Abstract
The aim of the present article is twofold. Firstly, it aims to study the problems arising from the notion of rule proposed by Peter Winch in The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (1958) to account for all meaningful behavior. On the one hand, it will analyze the problems in the argument posed by Winch in order to state that all meaningful behavior is governed by rules. On the other hand, it will focus on the problems concerning his conception of rules and rule-following, with specific emphasis on pointing out the issues that arise from the criterion posed by Winch in order to determine when a rule is being followed. Secondly, it aims to reassess Winch’s proposal and reformulate, accommodate and define his notion of rule in an intentional account of meaningful behavior, thus solving the problems presented. In addition, it will provide a criterion that allows to determine when a rule is being followed.
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Notes
In this paper we will focus on the first edition of ISS and the various problems that stem from Winch’s original proposal concerning rule and rule-following in order to reassess them and provide an alternative account of rules and rule-following, albeit the main objective of ISS was to critique positivism in social science, i.e. the understanding of social science as a natural science. Hence ISS will only refer here to the first edition. Specifically we will outline a particular reading of ISS that can be understood as similar to Learner’s (2002) reading. It must be noted that Winch argued against and countered several of the problems that stem from this original formulation in his subsequent works (see Winch 1964, 1996, 2002) and in the second edition of ISS from 1990. An alternative reading of ISS that takes into account the preface of the second edition has been provided by Hutchinson et al. (2008). Notwithstanding, this exceeds the scope of the present paper.
In this paper the terms “conduct” and “behavior” will only refer to meaningful behavior—unless the contrary is specified. Winch considers that all social behavior must be meaningful behavior and that all meaningful behavior is social—since it involves following rules (Winch 2003, 116). The identity between rule-following behavior, meaningful behavior and social behavior relies on Winch’s minimal criterion of social behavior (Lerner 2002, 42).
The notions of rule and norm will be used indistinctly—just as Winch (2003, 52) does. This also extends to social norms, since all rules are inherently social in Winch’s proposal.
The need to maintain this distinction can be found in MacIntyre and Bell (1967), Lukes (2003) and Cheal (1980). In addition, Roth (Lerner 2002, 39) and Turner (1994, 2001) have defended that linguistic communication is not itself a rule-governed behavior. For more on this issue see Lerner (2002, Chapters 2 and 3).
Winch confuses, in Lerner’s (2002, 37) terminology, rules of execution and rules of result evaluation.
Ways of life play an important role in intercultural studies. Winch’s suggestion, when approaching the study of another culture, consists in avoiding the use of our own paradigms of rationality, intelligibility or our conception of reality in order to understand and measure other cultures. Due to this approach Winch (1964) was highly critical of Evans-Pritchard’s (1937) study of the Azande. Winch’s remarks concerning our interpretation of alien cultures were revisited by Lukes (2000) due to the discussion between Shalins and Obeyesekere regarding the case of captain Cook and the Hawaiians (see Lukes 2000; Sahlins 1982, 1995; Obeyesekere 1992).
Further issues affect the legitimacy of resorting to the notion of way of life in order to demonstrate that the anarchist is following rules. On the one hand, Winch never specifies how broad or narrow the notion of way of life is. For example, religion is presented as a way of life, but specific religions (e.g. Christianity (Winch 2003, 108)) are also considered autonomous ways of life. This compromises the autonomous character of each way of life (Henderson 1987, 167; Lerner 2002, 23–24). On the other hand, Kekes (1973, 278–282) establishes two main issues in Winch’s conception of ways of life. Firstly, differentiating and individuating ways of life is impossible since it requires a rule, thus incurring in circularity. Second, Winch’s theory of rationality requires that ways of life must be autonomous. However, it is possible to establish aspects that are shared by all ways of life, such as common sense and natural language. The problems surrounding Winch’s ways of life also extend to other closely related aspects of his proposal. First, numerous critics (e.g. Lukes 1967, 1995; Kekes 1973, 283; Jarvie and Agassi 1979; Hollis 1982) have criticized his comprehensive theory of rationality. Second, Winch’s conception of ways of life generates a series of vicious circles when approaching other cultures and the way they conceive the world (Hertzberg 1980, 160; Hollis 1972, 98). Third, Winch’s proposal cannot account for social change: if conceptual frameworks are internally consistent, the possibility of questioning said conceptual framework merely begs the question (Gellner 1968; Jarvie 1970).
Winch’s analogy between communication and behavior has often been deemed problematic. Lerner explains (2002, 118–120), resorting to MacIntyre and Turner, that the division between instrumental and communicative action shows how Winch’s proposal is insufficient. Applying linguistic analysis to our behavior requires Winch to show the communicative character of all meaningful behavior.
This is an extraction of Wittgenstein’s argument against private language (see Winch 2003, 32–39).
Pleasants (2000, 86), similarly, argues that Winch does not distinguish a process being in accordance with a rule from a process that involves a rule.
This is due to the fact that abandoning the strict notion of rule in favor of the wide notion of rule would over-extend the notion of rule and allow us to illegitimately attribute rules to individuals.
For instance, we do not reject Winch’s main argument of ISS, namely the rejection of the view of social science as a natural science.
These various subjects have ignited debates in the philosophy of the social sciences, especially those concerning rationality, demarcation and interpretation of other cultures and alien societies. Nonetheless, it requires a specific analysis of Winch’s proposal and further reassessment that exceeds the objectives of the present article. For more information regarding these discussions see Lerner (2002), Lassman (2000) and Hutchinson et al. (2008).
Namely, it is a joint commitment that is socially constructed and possesses a series of characteristics that define it as rule.
In italics we specify the content we add to Krause’s original definition.
Thereby we can understand and describe how an agent follows a rule when he does not agree with it. For more information surrounding this topic see Krause (2012, 325–341).
Reflectiveness is conceived here in the same way as Winch (2003, 63) proposed in ISS.
Naturalism conceives human behavior as any other natural phenomenon, while Interpretivism defends that human conduct differs from natural phenomena since it is a meaningful behavior. In this paper we do not seek to analyze the existing debate between Interpretivism and Naturalism, since it exceeds the objectives established. Our concern is to analyze an approach that allows us to reformulate Winch’s proposal. Albeit, it should be noted that there are works that defend the thesis that meaningful behavior can be causally explained, as shown by Mantzavinos (2012) with his “successful transformation argument”.
We will mainly focus on Krause’s approach to intentionality and collective intentionality (CI)—which also allows us to account for the holism in Winch’s proposal. We assume here that the notion of intention suffices to account for all meaningful behavior. There is still debate amongst Interpretivists regarding which notion and approach is more adequate in order to account for all meaningful behavior or whether, alternatively, a combination of various notions and approaches is more appropriate. Notwithstanding, this issue exceeds the scope of this paper, thus we have to assume that the notion of intention suffices.
We shall only analyze the basic elements of the game of giving and asking for reasons to account for meaningful behavior and the intention of an agent—we will not present its formulation concerning discursive practices. For more information concerning the game of giving and asking for reasons or deontic states see González de Prado Salas and Zamora-Bonilla (2015) and Brandom (1994).
Contextual elements can also be taken into account when establishing the intention of an actor or the rule he is following.
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by a grant of the Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte del Gobieno de España code FPU16/05569. Thank you to José L. Lujan and the two anonymous reviewers for the numerous helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Fairhurst, J. Rules, Intentions and Social Behavior: A Reassessment of Peter Winch. J Gen Philos Sci 50, 429–445 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-019-09462-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-019-09462-w