Abstract
The wider the gap between rivaling positions, the more there can be debates between rivaling interlocutors. The gap between the respective formulations of scientific realism and antirealism that invoke the Prussian conception of rationality is wider than the gap between the respective formulations of scientific realism and antirealism that invoke the English conception of rationality. Therefore, scientific realists and antirealists should choose the former over the latter as the framework of their debate.
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Notes
To disbelieve p means neither to believe ~ p nor to suspend judgment on p. It rather means not to believe p.
I thank a referee for this comment.
I am grateful to a referee for this objection.
As Park (2017b, 26–27) observes, van Fraassen does not even attempt to prove that the English conception of rationality is better than the Prussian conception of rationality.
I am grateful to a referee for this objection.
I am grateful to a reviewer for this comment.
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Acknowledgements
I thank three anonymous referees and the editors of this journal for useful comments. This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2018S1A5A2A01039606).
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Park, S. How to Formulate Scientific Realism and Antirealism. J Gen Philos Sci 50, 477–488 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-019-09470-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-019-09470-w