Abstract
Recently, we notice an increasing support for mechanism-based social explanations. Earlier pleas for social mechanisms were often closely linked to defenses of methodological individualism. However, more recent contributions by, e.g., Daniel Little and Petri Ylikoski, seem to be loosening that link and develop a more sophisticated account. In this paper, we review the impact of the social mechanisms approach on methodological individualism and draw conclusions regarding the individualism/holism debate, severing the link between the social mechanisms approach and individualism. Four steps will be taken: (a) there are more than two levels of social explanation; (b) levels of explanation are perspectival, neither absolute, nor unique; (c) seeking microfoundations has value, but so has seeking macrofoundations; (d) there are no general preference rules with respect to the level of social explanations. In conclusion, the answer to the title question is that the social mechanisms approach does not strengthen the case for methodological individualism.
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Notes
Also in the latest programmatic paper by analytical sociologists Keuschnigg et al. (2018), this conviction is being reiterated: “Only by considering the individuals that are part of the collectivity, the relations between them, and their activities, can we explain the collective outcomes we observe” (ibid., 2).
An alternative characterization of the microfoundations requirement stipulates “that all social facts, social structures, and social causal properties depend ultimately on facts about individuals within socially defined circumstances. Social ascriptions require microfoundations at the level of individuals in concrete social relationships” (Little 2012, 138).
An anonymous reviewer questioned whether point (a) would not be included in point (b). Let me emphasize that point (a) deals with the question of what the minimal conditions are to speak of a satisfactory explanation. Point (b) deals with situations in which you might have several satisfactory explanations and decide which one is the better/best one.
Ylikoski (2012) also argues for replacing the idea of levels by scales, an interesting idea I will not discuss here.
Economist Paul Krugman (2013) advocates seeking macrofoundations and writes: “Macro is what makes micro work, to the extent that it does.”
This is in line with our earlier paper on explanatory power, where we write in the conclusion: “The explanatory power of a causal explanation has to be judged by taking the type of question […] and the context into account, what implies that there is not one criterion or desideratum on the basis of which the assessment of explanatory power of all explanations can be done” (Weber and Van Bouwel 2007, 118). As the reader might notice, I only discuss three out of the five dimensions of explanatory power analysed by Ylikoski and Kuorikoski (2010), the reason being that adding a discussion of the two other dimensions will not change the conclusion here.
As we have already mentioned above, for Ylikoski, the micro is not some predetermined level like intentional actions of individuals, it might just as well be a nation-state (as micro) vis-à-vis the global interstate system (as macro).
Ylikoski does refer to Wendt, but does not discuss Wendt’s examples, he only mentions in a footnote that Wendt’s “discussion is very confused”.
While elaborating this example, I came across a Financial Times article (Klein 2015) elaborating how Luxembourg “has been commercializing its own sovereignty”. It is suggested in the article that the sovereignty of Luxembourg could easily be taken away or compromised by neighboring countries, thus by actions of other countries as actors of change, not Luxembourg’s bottom-up mechanisms.
I am again using the term “microfoundations” here. Even though it might not have the same meaning here as it has in my discussion of Little’s work, I do see symmetries in that the foundations for certain explanations are being looked for on the micro level.
“Requirement” might not be the best label for what goes on in Ylikoski’s account of constitutive explanation. However, as I wrote above, I do see symmetries with Little’s account in the urge of having to look for foundations at the micro level, therefore I use the same label for both here.
However, the individualism remains prominent. Note also that, e.g., Demeulenaere in his introduction to Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms writes that methodological individualism “can be expressed very simply: Social life exists only by virtue of actors who live it; Consequently a social fact of any kind must be explained by direct reference to the actions of its constituents” (Demeulenaere 2011, 3–4). It is striking that Demeulenaere still advocates this position; an ontological fact about composition does not entail explanatory reducibility (also see Van Bouwel 2004).
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The author would like to thank Petri Ylikoski and Daniel Little for discussing their ideas on social mechanisms with him. He is also grateful to Julie Zahle as well as the audience at the Fifth Biennial Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA 2015) for questions and comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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Van Bouwel, J. Do Mechanism-Based Social Explanations Make a Case for Methodological Individualism?. J Gen Philos Sci 50, 263–282 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-019-09446-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-019-09446-w