna (2003).

  27. See, for e.g., Haji (2004, 2012).

  28. I have argued that “tracing” concerning obligation is suspect. It is implausible that the two-way control obligation requires can be “traced” back to, or inherited from, prior events concerning which there were alternatives. See, e.g., Haji (2002: 50–51).

References

  • Clarke, Randolph. 2000. Modest libertarianism. Philosophical Perspectives 14: 21–45.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clarke, Randolph. 2003. Libertarian accounts of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Clarke, Randolph. 2011. Alternatives for libertarians. In The Oxford handbook of free will, 2nd ed, ed. Robert Kane, 329–348. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, David. 1963. Action, reasons, and causes. The Journal of Philosophy 60: 685–700.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, Daniel. 1978. On giving libertarians what they say they want. In Brainstorms, ed. D. Dennett, 286–299. Montgomery: Bradford Books.

  • Fischer, John M. 1995. Libertarianism and avoidability: A reply to Widerker. Faith and Philosophy 12: 11–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fischer, John M. 2011. Indeterminism and control: An approach to the problem of luck. In Law and neuroscience, ed. Michael Freeman, 41–60. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Fischer, John M. 2014. Toward a solution to the luck problem. In Libertarian free will, ed. David Palmer, 52–68. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Fischer, John M., and Ravizza, Mark. 1998. Responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Frankfurt, Harry. 1969. Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. The Journal of Philosophy 66: 829–839.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Franklin, Chris. 2011. Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument. Philosophical Studies 156: 199–230.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Franklin, Chris. 2014. Event-causal libertarianism, functional reduction, and the disappearing agent argument. Philosophical Studies 170: 413–432.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Franklin, Chris. (n.d.). Free will, indeterminism, and reductionism: An essay on event-causal libertarianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Ginet, Carl. 1990. On action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Greenspan, Patricia. 2012. Free will and rational coherency. Philosophical Issues 22: 185–200.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haji, Ishtiyaque. 2002. Deontic morality and control. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Haji, Ishtiyaque. 2004. Active control, agent-causation, and free action. Philosophical Explorations 7: 131–148.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haji, Ishtiyaque. 2009. Incompatibilism’s allure: Principal arguments for incompatibilism. Peterbroughauthor plese check spelling of this location: Broadview Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haji, Ishtiyaque. 2012. Reason’s debt to freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Haji, Ishtiyaque. 2013. Event-causal libertarianism’s control conundrums. Grazer Philosophische Studien 88: 227–246.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haji, Ishtiyaque. 2016. Luck’s mischief: Obligation and blameworthiness on a thread. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kane, Robert. 1996. The significance of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kane, Robert. 1999a. On free will, responsibility, and indeterminism: Responses to Clarke, Haji, and Mele. Philosophical Explorations 2: 105–121.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kane, Robert. 1999b. Responsibility, luck, and chance: Reflections on free will and indeterminism. The Journal of Philosophy 96: 217–240.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kane, Robert. 2013. Frankfurt-style examples and self-forming actions. In Free will and moral responsibility, ed. I. Haji, and J. Caouette, 58–73. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lemos, John. 2011. Kane’s libertarian theory and luck: A reply to Griffith. Philosophia 39: 357–367.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mele, Alfred. 1995. Autonomous agents: From self-control to autonomy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mele, A. 1999. Ultimate responsibility and Dumb Luck. Social Philosophy and Policy 16: 274–293.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mele, Alfred. 2006. Free will and luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Mele, Alfred. 2008. A libertarian view of Akratic action. In Weakness of will from Plato to the present, ed. T. Hoffman, 252–275. Lanham: Catholic University of America Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mele, A. 2013. Moral responsibility and the continuation problem. Philosophical Studies 162: 237–255.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moya, Carlos J. 2015. Reasons and freedom. In Agency, freedom, and moral responsibility, ed. Andrei Buckareff, Carlos J. Moya, and Sergi Rosell. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pereboom, Derk. 2014. Free will, agency, and meaning in life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Schnall, Ira, and David Widerker. 2015. On the Luck objection to libertarianism. In Agency, freedom, and moral responsibility, ed. Andrei Buckareff, Carlos J. Moya, and Sergi Rosell. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shoemaker, David. 2003. Caring, identification, and agency. Ethics 114: 88–118.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sehon, Scott. 1997. Deviant causal chains and the irreducibility of teleological explanation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78: 195–213.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sehon, Scott. (n.d.). Free will and action explanation: A non-causal, compatibilist account. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Velleman, David. (2000). The possibility of practical reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Velleman, David. 2009. How we get along. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Watson, Gary. 1975. Free agency. The Journal of Philosophy 72: 205–220.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Watson, Gary. 1987. Free action and free will. Mind 96: 145–172.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Widerker, David, and Michael McKenna (eds.). 2003. Freedom, responsibility, and agency: Essays on the importance of alternative possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zimmerman, Michael J. 2006. Moral luck: A partial map. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36: 585–608.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zimmerman, Michael J. 2008. Living with uncertainty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

This paper was written during my tenure of a 2015–2016 Calgary Institute for the Humanities (at the University of Calgary) grant. I am most grateful to this Institute for its support.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Calgary, AB, Canada

    Ishtiyaque Haji

Authors
  1. Ishtiyaque Haji
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ishtiyaque Haji.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Haji, I. Luck’s Extended Reach. J Ethics 20, 191–218 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-016-9224-y

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-016-9224-y

Keywords

Search

Navigation